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Summary
Poverty within forests is often acknowledged but poorly assessed through economic evi-
dence. To some extent, this lack of evidence explains why even if forest conservation has
positive effects on households’ welfare, such benefits are quite limited. This thesis is aimed
at investigating in three steps how forest conservation can help poor forest households to
improve their welfare.
A first chapter deals with assessing poverty of forest households in Bolivia looking at their
asset accumulation and allowing for a poverty trap mechanism that may arise, preventing
households to be better off. The empirical analysis does not find evidence for the exis-
tence of a poverty trap. Households are slowly accumulating assets over time but such
an accumulation does not lead to any improvements in their welfare. Households would
remain persistently poor.
A second chapter focuses on forest households’ labour supply and allocations. Using
primary data I collected in Cameroon, a non-separable agricultural household model is
employed to identify factors influencing household labour supply and allocations into di-
verse activities. The empirical results shows that leisure is an inferior good, households
working more when having greater income. Furthermore, households participating in for-
est activities have higher levels of welfare than households that do not. Increasing prices
of forest resources helps households to improve their welfare.
The last chapter deals with designing payments for forest conservation so as to encourage
forest households to internalise externalities. These payments are theoretically analysed
using a principal-agent game in order to define incentives such that a forest group plants
and conserves a great number of trees. Payments are non-zero when observing such con-
servation levels and equal to zero in all other cases. Doing so creates a virtuous circle on
forest resources. Pro-poor conservation schemes as opposed to non-pro poor, are achiev-
able with lower payments.
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1Introduction
“The forest is the most beautiful [...], a house of jewels.”(Ballard, 1966)
There is a popular tendency towards imagining tropical forests as mysterious preserves
of luxurious wealth, flamboyant biodiversity and natural virginity. While these images
currently persist, they are in conflict with the fact that in reality forests are becoming
profoundly degraded and that within them poverty is widespread. I have always been
concerned by the loss of tropical forest and the consequences for people living within them
and more particularly, the poor.
A wide range of agents, including cattle ranchers, timber logging companies, agro-industrialists
and poorer farmers or indigenous populations, live or operate in forest areas and their ac-
tions increase pressures on forest resources. While the actions of the cattle ranchers, timber
logging companies and agro-industrialists have a greater impact on forest resources, it is
the poorer agents who suffer most, the latter often being engaged in subsistence agricul-
ture and extraction of forest resources (Byron and Arnold, 1999, Angelsen and Wunder,
2003). Though constituting a major part of the poor’s livelihoods both in terms of con-
sumption and income, such activities are generally characterised merely as safety nets
and last-resort mechanisms that do not help households to get better off (Angelsen and
Wunder, 2003). In actual fact, the loss of the resources upon which these activities rely,
2through the actions of the poor but also more importantly through the actions of other
agents, have great negative effects on poor households’ welfare.
In addition, considering that forest resources host several sub-ecosystems, losses and degra-
dations of forests contribute to a decrease in water quality and quantity, loss of animals
and fish, more frequent floods or droughts,... Such negative environmental consequences
have greater negative impacts on poorer households for whom health, security and food
depend on their environment (UNEP, 2004). Overall, it is generally acknowledged that
forest degradations and poverty have tight linkages such that an increase in forest degrada-
tions increases poverty pressures on forest households which in turn feed back to increase
pressures on forest (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003).
Such an argument is put forward by the Center for International Forestry Research
(CIFOR). A world-leading research agency, CIFOR maintains a dominant position with
respect to international research on forest uses and population, and lately has implemented
a research project “Poverty Environment Network” (PEN) in order to collect quantitative
and qualitative data necessary to assessing the links between poor forest households and
forest (CIFOR, 2003, CIFOR, 2007). However, so far, results from the PEN are limited
to the most general knowledge of forest households’ living conditions. CIFOR and its
scientists report that poor forest households depend even more than other households
on forest resources but that to a certain extent, poor forest households could alleviate
poverty pressures through modifying their uses of forest resources and adopting activities
including the provision of environmental services. CIFOR reckons that policy and forestry
management reforms should be targeted towards decentralisation and the delegation of
power over forest resources to forest communities in order to permit them to reap greater
benefits.
However, CIFOR fails both to provide a full assessment of forest households’ welfare that
utilises rigorous economic tools and to explain what are the factors contributing to house-
3holds’ poverty and what are the benefits gained from using forest resources. Arnold and
Townson (1998), Byron and Arnold (1999) and Coomes et al. (2004) have provided further
evidence on how poor forest households depend upon forest resources for their livelihoods.
Discussing this in terms of economic reliance upon such resources according to levels of
income or assets, they affirm that poorer households with low levels of income or assets
have a greater share of their income from forests than wealthier households. However,
while providing some clarifications about forest households’ livelihoods, these studies do
not give a thoroughly detailed assessment of households’ welfare and how it changes over
time.
Such household assessment is often performed at a wider level, i.e. national or sub-national
(Sunderlin et al., 2007), or on other types of populations such as agro-pastoralist herders
in Ethiopia or Kenya (Lybbert et al., 2004, Carter and Barrett, 2006), or rice cultivators in
Madagascar (Carter and Barrett, 2006). These studies, while not focusing on forest house-
holds, are interesting in the sense that they present a theoretical framework from within
which one can investigate forest households’ poverty and what are its dynamics. Gener-
ally, such studies analyse the manner in which household asset holdings define household
poverty, rejecting monetary measures of poverty in favour of affirming that such measures
are too volatile and subject to too many measurement errors to give an appropriate as-
sessment of poverty over time (Klasen, 2000, McKay and Lawson, 2003). With respect
to forest households, asset data are better able to capture the wide range of livelihoods
implemented by households. Because they are more easily observable than consumption,
assets are more easily measurable. As a consequence, asset data are more appropriate
generating a consistent narrative of households’ poverty both at one point in time and
over several periods, and to identifying whether households are able to accumulate assets
and to escape poverty or not.
A second means by which to assess forest households’ poverty status, given the assets
4and opportunities they can access, is to analyse households’ activities. Forest households
are generally engaged in agriculture, NTFP extraction including hunting and fishing, and
wage or self-employed activities (Byron and Arnold, 1999). Households may combine var-
ious activities, generating their income through several sources depending their assets,
capacities and opportunities. However, it is observed that forest households are especially
likely to diversify their labour into NTFP extraction in times of shortage in agricultural
production so as to guarantee additional food resources or generate extra income. Further
studies explain that households engage in NTFP extraction in response to other shocks,
e.g. health shocks (Arnold and Townson, 1998, Byron and Arnold, 1999, Angelsen and
Wunder, 2003).
Both household characteristics and market factors encourage households to extract forest
products and to allocate their labour to diverse activities (Cooke, 1998, Fisher et al., 2005,
Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor, 2008, Sikei et al., 2009). Earlier studies affirm that due to a
lack of off-farm opportunities, poorer forest households are more dependent upon forest
resources and that increasing returns in forest-related activities encourages households to
spend more time in these activities.
Unfortunately, these earlier studies have failed to explain how participating in different
activities affects households’ welfare. Assessing the effect of labour on households’ welfare
consists in determining how leisure and consumption respond to changes in income and
wages (Singh et al., 1986). Since forest households are restricted in their ability to sell
their labour, wage activities being limited, their decisions regarding allocations of labour
and other inputs to home-production are made simultaneously to decisions concerning con-
sumption. Changes in prices or technology have impacts on production function, labour
supply and households’ consumption.
With such a model, diversified activities have several impacts on consumption and leisure.
Participating in forest-related activities can improve households’ welfare through consump-
5tion or leisure, and higher prices of NTFPs should have positive effects on households’
welfare. Therefore, if households are able to develop forest conservation activities, which,
by improving the quality of forest resources, increase the prices of such resources, the
increase in welfare through the extraction of NTFPs is even higher. In addition to provid-
ing higher returns in forest-related activities, the latter have numerous benefits for forest
households’ welfare. Indeed, conserving forests improves agricultural outputs through
better soil quality, a decrease in the occurrence of floods or fewer losses of crops due to
animals. In addition to these local benefits on poor forest households, there exist global
benefits motivating the development of several forest conservation initiatives.
Recently, Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have been initiated wherein con-
sumers of an environmental service (ES) pay forest users directly for adopting more sus-
tainable practices in order to provide an ES (Wunder, 2005). Using market-based mecha-
nisms, such payments have been designed to internalise the externalities created by land
users when deciding their production process. Widely developed in Latin America and
more particularly in Costa Rica, these payments focus on the provision and restoration
of four environmental services: biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, landscape
beauty and carbon sequestration.
When providing the latter, these PES seek recognition under the Kyoto Protocol as Clean
Development Mechanisms (CDMs). Such mechanisms consist in allowing an investor to
buy Carbon Tradable Offsets (CTOs) generated through afforestation and reforestation
programmes in developing countries, only if these credits represent verifiable changes in
carbon stocks (United Nations, 1998). In the majority of cases, communities fail to create
valid carbon projects due to a lack of financial means and because they are unsuccessful
in creating additional carbon sinks through reforestation and afforestation. Furthermore,
if a developing country is successful in creating such a carbon projejct, it seems clear that
6better off communities are more able to participate, though increases in income through
these CDMs are quite small, while poorer communities are unlikely to reap any benefits
from these mechanisms (Brown et al., 2004). The primary challenge faced by develop-
ing countries in receiving the accreditation consists in proving that CTOs have created
additional carbon sinks that would have been impossible in the absence of reforestation
initiatives.
Reacting to this and so as to relax the requirement that carbon offsets must be created
through reforestation and afforestation practices, the Reduced Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradations (REDD) programme promotes the creation of carbon credits
from avoided deforestation practices. These latter are assumed to be more easily imple-
mentable by developing countries and poorer forest communities, the latter either receiving
aid money from developed countries to stop forest clearance or selling carbon offsets to
developing countries when they have conserved forests in order to store carbon (Griffiths,
2007).
Overall, these payments and initiatives have been successful in improving the conditions
of forest resources, which, indirectly, has positive effects on poor forest households’ welfare
(Pagiola, 2006). However, since these payments and policies are not designed to tackle
poverty, in some cases poorer households have suffered. Impediments to participation
in these programmes for the poor include both the stringency of eligibility requirements
and high participation costs. And in addition of being unable to participate within these
schemes, poor forest households often end up being excluded from using the resources (Mi-
randa et al., 2003, Pagiola, 2008). Such schemes and policies, being implemented without
popular consultation on accessibility and uses of forest resources, regularly degrade poorer
household welfare and fail to provide incentives to protect forest areas.
As a consequence, assessing forest households’ poverty status, livelihoods and heterogene-
ity, and determining the crucial role of households’ asset holdings and activities are a
7pre-requisite to developing forest conservation policies that are efficient and encourage the
participation of forest households (Coomes et al., 2004).
Assessing households’ livelihoods and welfare and determining a means of successfully
encouraging poor forest households to participate in forest conservation are the main ob-
jectives of my thesis. Such objectives are aimed at answering the following question: “How
can forest conservation help poor forest households to improve their welfare?”
Answering such a broad question involves three steps. In the first step, household welfare
is studied through asset holdings in order to determine how important are assets for forest
households and whether these assets are being accumulated or not. The second step is
an investigation into how forest households combine forest-related activities with other
activities and whether participating in the former can improve household welfare or not,
so as to highlight if households have incentives to improve forest resources. The third
step consists in defining incentives for forest users to conserve forest resources and areas
according to their efforts and intrinsic characteristics such as disutility, forest resources
prior conservation and poverty.
Chapter one investigates the importance of assets for the Tsimane’, an indigenous forest
population living in the Bolivian Amazon. According to the literature on household liveli-
hood, since assets are a means households can use to generate their income, determining
what are the assets they hold and how they diversified such assets is an appropriate way
of measuring household welfare. In this chapter, I investigate households’ accumulation
of assets. I also test for an asset-based poverty trap, such a test consisting in determining
whether households accumulate assets and escape poverty over time or are ensnared into
low levels of development without any prospect of escape (Carter and Barrett, 2006).
Developed for studying asset accumulation by agro-pastoralist herders, this poverty trap
8model is here applied to the Tsimane’, who, contrary to herders, rely on a wide range
of assets to generate their livelihood. The data used are the Tsimane’ Amazonian Panel
Study, collected yearly between 2002 and 2006. An asset index encompassing a wide range
of assets is defined and employed to investigate assets accumulation using parametric, non-
parametric and semi-parametric regressions. Regressions show that there is no evidence of
a poverty trap; households are increasing their levels of asset holdings. But, small initial
levels of assets and slow growth in the asset accumulation process allow me to conclude
that households are more likely to converge towards a low equilibrium and to remain poor.
Nonetheless, asset diversification seems a requirement for the Tsimane’, reducing poverty
pressures through the creation of earnings from one or several sources. That said until
now, a small number of Tsimane’ households has managed to reduce poverty pressures and
the large majority of households is more likely to live in persistent poverty than escape it.
Studying asset holdings emphasises the role of activities choices in households’ welfare.
Decisions concerning labour allocations have direct consequences for households’ welfare
and while forest-related activities are often assumed as being used only as safety and cop-
ing mechanism, Chapter two sheds light on the potential role of forest-related activities as
a means to improve household welfare (Cooke, 1998, Fisher et al., 2005, Lo´pez-Feldman
and Taylor, 2008). To investigate such an hypothesis, a household model of production
based on Singh et al. (1986) is estimated using data I collected in February-May 2009 in
thirteen villages in the Province South of Cameroon. Labour supply and labour alloca-
tions are estimated as functions of shadow wages, shadow income and different household
characteristics. Endogeneity problems occur in most estimations and are controlled for
using appropriate and relevant instrumental variables. Welfare analysis is derived from all
empirical results and linked to the theoretical model and the descriptive analysis.
Poorer households are more dependent upon NTFP extraction than wealthier households
9but on average, all households engaged in NTFP extraction appear to be better off than
households not engaged in such activities. Labour supply estimations report that house-
holds’ marginal shadow wage and income have respectively positive and negative effects
on leisure; leisure is an inferior good. According to labour allocations estimations, al-
though households are likely to work more in agriculture and off-farm activities following
an increase in agricultural earnings, an increase in NTFP earnings does not affect their
labour allocations to NTFP activities. However, an increase in NTFP prices has a net
positive effect on household consumption and an indeterminate effect on leisure. It seems
quite likely that the effects on consumption outweigh any effects on leisure and that overall
households are better off. As a consequence, improving forest management and encour-
aging households to participate in forest conservation would increase the price of NTFPs
leading to improvements in forest households’ welfare through better prices of forest re-
sources and indirect effects linked to forest conservation.
Since forest-related activities can improve household welfare, households have a direct in-
centive to protect forest resources. Additional incentives may be provided to encourage
households to conserve forests and to make them benefit directly from forest conservation.
Inspired by PES case studies, a direct forest conservation payment scheme is theoretically
analysed in Chapter three. This theoretical model includes a forest group in charge of
providing an environmental service bought by an international non-governmental organi-
sation (NGO) whose utility increases with levels of forest conserved and replanted. Both
stakeholders have opposed utility functions; the NGO wants the forest group to spend as
much time and investment as possible to conserve a high level of trees at a least cost while
the forest group wants to spend as little time and investment as possible in this conserva-
tion scheme, while earning more. Opposed utility functions associated with the incapacity
of the NGO to monitor the forest group’s actions justify the use of a principal-agent game
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(Laffont and Martimort, 2002). The NGO needs to create a contract such that the forest
group exerts a high effort in order to get a high number of trees conserved and replanted
while minimising ES buyer’s cost.
According to this model, the incentive contract is such that to have the agent performing
a high effort in forest conservation, the buyer should offer a non-zero payment when the
output is high and payments equal to zero in all other cases. When the supplier becomes
risk-averse, the payment associated with a high level of trees planted and conserved in-
creases since the buyer has to bear part of the risk. Over several periods, if the agent
always exerts the high effort, the payments linked to a high level of trees planted and
conserved are greater than if the principal observes such an outcome in one of the two
periods.
If the NGO wants to contract with poor or highly-degraded forest groups as opposed to
wealthier or better-preserved forest groups, she may offer lower payments. The NGO de-
fines a fine so as to reduce forest groups’ benefits from leakage when leakage results from
increased facilities for adopting more degrading techniques as a result from higher pay-
ments. To increase the benefits for non-participants in the scheme, the NGO can either
promote the development of local infrastructures or encourage the forest group to hire
poor non-participants in the group to conserve forests.
Payments may appear unfair since the forest group is paid only if a high level of trees is
planted and conserved, but with such incentives, the NGO is sure to pay only the forest
groups that have dedicated a large amount of time and investment in this conservation
activity. Only as such a programme has created additionality since the forest group would
not have conserved forest resources otherwise.
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Chapter 1
Poverty trap or welfare
improvements for the Tsimane’
indigenous population in the
Amazon?
Forest people depend upon forest resources to fulfil their basic needs but also on a wide
range of assets that may allow them to implement forest-related or non-forest related
activities. Unfortunately, little is known about forest households in terms of how diversified
their assets are and what are the impacts of asset diversification on their welfare. This
chapter provides evidence on this subject highlighting the importance of assets in order
to determine forest people’s welfare through asset accumulation in relation to different
livelihood strategies. An asset-based poverty trap as developed by Carter and Barrett
(2006) is tested to identify whether forest people are accumulating assets and reaching
higher levels of welfare or not. This model has been originally tested for agro-pastoralist
herders looking at the accumulation of a single asset. In this chapter, the model is applied
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to the Tsimane’ living in the Bolivian Amazon using data from the Tsimane’ Amazonian
Panel Study, collected yearly between 2002 and 2006. The present test considers a wide
range of assets aggregated in an asset index and the test is developed looking at the
accumulation of assets using parametric, nonparametric and semiparametric regressions.
The results contradict some earlier findings; there is no evidence of a poverty trap and
the households are increasing their levels of asset holdings. Asset diversification seems
important for the Tsimane’ to reduce poverty pressures through the creation of earnings
from one or several sources. To date only very few Tsimane’ households have managed
to reduce poverty pressures and the large majority of households is more likely to live in
persistent poverty than to escape it.
1.1 Introduction
Forest people, living near or within forests are strongly dependent upon forest resources to
fulfil their basic needs and to develop different forest-related activities. Their livelihoods
consist of a variety of activities ranging from forest-product activities, such as timber and
non-timber forest product (NTFP) activities, e.g. hunting, fruit extraction and palm col-
lection, to agriculture and wage activities (Arnold and Townson, 1998, Byron and Arnold,
1999, Wunder, 2001, Coomes et al., 2004, Sunderlin et al., 2005). All these activities
can be used within different livelihood strategies and these activities depend upon the as-
sets households own; households with different types of assets develop different livelihood
strategies, which influences their welfare (Ellis, 2001). However little is known about the
importance of assets for forest people’s welfare. Previous assessments of forest people’s
welfare have focused on income and on household dwellings decomposing households ac-
cording their holdings of assets and their different livelihood strategies (Perz, 2005).
The contribution of this chapter is to provide further evidence on the importance of assets
for forest people’s livelihoods. Such an assessment is performed examining asset accumu-
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lation in relation to the different livelihood strategies forest people can implement and
testing for an asset-based poverty trap as developed by Carter and Barrett (2006). This
test determines whether forest people are accumulating assets to reach higher levels of wel-
fare or whether households have low levels of asset holdings that keep them in a poverty
trap without any prospect of escape.
This poverty trap model was originally developed for the purpose of identifying whether
asset accumulations by agro-pastoralist herders in Kenya or Ethiopia appeared to be fol-
lowing a non-linear non-convex process with multiple equilibria, which would draw an
S-shaped curve explaining that some households are caught into poverty (Lybbert et al.,
2004, Carter and Barrett, 2007, Barrett, 2007). These earlier studies look at livestock
accumulation and find that there exists a threshold below which herder households are
trapped in poverty without any means to escape it; herder households without a great
number of livestock are not able to accumulate assets that would allow them to reach
higher levels of welfare.
This chapter applies the same test but drawing attention to the Tsimane’, an indigenous
population in the Bolivian Amazon that presents a number of characteristics corresponding
to a poverty trap situation such as low levels of development, of education, of consumption
and earnings. They are marginalised forest households and are poor even when compared
to Bolivian society. Their livelihood relies mainly on agriculture and forest resources, and
recently they have increased interactions with the market economy.
The data used to run this test are panel data collected yearly by the Tsimane’ Amazo-
nian Panel Study between 2002 and 2006. Bolivian and US researchers have surveyed
332 households each year looking at several economic characteristics of this population as
well as their health and psychological status in order to assess the impact of an increasing
market economy on the indigenous well-being. These quantitative data have been com-
pleted by qualitative data that I collected in June-July 2008 in order to observe the living
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conditions of the Tsimane’, their different economic activities and the organisation of their
communities.
Contrary to earlier tests by Lybbert et al. (2004) and Carter and Barrett (2006), the
poverty trap test is designed to look at asset accumulation of a wide range of assets. This
test requires prior construction of an asset index as a way to aggregate assets. Asset
accumulation dynamics are then estimated using parametric, nonparametric and semi-
parametric regressions.
All these different regressions show neither non-linearities nor non-convexities in the asset
accumulation process; there exists no threshold below which a household should be trapped
into poverty. According to these regressions, the Tsimane’ households are accumulating
assets and could reach a higher equilibrium in the future. I investigate the existence of
a high-return strategy and a possible higher equilibrium but I am unable to find such an
equilibrium within the data. Few households are in what could be a high-return strategy.
Most of the households are in a low-return strategy with holdings of assets way below the
equilibrium that may correspond to the lower equilibrium. Poverty seems to persist and
only external interventions could allow them to escape poverty.
The chapter presents in section 1.2 the literature on the poverty trap mechanism as Carter
and Barrett (2006) derive it from a macroeconomic context in order to apply to house-
holds, and the earlier evidence of the existence of poverty trap. In section 1.3 a detailed
description of the Tsimane’ households and of their livelihoods is undertaken using both
quantitative and qualitative data. Section 1.4 reports how an asset index is constructed
for the Tsimane’ households and compares households’ asset holdings to an intuitive asset
poverty line so as to explain households’ poverty status and dynamics. In section 1.5,
the poverty trap tests using different regressions are estimated and following these tests,
section 1.6 discusses the implications of failing to discover an S-shaped curve. The final
section 1.7 concludes and sheds light on some further research and policy implications
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linked to the Tsimane’.
1.2 Poverty traps at macro and micro levels: description
and evidence
A poverty trap arises when an agent (region, country, households...) is caught into low
levels of economic development without any prospect of escaping those levels; it can for-
mally be defined as “self-reinforcing mechanisms that act as barriers to the adoption of
more productive techniques and so cause poverty to persist” (Azariadis and Stachurski,
2004, Barrett, 2007).
The literature on the poverty trap mechanism shows that this can be observed at a macro
and a micro level. First presenting the macro level as conceptual basis of the micro level,
I focus on the latter to analyse its implementation and resulting shape, to describe the
different exclusionary mechanisms that account for such a shape and to present the exist-
ing empirical evidence.
1.2.1 Roots and hypotheses of the model
Growth at the macro level is explained by investments in physical or human capital. Stan-
dard models of economic growth predict that because marginal returns decrease monoton-
ically, countries starting with lower levels of capital should have higher returns, and as a
result should converge towards a steady state situation. If all parameters have the same
value, a poorer country will catch up with a wealthier country and have the same income
level; if parameters other than technological change differ, convergence will occur but in
the growth rates instead of income levels.
These models assume that all differentials in income levels or at least growth rates would
16
be overcome in the long run and that persistent divergences must be due to exogenous
factors such as religion, culture...(Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, Azariadis and Stachurski,
2004). Such a conclusion though relies on certain assumptions including the completeness
of markets, free entry and exit on these markets, relatively low transaction costs, convex-
ity of technology at an efficient scale relative to the size of the markets and diminishing
returns to capital, which do not correspond to reality in poorer countries. This raises
doubts on how accurate standard models are (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004).
In poorer countries, increasing returns to scale may be important when development and
industrialisation are based on the adoption of modern technologies which often have a
fixed cost and require higher level of skills. Poorer countries are not able to adopt such
technologies as they have neither the means to face the fixed cost nor the initial capaci-
ties and skills to use them. Also, the underdevelopment of insurance and credit markets
in poorer countries constrains agents into adopting inefficient production processes that
generate earnings with lower variation but also lower mean values, which could maintain
these countries into poverty (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004).
As a result, poorer countries are unable to make such an investment and cannot catch
up with wealthier countries. The assumed convexity of technologies is violated and with
increasing returns to scale, returns to investment increase over part of the range impeding
the convergence in growth rates and maintaining in poorer countries lower levels of income
(Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004).
Looking at different aspects of poverty traps, Sachs et al. (2004) explain that sub-Saharan
African countries are caught in poverty from which they are unable to escape; negative
savings rate, low capital stock, high demographic growth and poor governance explain
persistent poverty and the existence of poverty trap that justifies the need of external
assistance to push countries out of this low equilibrium.
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Microeconomic models of growth exhibit the same type of limits when explaining the
different levels of economic development between agents. Increasing returns to scale and
other externalities can be identified at a micro level (Burgess and Venables, 2004). The
poverty trap model developed in the microeconomic literature is intended to analyse the
shape of the asset accumulation process and to determine whether there is the threshold,
where it is located.
1.2.2 Asset-based poverty trap mechanism
Many models have been designed at the microeconomic level to explain why certain in-
dividuals or households are ensnared in low levels of economic development while others
seem to enjoy greater levels of welfare. Some underline the importance of institutions, kin
systems and history in the development of multiple equilibria, while others focus on the
lack of insurance and the nature of the risks individuals face (Bowles et al., 2006).
Jalan and Ravaillon (2001) use income and consumption dynamics in order to assess house-
hold welfare, but limits of these monetary measures of welfare including seasonality, high
volatility and valuation of home-consumption or non-wage activities especially in a forest
context justify the use of assets which are supposed to be less volatile, more easily observ-
able and giving a more accurate measure of welfare (Sahn and Stifel, 2003, Gunther and
Klasen, 2007, Moser and Felton, 2007).
I then have chosen to focus on assets which are expected to better reflect the heterogeneity
of the livelihoods of the forest households. Furthermore, assets being the source of future
earnings, their accumulation should enable households to reach higher levels of well-being
(McKay and Lawson, 2003, Coomes et al., 2004, Naschold, 2005). In order to assess house-
hold welfare, I estimate asset accumulation testing for the existence of a poverty trap using
a Carter and Barrett’s model of poverty trap (Carter and Barrett, 2006).
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Presentation and shape of a poverty trap mechanism
The following analysis of the poverty trap mechanism bases itself on the literature of Carter
and Barrett who test such a mechanism in agrarian societies (Carter and Barrett, 2006).
In their approach and model (figure 1.1), Carter and Barrett consider that a household
chooses to allocate its assets to one of two distinct strategies. A household with a low level
of asset holdings A?L chooses to use its assets within a low-return strategy L1 yielding to
a low level of well-being U?L while a wealthier household chooses to use its assets A
?
H in a
higher-return strategy L2 leading to a higher level of welfare U?H . Both asset allocations
lead to locally stable equilibria with non-increasing marginal returns.
The level of asset holdings referring to an income poverty line UP corresponds to a static
asset poverty line A that can be used to distinguish stochastic or structural poverty (Carter
and May, 2001). A household whose level of income is below an income poverty line but
whose level of assets is above the asset poverty line is stochastically poor while a household
whose both assets and income are below their respective poverty line is structurally poor.
In this case, a household can remain persistently poor since low levels of assets impede
it any increase in its income that may take it beyond the poverty line. On the contrary,
a stochastically poor household with higher levels of assets can escape income poverty
through using its assets.
The graph illustrates that there exists an unstable equilibrium A? called in this model a
Micawber threshold which can be thought as a dynamic asset poverty line. Below this
dynamic asset poverty line, a household is poor in terms of consumption and assets; it
cannot start saving and has to sell its assets to fulfill its consumption needs. The lower
part of the graph shows that a household with such a low level of assets will converge
towards the low equilibrium. On the other hand, when a household has reached this
unstable equilibrium A?, it has incentives to reduce its consumption and to start saving
in order to reach a switching point AS . From AS a household can adopt a high return
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strategy. Adopting the high-return strategy, a household will converge towards the stable
high-equilibrium.
Determining this threshold requires an assessment of the asset accumulation process which
is assumed to be non-linear and non-convex due to a range of increasing returns. In
the recursion diagram in the lower chart, a household whose assets are below the low
equilibrium A?L will accumulate assets and converge towards this equilibrium over time
and a household with assets below A? will not accumulate assets and as over time assets
decrease, it will also converge towards the low equilibrium. On the contrary, a household
with assets above the Micawber threshold increase its assets over time and will converge
towards the high equilibrium A?H .
Evidence of the Micawber threshold is crucial to prove the existence of a poverty trap.
Below this threshold, a household with less investible surplus and depressed marginal
incentives to save is caught in a poverty trap while from this threshold, a household
rationally starts accumulating assets through an autarkic accumulation strategy and can
escape poverty (Carter and Barrett, 2006). As a consequence, testing for a poverty trap
involves finding an S-shaped relationship between current period’s and next period’s assets
in which the Micawber threshold would simply be the unstable equilibrium where the asset
accumulation bifurcates and so gives rise to the high and low stable equilibria (Carter and
Barrett, 2006).
Exclusionary mechanisms creating non-linearities and non-convexities
The existence of non-linearities and non-convexities leading to multiple equilibria in the
asset accumulation process can be explained by several exclusionary mechanisms: market
imperfections and low level of development of insurance and of credit markets; imperfect
information and low levels of education; and coordination failures. These exclusionary
mechanisms are all quite common in developing countries (Carter and Barrett, 2006, Bar-
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Figure 1.1: Poverty trap mechanism from Carter and Barrett (2006)
rett, 2007).
Markets in developing countries are such that costs associated with the adoption of more
productive strategies are high and returns on investment are low since to be profitable such
strategies require a minimum size, impeding poorer households to adopt such strategies
(Carter and Barrett, 2006). The benefits of adopting a higher welfare strategy seem insuf-
ficient to overcome the cost and only wealthier households are willing and able to adopt
such strategies (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004, Barrett, 2007). Also, the inefficiency of
financial markets in developing countries leads to increase financial constraints, credit con-
straints and uninsured risks, which restricts the poorer households from switching their
actual subsistence strategy to a higher welfare strategy. In developing countries the lack
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of legal frameworks, effective in enforcing insurance contracts, has been underlined as an
important source of failures in the insurance market (Carter and Barrett, 2006, Barrett,
2007). When shocks are idiosyncratic, poorer households who cannot smooth their con-
sumption, can rely on others to reduce the burden from shocks. However, such a coping
mechanism is quite limited when supportive households are as poor as they are and de
facto unable to provide any insurance (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004, Barrett, 2007,
Barnet et al., 2008). When shocks are covariant, self-insurance, risk mitigation and risk
transfers become inapplicable among households and households rely on external aid to
cope with such shocks (Carter and Barrett, 2006, 2007).
At the macroeconomic level, creation of knowledge has been advanced as an important
feature in the explanation of the divergence in growth rates in the long run (Azariadis and
Stachurski, 2004). Analogously, the existence of imperfect information for the poor creates
barriers to adopting higher welfare strategies and escaping poverty. Low access to informa-
tion, due to low levels of education and relatively homogenous social networks, increases
the cost of adopting a livelihood strategy relying on more complicated and productive
techniques. Moreover poorer households are unable to perfectly predict and observe the
consequences of their actions, and even less to monitor the consequences of the actions
of other agents, making the impacts of such actions observable only in the future (Carter
and Barrett, 2006, Barrett, 2007).
The path-dependent nature of information leads the poor to create norms and institutions
that reflect their available information and that retard the evolutions of these institutions
according to emerging information. Lack of adaptation of these institutions to new infor-
mation and context is a crucial element in explaining why poorer individuals are unable
to implement higher strategy (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004, Barrett, 2007).
There exist coordination failures in developing countries due to the fact that one house-
hold’s actions have an impact on other households’ welfare and also on their behaviour
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(Barrett and Swallow, 2006, Barrett, 2007). If a household knows that its crop can be con-
taminated because of a neighbour’s negligence in controlling crop diseases, this former has
diminished incentives to invest in a higher welfare strategy. Weakness of the institutions
and their incapacity to control, monitor, enforce the law, and to provide public goods, as
well as actual corruption of these institutions are reasons preventing poorer individuals
from implementing higher-earnings strategy (Barrett, 2007, Carter and Barrett, 2006).
Some authors have explained that a poverty trap related to environmental resources can
occur (Baland and Platteau, 1996, Barrett, 2007). Unclear property rights and prominence
of open-access resources wherein agents fail to communicate on the state of the resources,
constitute further barriers to the adoption of higher-earnings strategies and lead to the
existence of multiple equilibria. Wealthier households are better able to secure their land
and to exclude others from their land, encouraging them to adopt higher returns strate-
gies. Poorer households not able to secure their land, are not incentivised to invest in such
strategies.
1.2.3 Previous poverty trap tests and contribution of this research
Empirically, testing for a poverty trap is generally performed using assets and developing
different parametric, nonparametric or semiparametric regressions. Conclusions of these
tests have diverged in the sense that some tests have found evidence for the existence of
a poverty trap mechanism and the Micawber threshold, while the others have not.
Evidence from previous studies
Pioneering study by Lybbert et al. (2004) has found evidence for the existence of a poverty
trap among Ethiopian pastoralists when studying one asset: herd size. There exist non-
convexities in the accumulation of their cattle leading to an S-shaped asset accumulation
curve with two stable equilibria: a low one corresponding to a size herd of one head range,
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and a higher one at herd size of 40-75 head range. Lybbert and co-authors have identified
a Micawber threshold of 15 animals from which the households are able to accumulate
cattle in order to change their way of raising cattle to a more productive one, and over
time they will converge to the higher equilibrium. Below this threshold, households are
not able to accumulate cattle and are likely to lose their cattle and return to the lower
equilibrium.
Barrett and co-authors have provided evidence for the existence of a poverty trap among
Kenyan pastoralists; Northern Kenyan pastoralists with livestock above 5-6 Tropical Live-
stock Units are able to accumulate livestock and will reach in time a higher equilibrium
while the pastoralists with livestock below this bifurcation point will converge to a low
equilibrium (Barrett et al., 2006).
Adato et al. (2006) in South Africa have used an asset index constructed through liveli-
hood weighted regression of four types of assets and they have found an S-shaped curve in
the asset accumulation process. They have discovered that households below a Micawber
threshold equal to twice the poverty line will be captured in low equilibrium with a level
of well-being equal to 90 percent of the poverty line.
Barrett et al. (2006) have not found evidence of an asset-based poverty trap for Malagasy
households. They have acknowledged the existence of persistent poverty using qualita-
tive findings, but when studying the asset accumulation process of an asset index built
following Sahn and Stifel’s methodology (Sahn and Stifel, 2000), they have not found non-
linearities and non-convexities in asset accumulation that could explain a poverty trap.
Using an identically built asset index for rural households in Ethiopia and Pakistan,
Naschold (2005) has not found evidence of a multiple equilibria pattern in the asset accu-
mulation process.
More recently, Quisumbing and Baulch (2009) in Bangladesh and Giesbert and Schindler
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(2010) in Mozambique, using asset indices constructed respectively using Sahn and Stifel
(2000) methodology or a weighted-livelihood regression as in Adato et al. (2006), have not
found evidence of a poverty trap for households in these two countries.
Contribution of my research
Lybbert et al. (2004) as well as Barrett et al. (2006) have tested the model for herders and
pastoralists in both Kenya and Ethiopia, for which both low-return and high-return strate-
gies rely on a single asset: cattle. Because these studied populations rely on one type of
asset to generate their strategies, it is easy to identify the presence of various exclusionary
mechanisms, such as the lack of insurance against the loss of animals from diseases or the
lack of liquidity to buy medicines to take care of the cattle, that will generate an S-shaped
curve in the asset accumulation and multiple equilibria with a Micawber threshold.
My contribution is to thoroughly assess the welfare of households living within or near
forests looking at their assets instead of other measures. Under analysis I determine how
forest households have diversified their livelihood strategies and what are the resulting
consequences on their welfare.
More importantly I provide more evidence on how relevant and accurate is the test for a
poverty trap and I apply this test to forest households which has not been done yet. For-
est households have more diversified livelihoods but remain largely poor and the findings
from the following test provide more insights on the role of assets for household livelihoods.
The forest population for which the test is applied is the Tsimane’ indigenous group living
in the Bolivian Amazon. This group of households appears to have low levels of welfare
even if it seems that they have diversified their assets and livelihood strategies. Further-
more while there exist many anthropological studies about these households, assessment
of their welfare in general and assessment through the analysis of their asset accumulation
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have not yet been done.
1.3 Presentation of the Tsimane”s characteristics and data
Several anthropologists, ethno-biologists and other social science researchers have studied
the Tsimane’ to assess the impact of market on their living standards. Since 1995, a more
systematic data collection has been undertaken and a panel data set using yearly collected
data between 2002 and 2006 has been created. Using this five-wave panel data and my
own qualitative data, I try to assess the Tsimane’ welfare and compare them to an average
Bolivian household.
1.3.1 Presentation of the Tsimane’
The Tsimane’ are a native Amazonian population living in the plains and rainforests of
the department of Beni in Bolivia. The Tsimane’ territory is equal to 1.2 million hectares
and in the last census from the Vice-Ministry of Indigenous Affairs, the Tsimane’ popu-
lation exceeds 8,000 inhabitants in 2004 while they were only 5,000 inhabitants in 1995
(Godoy et al., 2004). Traditionally a semi-nomadic population, they have settled in 100
communities mainly located along the Maniqui and Apere rivers, rarely moving from one
community to another (Godoy and Jacobson, 1999, Reyes-Garc´ıa, 2001, Apaza et al.,
2002). Access to many communities is feasible by road, but some are highly remote and
only connected to other communities by river channels. The Tsimane’ spend their life in
the communities, going to a Tsimane’ school where education takes place not in Span-
ish but in Tsimane’. This limits migration outside the communities. They marry either
within the community or in a neighbouring one, inter-cousin marriages still being the rule
in these communities.
Historically living in autarky, they have multiplied contacts with outside agents since the
beginning of the 19th century, first through gold extraction and now through sales of
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agricultural and non-timber forest products (NTFPs), and through wage work with cattle
ranchers and timber loggers (Godoy and Jacobson, 1999, Reyes-Garc´ıa, 2001, Apaza et al.,
2002).
The closest town to the communities is San Borja where the Tsimane’ may go to sell their
products and buy the goods they need. San Borja has certain health amenities, including
a public hospital, doctors and an evangelist dispensary. In this town, they can also find
schools up to the highest grade before university and transport services to the capital-city
La Paz, to Santa Cruz de la Sierra and several other towns (Godoy et al., 1998, Reyes-
Garc´ıa, 2001).
Agriculture and extraction of timber or NTFPs are important parts of their livelihood.
Through traditional slash-and-burn agriculture, they cultivate rice, maize, cassava and
plantain. Their production process is quite simple: from May to August, they clear a
fallow or old-growth forest plot; in September-October, they set the cleared plot on fire;
in November, before the rainy season they sow rice for the first year. After harvesting
rice, they mix maize, cassava and plantain on the same plot. The cultivation cycle of
these staples lasts only one or two years after which the plot is left in transition for forest
regeneration and they clear another plot. After a normal period of five years the same
plot will be cleared again (Godoy et al., 1998, Vadez et al., 2003, Reyes-Garc´ıa, 2001).
They extract NTFPs such as firewood, bamboo, a thatch palm called jatata and medic-
inal plants they consume. Recent development programmes have promoted extractions
and trade of jatata not only in San Borja but Santa Cruz de la Sierra. They trade only
high-value timber since timber logging requires authorisations and capital that a minority
of households can afford. Hunting and fishing are their main sources of protein but loss of
game and increased contacts with the outside world have encouraged them to raise chicken
and pigs as alternative sources (Vadez et al., 2003, Reyes-Garc´ıa, 2001).
As said above, the Tsimane’ trade and barter their agricultural and forest products in San
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Borja, but more importantly with traders traveling the communities bringing with them
durable, manufactured and consumption goods the Tsimane’ cannot produce, e.g. clothes,
radios, batteries, tools, alcohol and sugar (Apaza et al., 2002, Reyes-Garc´ıa, 2001, Godoy
et al., 2008).
In the last decade, the Tsimane’ villages have been profoundly affected by floods; in 2006,
severe rainfalls and floods destroyed the majority of their agricultural cultivations. Inter-
national non-governmental organisations such as the Belgian Red Cross intervened in the
communities to help them, providing buckets for collection and treatment of water and
the storage of food, or mosquito nets to prevent insect-borne diseases.
Missionaries have had an important role in modifying social organisation within and be-
tween the communities. Besides unsuccessful attempts to evangelize them, their main
contribution has been to introduce monolingual and bilingual schools in Tsimane’ and
Spanish, to build and maintain dispensaries within the communities and to set up a radio
channel allowing the Tsimane’ communities to communicate among themselves. This ra-
dio channel has assisted in promoting awareness of future market fairs and of technological
changes (Reyes-Garc´ıa, 2001).
To these external influences, the Tsimane’ have adapted certain aspects of their way of
life, but none more so than that of their community organisation. Becoming more and
more sedentary has led to a manifest change in the composition of the communities in two
particular ways. Firstly, from small communities in which the households were related by
blood, they have developed larger communities composed of three to eight related fami-
lies. Secondly, there has been a transfer of authority in the village from the shaman to an
elected corregidor with essential connections in the market economy (Reyes-Garc´ıa, 2001).
These external forces have also served to increase the frequency of conflicts between the
Tsimane’ and outside agents.
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1.3.2 Two sources of data: quantitative and qualitative data
Quantitative data: TAPS 2002-2006
Since 1995, the TAPS (Tsimane’ Amazonian Panel Study) has gathered data on the Tsi-
mane’ to analyse the evolution of different welfare indicators. The final panel data avail-
able only encompasses five years (2002 to 2006) as the first seven years of the surveys were
taken up by the need to “identify communities, win the trust of the villagers, train local
researchers, build logistical infrastructure, and refine methods of data collection” (Leonard
and Godoy, 2008).
Out of the 100 Tsimane’ communities in Beni, the panel data survey focuses on 13 villages
located at different distances from the main town of San Borja, and while some of these are
located along the Maniqui river, others are only accessible by roads. The data available
through the panel covers around 332 households, comprising nearly 1,985 individuals who
have been interviewed every year since 2002. The following table (table 1.1) gives the
number of households interviewed in each community.
Absence of changes in the size of the sample reports low levels of attrition; people are not
Table 1.1: Sample size from 2002 to 2006
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Villages
Ind. Hhold Ind. Hhold Ind. Hhold Ind. Hhold Ind. Hhold
San Antonio 142 26 140 24 143 23 134 23 143 23
Yaranda 152 27 155 28 157 27 173 29 168 28
Alta Gracia 147 24 145 24 125 19 135 18 111 17
Arenales 85 15 83 14 92 15 97 15 116 19
Campo Bello 140 23 131 22 132 20 141 21 147 23
Cara Cara 91 16 87 19 62 11 35 7 33 8
La Pampita 76 13 49 10 72 12 84 14 91 15
Maraca 68 12 73 12 59 11 54 10 82 13
Puerto Mendez 93 14 95 14 95 14 102 15 103 16
Puerto Yucumo 141 23 145 22 165 24 176 25 186 29
San Ramon 49 8 42 7 53 9 64 11 63 12
Santa Maria 157 24 142 21 159 27 184 32 157 27
Uvasichi 118 21 96 17 135 24 147 24 148 25
Total 1459 246 1383 234 1449 236 1526 244 1548 255
mobile and stay in the area. When absent during the survey, the household is interviewed
later upon returning to the research area (Apaza et al., 2002, Leonard and Godoy, 2008).
To fulfil their goals with respect to the market economy on the Tsimane’ well-being, the
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research team has collected different data on demography, agriculture, income, consump-
tion and expenditures, the shocks they faced as well as their psychological status. TAPS
researchers’ aim is to construct a series of welfare indicators dealing with the economic
status of the Tsimane’ households, how they are socially integrated, their psychological
status, their biological and health situation and their human capital holdings (Leonard
and Godoy, 2008).
The economic data gathered are well developed; they encompass measures of the Tsimane’
income according to different sources such as wage, sales, barter and remittances. For the
wage earnings, the researchers have sought to ascertain the number of days worked in each
type of wage labour and who was the contractor. They have collected food and non-food
consumption data as well as asset data at the household level asking question about quan-
tities and expenses. With the asset data, the TAPS team has created three aggregates:
animal wealth, encompassing the different animals possessed by the household; traditional
wealth, being the assets the household can fabricate; and modern wealth, manufactured
goods the household has to buy (Leonard and Godoy, 2008).
When first analysing the data, consumption data presented certain problems; consump-
tions of staples (rice, cassava, plantain and maize) reported in local units, e.g. mancornas,
arrobas1 or regimes, were valued with village buying prices per kilograms, and I have made
sure to correct these errors. Missing prices of birds, chick peas, chicken, pork or duck, in
2002 and 2003, forced me to construct a price based on the ratio of consumption in value
on quantities consumed in 2006. I valued consumption of these goods in each year with
the 2006 prices. When constructing deflated food aggregates, I kept the values of these 5
products at their 2006 prices and deflated values of goods for which I have prices in all
waves to 2006 prices using a consumer price index.2 Doing so has allowed me to construct
1Local unit and 6 mancornas=1 arroba = 11.5kg
2Construction of the index is presented in appendix of this chapter.
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comparable food aggregates deflated to 2006 prices in all five waves.
With respect to income data, the latter income data are too aggregated and there are
missing observations in 2002, 2003 and 2004 concerning remittances, meaning that total
earnings are not composed of the same earnings in all five waves.
Beside these technicalities and specificities of the data, the short period of recollection
even if always more appropriate since giving more accurate data, generates high volatility
in the consumption pattern and data may not be representative in a longer period. In
the income data, there exists high seasonality; since the data were collected throughout
the clearing season which requires households to use their labour mainly for this task,
non-agricultural wage earnings may be underestimated. As a consequence, volatility in
consumption or income can be a significant problem when measuring poverty and can lead
to an overestimation of transient poverty (McKay and Lawson, 2003, Gunther and Klasen,
2007).
Asset data are likely to be less volatile than consumption or income; using asset data to
assess Tsimane’ welfare may be an easier and more reliable option. During the interview,
the enumerator may easily observe whether or not the household possesses the assets men-
tioned.
Finally, TAPS data are also limited in terms of time use. Knowing time use would have
been relevant to the qualification of household livelihood diversification. TAPS data also
omit the overall size of fields and land holdings providing only the area cleared. Some
data on gifts and educational levels are only reported for the last three waves of the panel.
Qualitative data
In addition to these quantitative data, I undertook a qualitative survey with the object of
learning how the Tsimane’ use the forest and its resources, to understand what motivates
their participation, or lack of, in wage activities, to appreciate how they insure themselves
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against future shocks and finally to learn how organised they are both within the commu-
nity and in their interactions with non-indigenous communities.
My fieldwork took place in June-July 2008; during five weeks, I went to 19 villages to
run interviews with three or four households in each village and to observe households’
differences and similarities. Most villages I went to were accessible by motorbike, and a
minority accessible by canoe. On average, the time needed to reach most of them varied
from half an hour up to an hour or so. Of those surveyed, three villages were not in the
TAPS panel data, although these three were interesting cases since timber logging com-
panies were stationed in their communities and offered them some job opportunities.
I was accompanied by a translator who worked frequently with TAPS researchers and was
known by all the Tsimane’ we interviewed. The interviews lasted up to half-an-hour and
were either run individually, with several members of the household, or more collectively
with members of different households.
Generally I interviewed the male head of the household in his house as men participate to
a greater degree in wage activities than women. When male heads were away, I attempted
to question their wives but most of these interviews were unsuccessful; the women were
busy taking care of their children and not willing to answer my questions. As often as I
could, I tried to interview both the corregidor and the teacher, both playing important
roles within the community. Furthermore I attended many community meetings, there
gaining an insight into both the strength of communities and how democracy works in
these communities.
From these visits and meetings, I can assert that all villages visited were either small or
widely geographically spread, with the school in the center of the village. There was no
market place in the villages, nor were there official buildings representing either the Tsi-
mane’ governing body or the Bolivian government. Sense of community was lacking with
regard to certain villages that consisted merely of two or three families.
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From my point of view, all these households were highly deprived and live in poverty;
though they do not suffer malnutrition, there is a low diversification of food sources and
they are dependent upon home-production of agriculture, chicken raising, hunting and
fishing to fill their basic needs.
1.3.3 The Tsimane’: descriptive analysis resulting from these two types
of data
From the TAPS data and my qualitative data, I can give a snapshot of the Tsimane’ living
conditions, the composition of their households, the different sources of their income, their
agricultural activities, the levels of their consumption and their assets.
Physical living conditions
The TAPS survey does not collect data on interviewees’ dwellings. From my own survey, I
can describe their dwellings as being ground-floor houses with or without walls, and with
thatch-palm roof and earth floor. In the majority of households, all their belongings are
kept in a single room wherein cooking and sleeping also take place, though some households
have a shelter for the kitchen away from the main room.
Construction material require that houses are rebuilt regularly, especially after heavy rains
and flooding; light material also allow them to change their location within the village and
between villages quite easily and quickly.
Most of the households do not have shelters for animals which are free to wander in their
houses and in the village.
Most of drinking water comes from the river; water can be of poor quality in some villages
and at certain times of the year. The water must be boiled prior to consumption though
this does not seem to be widely done. A small number of villages has a well or fountain for
the provision of cleaner water. In none of the villages, I could observe sanitation systems.
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Some villages have solar panels at the school; the electricity generated is supplied for
televisions and VHS players used in an alphabetization programme. This programme
uses these items and VHS tapes to teach children and adults to speak, read and write in
Spanish. The communication medium mainly used is the Tsimane’ radio created by the
Evangelist missionaries in San Borja.
Household composition and characteristics of household members
Over the five waves 98% of the households have a male household head but the number of
households headed by a woman increases over the period from 7 to 12 households (table
1.2). However, only 2 households are female-headed households in each year; in the other
cases, the gender of household head varies from one year to the other. This can hide some
temporary migration of male household heads leaving woman in charge of the household.
Between 2002 and 2006, the average age of the male household head is 42 years old; the
number of male head of households aged more than 65 years old doubles over the 5 years
while the number of household heads aged less than 25 years old is cut by more than a
third.
Households headed by a man are bigger and younger than households headed by a woman;
male-headed households have more children younger than 14 than female-headed house-
holds but number of children in these latter households increases over time.
Between 2002 and 2006, the average age of the household has increased from 20.3 years
old in 2002 to 22.1 years old; they are on average composed of 6 members, half of these
being children.
Educational levels are quite low; on average Tsimane’ household members aged more than
15 years old have attained the 2nd grade at primary school. Over time, educational at-
tainments do not change; considering household head education, younger household heads
have higher educational levels and have attained on average a 3rd or 4th grade at primary
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Table 1.2: Description of Tsimane’ households according to the gender of the household
head
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All
Nb Hhold 7 237 244 12 218 230 8 222 230 8 243 251 12 250 262
Head Age 60.5 38.9 39.5 50.2 39.1 39.7 59.7 38.0 38.8 53.0 44.0 44.3 53.6 44.7 45.1
Hhold
Agea
35.9 19.7 20.3 33.8 19.6 20.4 28.9 24.2 24.6 26.6 21.4 21.5 28.5 21.8 22.1
Hhold Size 3.8 6.5 6.4 4.9 6.6 6.4 5.2 6.2 6.1 4.8 6.3 6.2 4.4 6.1 6.0
Childrenb 1.4 3.2 3.1 1.2 3.4 3.2 3 3.3 3.3 2.6 3.3 3.2 2.2 3.2 3.2
Hhold Edu 0.8 2.0 1.9 1.1 2.0 2.0 0.5 1.8 1.8 1.3 2.1 2.1 0.8 2.1 2.1
aAverage age of household members
bNumber of household members aged less than 14
school.
I can now undertake a descriptive analysis of the Tsimane’ households’ sources of earnings
as defined by TAPS researchers.
Sources of earnings
To summarise the different sources of earnings of the Tsimane’, the TAPS researchers
have built four aggregates: sales earnings of agricultural products and NTFPs, wage earn-
ings from different wage activities, barter earnings3 of agricultural products and NTFPs
and remittances.4 The aggregation of the earnings data does not allow me to distinguish
clearly which type of goods were sold. From the qualitative data, it seems that most of
the goods sold are agricultural products (rice and corn) and few households sell NTFPs
(jatata mainly).
Table 1.3 describes earnings from all four sources as well as total earnings for all house-
holds that answer having any earnings.5 Over the five waves, more households are selling
than participating in a wage activity though wage earnings are more important both in
3They use village selling prices to find the values of bartered products.
4They report remittances only for 2005 and 2006, total earnings in 2002-03-04 do not include remit-
tances.
5Implied Purchasing Parity Power (PPP) exchange rate for bolivianos was US$1=1.995 in 2002, 2.077
in 2003, 2.185 in 2004, 2.23 in 2005 and 2.454 in 2006. Source EconomyWatch.com.
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values and in terms of contribution to the total earnings. In 2006, the contribution of
wage earnings to total earnings increases while the contribution of sales earnings to total
earnings decreases.
A non-negligible and increasing proportion of households reports bartering products but
contribution of barter earnings to total earnings decreases over time from 15% to less than
12%.
In 2005 and 2006, respectively 26 and 20 households report receiving remittances but for
Table 1.3: Nominal earnings in Bolivianos during the last two weeks (2002-2006)
Sale Wage Barter Remittances Total earningsa
Year
N Bol % b N Bol % N Bol % N Bol N Bol
2002 153 186.0 67.8 133 171.6 60.7 128 31.0 15.2 n/a n/a n/a 230 240.3
2003 141 142.9 56.6 110 200.9 71.3 130 34.9 14.4 n/a n/a n/a 206 227.2
2004 143 137.1 56.2 133 238.3 73.2 122 35.7 14.8 n/a n/a n/a 219 254.1
2005 172 249.9 59.6 140 246.1 48.8 135 50.4 11.8 26 252.9 38.0 237 383.2
2006 156 204.5 50.1 141 284.8 65.6 146 45.4 11.8 20 409.6 48.8 235 369.7
aSum of all 4 earnings.
bPercentage of household total earnings for households reporting earnings from such source.
these households, both the total amount of remittances received and their contribution to
their total earnings are important and increasing.
Households with young household heads have less earnings from sales than other house-
holds; they are more likely to participate in wage activities whose earnings represent
around 80% of their total earnings.
It is interesting to consider in which wage activities household members participate. Unfor-
tunately, individual wage data available are limited to the last three years. Main activities
for the Tsimane’ are working as an unskilled labourer for a Bolivian farmer, a logging
company, a cattle rancher, other Tsimane’ households or the State. Individuals working
in these five activities have higher earnings from these activities than individuals working
in another type of activity (table 1.4). In all three waves, individuals working for the State
generate greater earnings than other individuals and these earnings appear less volatile
than earnings from a Bolivian farmer or other Tsimane’ households.
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Households working for the State, a cattle rancher or a logging company6 are the ones
Table 1.4: Nominal wage earnings in Bolivianos in the last 7 days in each type of activities
and number of days worked (2004-2006)
2004 2005 2006
Labour types N Bol days N Bol days N Bol days
Farmer 12 46.6 2.5 13 114.1 4.8 7 107.4 5.7
Logger 36 111.5 4.0 40 168.8 5.3 28 194.0 5.9
Trader 3 66.7 3.3 0 0 0 3 103.3 4.3
Other Tsimane’ 20 230.4 4.5 12 86.7 3.33 17 95.9 3.7
Cattle rancher 16 73.4 3.3 32 109.5 4.9 32 124.5 5.0
Teacher 2 72.5 2.5 2 8 4 6 86.9 2.8
Project Felicidad 6 149.5 4.3 6 137.7 4.8 6 316.6 7
Other sources 4 125.5 4.5 2 140 4.5 1 175 7
State 13 256.8 6.15 13 227.2 6.5 26 237.7 5.1
Tsimane’ Council 1 161 7 2 116.5 7 0 0 0
Colons 2 40 2 4 117.5 4.7 5 131 5.8
Horeb 0 0 0 2 227.5 7 0 0 0
working more often, 5 to 6 days in the last week, while individuals working as a teacher
report working only 2 days during the last 7 days. Unfortunately, interpreting the data
must be done cautiously since it could be that the last 7 days are not representative of
the whole year. During the qualitative survey, most of the households with a member
working for a cattle rancher or a logger say that they usually work in these activities on a
daily basis, for a specific task, and sporadically at times when they need to cope with an
unexpected event that requires them to spend on medicines or tools.
During the qualitative survey, the Tsimane’ explain that they do not work for someone
else all the time because it is tiring and they are not willing to follow someone else rules
and orders. They prefer rather to work on their own than to work with and for somebody
else. Individuals working more permanently tend to be young single men without the
responsibility of a head of a household such that they may live in the logging camp or at
the ranch.
The individuals use their wage mainly to help their family in coping with events and to
buy durable goods (clothes, radios...). In the case of important emergency, they said that
6I want to notice here that even households working for the State, as teacher, for a cattle rancher or a
logging company have an agricultural plot and use the same range of basic assets and tools as households
not engaged in these activities.
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they can ask the cattle rancher they usually work with for loans and would repay them
by working for them.
Regarding sales of NTFPs, the TAPS survey lacks sufficient information to appreciate the
different NTFP productions. In the qualitative survey I asked households how production
and sales of jatata work. Jatata production is mainly done in upriver villages where palm
trees are still abundant. Its production process does not require great labour investment
nor skills but it is time intensive since households need to let the palm dry for at least
a month. Households are either regular jatata producers or only using this product to
reimburse a debt. To sell their products, they rely on the traders coming to the village or
they go to San Borja.
Agricultural activities and forest clearance
In the data set, data on rice and corn production and sales are only available for 2004,
2005 and 2006. Participation in agriculture is quite high; 213 households in 2004 and 243
in 2006 report cultivating rice and 116 in 2004 and 138 in 2006 report cultivating corn.
All households cultivating rice or corn report selling a part of their production.
Between 2004 and 2006, rice production (upper part of table 1.5) increases from 62.2
arrobas (around 715.3kg) up to 71.0 arrobas (816.5kg) but rice sales decrease from 33.9
arrobas (389.85kg) which represents 54% of their production to 29.2 arrobas (335.8kg),
44% of the production.
Corn production between 2004 and 2006 (lower part of table 1.5) decreases from 83.3
mancornas (160.0kg) down to 40.8 mancornas (78.2kg) and so have the sales from 53.8
mancornas (103.1 kg) down to 8.6 mancornas (16.5kg). Corn production and sales have
decreased over three years, and corn sales have decreased in a larger measure leading to a
decrease in the ratio of sales on production.
Over time, rice production is more important for the Tsimane’ both in terms of quantities
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harvested but also in terms of quantities sold.
Between 2004 and 2006, rice selling price in each village has increased by 2 to 8 bolivianos
Table 1.5: Household agricultural production and sales of rice and corn (2004-2006)
Products 2004 2005 2006
Rice in arrobas
Rice production 62.2 81.7 71.0
Rice sales 33.9 41.6 29.2
Ratio sales/production 0.54 0.53 0.44
Corn in mancornas
Corn production 83.3 67.3 40.8
Corn sales 53.8 18.8 8.6
Ratio sales/production 0.64 0.52 0.40
in 9 of the 13 villages; half of the households increase their rice sales but this increase has
not been high enough to counterbalance the sales reduction from the other households.
Households do not seem to be really responsive to rice price variations.
During the qualitative survey, I ask households their strategy when deciding how much to
plant, harvest and sell. Their answer has been that when harvesting they first keep what
they need for their home-consumption and if there exists a surplus they sell it or barter
it.
Overall, all households cultivate the same quantities of rice and corn and no organisation
or cooperative system has been implemented. Only a small proportion of households has
developed a “rice strategy” which consists in cultivating and selling a type of rice with a
higher price while simultaneously cultivating a smaller proportion of a cheaper rice used
for home-consumption.
Besides rice and corn, the Tsimane’ report growing other crops; around 80% of the Tsi-
mane’ households report cultivating plantain. Cassava, sugar cane and sweet potato are
also important crops while onion and peanut are cultivated by a small number of house-
holds (table 2.5).
However, it seems that the Tsimane’ are diversifying their agricultural production as more
households in 2006 cultivate different products.
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With respect to agricultural plots and forest clearing, the Tsimane’ households cleared
Table 1.6: Number of households cultivating other types of products
Products 2004 2005 2006
Cassava 91 145 130
Plantain 193 232 200
Onion 55 50 72
Peanut 58 57 63
Sugar cane 114 127 134
Sweet potato 94 130 145
on average 5.7 tareas7 of fallow forest and 4.1 tareas of old-growth forest over 2004 to 2006
(table 1.7). Areas of cleared fallow and old-growth forest for agriculture are increasing
over the period but not the number of plots. Tsimane’ households have on average 1.5
plots dedicated to agriculture and these plots are becoming bigger over the period.
Areas cultivated with rice are increasing between 2004 and 2006 while the size of land
dedicated to corn production remains without variation. It seems then that households
are opening bigger plots in order to increase rice production in the first year; then they
do not increase corn production but they tend to mix corn and other products (cassava,
plantain or sugar cane) on one plot.
During the fieldwork, I asked households whether they were selling trees standing on
Table 1.7: Size and number of agricultural plots (2004-2006)
Field 2004 2005 2006
Tareas of cleared fallow forest 5.4 5.3 6.4
Tareas of old-growth forest 3.4 4.6 4.3
Tareas of rice 7.7 8.2 8.7
Tareas of corn 1.3 1.3 1.3
Number of plots 1.4 1.6 1.5
the plot while clearing. Households answered that they prefer keeping trees to dry and
to collect them for use as firewood. Very few of them have ever sold firewood as a way
of increasing their earnings and only one householder says he sold a tree once although it
was too costly to be profitable.
710 tareas are equal to 1 hectare.
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Household food consumption
Consumption values are deflated in order to compare values over time. Since there are
no deflators in the data, I constructed a price deflator using price information available in
the data (Appendix A.1).
I first tried to construct consumer price index (CPI) using village price information and
looking at weights of all food products in households’ total consumption. Unfortunately,
missing values in the price information resulted in missing values for CPI and I chose to
look at price changes at the village level for a set of 10 commodities over the five years
using weights defined for the whole research area.8 With these weights, I cover 33% of
total consumption (appendix table A.1). Inflation is flat over the three first years and
jumps between 2004 and 2005 (appendix table A.2).
Keeping only households that report information about consumption and assets in all five
waves, the size of the sample decreases to 176 households; the other households have not
answered either questions about consumption or assets. The end of this chapter relies on
these 176 households.
At first glance, over time per capita household consumption during the last 7 days decreases
but not monotonically (table 2.8). Consumption9 increases until 2004 before decreasing;
in 2006, per capita consumption at the household level is lower than in 2002.
Over time, in terms of value, households consume mainly game and fish and this remains
true when consumption of game and consumption of fish decrease, as between 2004 and
2006. The large decrease in game consumption is explained by both a decrease in the price
of game and a decrease in quantities consumed. Caution is required when talking about
8I also tried using as a deflator the price of rice in 2006 which has brought the same results.
9Table 2.8 does not include all food products consumed by households but only the most important
ones.
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game consumption since the dataset price of game is an average price of different game
and not a price for each game households can consume. Overall this decrease in the price
of game is quite surprising and cannot be explained by the available information.
Concomitantly to the decrease in consumption of wildlife products (game and fish), con-
sumption of chicken and beef has increased between 2002 and 2006 while consumption
of dry meat, eggs, ducks and sardines has remained the same over time. It seems that
to compensate their loss of proteins from game or fish, households have increased their
consumption of domestic animals.
Consumption of rice, cassava and plantains is also important for households in terms of
value consumed. These products are mainly home-produced and have been valued at their
buying price in the data set to allow aggregation. Consumption of rice increases over time
though not monotonically. Consumption of plantains in 2006 is smaller in values than in
2002, while consumption of cassava and maize has changed little over time.
Consumption of other products bought on the market (noodle, cooking oil or flour) has ei-
Table 1.8: Per capita consumption during the last 7 days (values deflated to 2006 Boli-
vianos)
Food products 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Beef 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.9 2.4
Cassava 1.5 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.1
Chicken 1.1 1.8 1.0 1.1 1.6
Dry meat 1.6 1.2 1.6 2.0 1.8
Duck 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.01
Egg 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Flour 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5
Maize 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
Noodle 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.0
Oil 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.4
Plantain 3.2 2.7 1.9 2.2 2.6
Pork 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.09
Rice 1.1 2.1 1.3 1.5 1.8
Sardines 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7
Sugar 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
Bird 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3
Fish 11.4 10.7 14.7 12.6 8.4
Game 12.9 14.9 18.7 13.2 5.1
Total 41.5 45.1 49.7 47.4 34.7
ther increased between 2002 and 2006, e.g. cooking oil and flour, or decreased, e.g. noodle.
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In summary, there exists a big decline of per capita consumption in 2006 compared to
2002 which is largely due to a decrease in their consumption of wildlife products resulting
from a decrease in quantities of game and fish consumed. On the other hand, households
have not succeeded in compensating losses of consumption through consumption of other
products and hence they appear to be worse-off in terms of consumption.
Asset holdings and wealth
Asset data are aggregated in three different measures: modern, traditional and animal
assets. Looking at the values of different aggregates and particular assets deflated to 2006
prices using the CPI I have created (table 1.9), on average, household total wealth has
slightly increased between 2002 and 2006 but this increase has been undermined by a large
decrease between 2005 and 2006.
Over the five years, the Tsimane’ have accumulated mainly modern assets; they own on
average more mosquito nets, bikes and rifles than other assets and this is true both in
terms of value and quantities of assets. Between 2002 and 2006, households possess more
radios but these assets are cheaper in the last year thus reducing their contribution to
total household wealth.
The Tsimane’ also own many traditional assets; these assets encompass different objects
from bags and bows to canoes and grinder stones, canoes being the most valuable. Over
time traditional asset holdings have decreased in value. However a closer look at the com-
position of traditional assets shows that the decrease in these asset holdings is mainly due
to a decrease in their price since quantities have either increased or remained unchanged.
For instance, the Tsimane’ have on average the same number of canoes or bags in 2002
and 2006.
Their animal asset holdings are composed of cows, ducks, chickens and pigs. Over the
period, animal asset holdings have first increased then decreased in value and in 2006,
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values of animal asset holdings are lower than in 2002. They have slightly more cows both
in value and quantity in 2006 than in 2002 but considerably fewer pigs between the first
and last year. Price of cows remains the same over time while pigs become more expen-
sive. Overall, the Tsimane’ appear to be better-off in 2006 in terms of asset holdings;
Table 1.9: Household asset holdings: quantities owned and values (values deflated to 2006
Bolivianos)
Assets 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Qties Bol Qties Bol Qties Bol Qties Bol Qties Bol
Animal assets 673.6 529.8 810.5 733.6 560.1
Cow 0.3 262.5 0.4 196.7 0.6 507.5 0.7 489.2 0.4 269.1
Pig 1.0 225.7 0.8 125.9 0.7 118.1 0.3 81.4 0.5 99.1
Modern assets 2068.2 2204.8 2422.4 2647.0 2286.1
Hook 5.5 29.3 5.3 25.9 5.1 39.0 5.5 13.0 5.8 23.2
Bike 0.3 239.5 0.3 250.8 0.3 100.1 0.4 226.2 0.4 234.3
Machete 3.4 87.5 3.1 92.7 3.4 155.4 3.7 128.3 3.8 135.1
Mosquito net 3.5 157.0 3.8 340.6 3.9 314.9 4.2 228.4 5.4 322.3
Radio 0.6 218.1 0.8 310.8 0.9 376.3 1.0 194.0 1.0 155.1
Rifle 0.5 511.1 0.5 306.5 0.4 356.0 0.5 473.4 0.5 375
Traditional assets 910.7 856.9 802.8 904.3 816.6
Bag 5.5 431.9 5.9 518.0 6 496.7 7.1 429.4 6.6 356.3
Bow 0.5 95.7 0.4 54.3 0.4 83.6 0.4 84.6 0.4 82.9
Canoe 1.6 216.6 1.6 175.0 1.5 108.8 1.6 275.6 1.6 238.6
Total assets 3652.5 3591.6 4035.8 4285.0 3662.9
looking at quantities, assets seem either to have increased or remained unchanged. Values
of assets have either increased or decreased; decreases in value of assets correspond more
to decrease in prices than loss of assets.
In the end, there does not seem to be any correlation between consumption and asset hold-
ings and earnings; while consumption decreases, households seem to have both increased
earnings and assets. The different problems linked to the valuation of consumption items
and the fact that earnings in the last 7 days may not represent the general trend of yearly
earnings strengthen my choice of using asset data in order to assess the welfare of the
Tsimane’.
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Tsimane’ in the national Bolivian poverty context
Bolivia is the second poorest country in South America, after Guyana when considering
GDP per capita (PPP) in 2009. In 2002, 67% of the population was poor and 84% of the
rural households were poor according to this definition (Grosse et al., 2005). In 2002, 57%
of the population was extremely poor in rural Bolivia (less than US$1 a day PPP) and
three quarters of the extreme poor were living in rural areas (O’Hare and Rivas, 2007).
To appreciate how poor the Tsimane’ households are, I compare the Tsimane’ income and
consumption to the average rural Bolivian household, keeping in mind that the Tsimane’
data may be underestimated and not fully comparable. With respect to the 2006 National
Survey, the Tsimane’ households have much lower levels of earnings than the majority
of rural Bolivian households. In the 2006 survey, the income poverty line is set at 294
Bolivianos per capita per month for households living in dispersed communities, such as
the Tsimane’. Estimating Tsimane’ total income as closely as defined in the National
Survey, i.e. adding up earnings from sales, wage labour, remittances, bartering products
and agricultural production, I find that average monthly total income per capita is 120
Bolivianos. As a result 97% of the households in the sample have their total income below
the income poverty line.
With respect to consumption, in 2006, the Tsimane’ have levels of consumption much lower
than rural poor Bolivian households. The average consumption per capita per month for
the Tsimane’ is 138 Bolivianos in 2006 while the average consumption per capita for a
Bolivian household living in a dispersed community was 299 Bolivianos. Comparing their
monthly consumption per capita to 80% of a consumption poverty line10, 84% of the Tsi-
mane’ are poor in terms of consumption and deflating values of consumption in previous
10I estimated a consumption poverty line comparing in the National Survey households’s consumption
when their income is equal to the income poverty line. In the National Survey, consumption encompasses
food and non-food products and I assume that 80% of the consumption poverty line represents the food
poverty line.
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years show that 90% of the poor in 2006 were poor in 2002.
On average, a rural Bolivian individual goes up to a 5th grade at primary school while a
Tsimane’ adult reaches the 2nd grade at primary school.
On average, the Tsimane’ have a body-mass index11 (BMI) around 20.8 which is not low
but does not show any improvements. On average, 4% of the Tsimane’ women aged 15 or
more are underweight with their BMI below 18.5 while in rural Bolivia, around 1% of the
women have their BMI below 18.5 (WHO, 2008).
This descriptive analysis and presentation of the Tsimane’ shows that they can generate
their revenue from different sources by implementing different activities but that overall
they remain poor. In what follows I look more closely at the characteristics of Tsimane’
according to their different livelihood strategies.
1.3.4 Tsimane’ livelihood strategies
Carter and Barrett (2006) model sheds light on the fact that households have different
types of livelihood strategies and that they choose either to be in a low- or high-return
livelihood strategy in respect with their asset holdings (Carter and Barrett, 2006, 2007).
The following subsection determines the existence of different strategies for the Tsimane’
and whether there are groups of households with better welfare than others. As in the
Carter and Barrett model, I assume that a Tsimane’ household with higher levels of asset
holdings, i.e. in the two upper quintiles at least three years,12 who sells more than half of
its rice production and has relatively large agricultural plots, is engaged in a high-return
strategy. On the contrary, a Tsimane’ household with lower levels of assets and/or partic-
11weight in kilograms divided by height in centimeters squared kg/cm2
12I choose three years such as to avoid the fact that some households use sales of assets or rice to cope
with an unexpected event; being on the upper quintile once does not guarantee that a household is in a
high-return strategy while a household with assets and production in the top quintiles over a longer period
of time is more likely to be engaged in a high-return strategy.
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ipating less in agricultural sales or with smaller plots is engaged in a low-return activity
in which agricultural production is mainly directed to fulfil its basic needs.13
With this specification, 32 households are engaged in a high-return activity since they
have more assets and higher agricultural production, and the 144 remaining households
are engaged in a low-return strategy.
Households in a high-return strategy have higher earnings than households in a low-return
strategy (table 1.10); nonetheless differences between both strategies are not striking even
if they increase over time. Households in a high-return strategy have on average between
1.4 and 2 times greater earnings than households in a low-return strategy. Differences in
sales earnings between both strategies are bigger than differences in wage earnings; this
result corroborates the fact that sales depend to some extent on rice sales used to define
the strategies.
By construction, households in a high-return strategy have also more assets but the gap
tends to reduce over time since households in a low-return strategy have increased asset
holdings in 2006 over 2002 while households in the high-return strategy have fewer asset
holdings. This decrease in total wealth for households in a high-return strategy is mainly
accounted for the reduction in their holdings of modern and animal assets.
Consumption does not seem to be correlated to wealth or agricultural production which
suggests that consumption may not be well-estimated. Across strategies, consumption is
either more important in a high-return strategy or in a low-return strategy from one year
to the other.
Looking at household characteristics, households in a low-return strategy are smaller. Av-
erage age of households seem to be similar between strategies; households in a high-return
strategy are sometimes younger or older than households in the low-return strategy. How-
13In appendix, I present a distinction of the Tsimane’ livelihood according to assets and earnings.
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Table 1.10: High- and low-return strategy according to agricultural production and assets
(values deflated to 2006 Bolivianos)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Variables High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
Sale 150.2 96.1 243.8 95.5 214.7 83.3 483.6 136.1 281.8 108.4
Wage 120.2 117.5 105.3 139.9 184.3 164.3 193.0 128.5 206.8 165.3
Total earnings 292.8 237.7 385.9 259.2 438.1 269.3 732.6 331.5 597.2 300.7
Animal wealth 1516.9 483.5 1212.1 380.9 2273.9 485.3 1850.1 485.5 972.5 468.5
Traditional wealth 1282.0 826.9 1233.0 774.7 1260.1 701.1 1372.0 800.4 1152.1 742.0
Modern wealth 3759.9 1686.9 3981.6 1816.9 3919.0 2089.8 4092.5 2325.7 3258.7 2069.9
Total wealth 6558.9 2997.5 6426.8 2972.6 7453.1 3276.4 7314.7 3611.7 5383.4 3280.5
Beef 2.5 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 2.1 3.1 2.2
Chicken 1.8 0.9 0.9 1.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 2.4 1.4
Plantains 2.3 3.3 2.1 2.8 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.7
Cassava 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.2 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.0
Game 11.2 13.2 10.6 15.9 22.0 18.0 10.2 13.8 5.6 5.0
Fish 8.9 12.0 8.1 11.3 9.9 15.8 9.6 13.2 8.6 8.3
Total Consumption 41.4 41.5 35.9 47.1 47.2 50.3 38.9 49.3 38.9 33.8
Household characteristics
Household size 8.1 6.3 8.1 6.3 7.9 6.2 8.2 6.5 7.8 6.6
Household age 23.6 21.4 21.8 21.8 23.8 21.4 20.6 20.7 23.1 21.3
Head Age 50.1 41.8 47.9 43.7 52.4 42.9 48.5 42.6 52.5 41.6
Household education 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.5 1.8 2.5 1.8
Agricultural production
Rice production n/a n/a n/a n/a 101.0 54.8 159.2 69.6 130.0 63.5
Rice sales 54.8 20.6 n/a n/a 64.0 28.5 94.2 35.7 61.0 25.9
Corn production n/a n/a n/a n/a 72.1 72.8 126.0 66.7 54.2 34.1
Corn sales 22.7 8.6 n/a n/a 49.8 47.1 47.6 17.8 8.3 8.7
Plot size 16.0 7.8 16.4 8.8 14.1 8.1 18.0 9.0 17.1 9.8
ever, households in a high-return strategy tend to have older heads of household which
implies that there may be certain experience effects. Older household heads know from
whom to obtain better prices and what are the best cultivation techniques to use. Over
time, households in the high-return strategy have higher educational levels.
By construction, households in a high-return strategy have sales of rice 2 to 3 times larger
than households in a low-return strategy. Considering corn, differences in production are
not important in 2004 and 2006, and sales in 2006 are similar between the two types of
households.
Size of plots has increased over time but as it increases in the same range for both types
of households, difference remains unchanged.
Overall, households with higher assets in a high-return strategy have also greater earnings
and may be better-off. However, the number of households in a high-return strategy is
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quite small and even smaller when identifying other groups.14 However, low evidence of
the existence of high- and low-return strategies does not undermine the existence of an
S-shaped curve in the asset accumulation.
In addition, there are clearly various mechanisms preventing Tsimane’ households to im-
prove their welfare (Carter and Barrett, 2006). Firstly, there exist market imperfections
for the Tsimane’; these imperfections imply that to implement higher-return strategies,
the Tsimane’ need to adopt more expensive tools or production processes. Consequently,
wealthier Tsimane’ are more able to adopt such tools while the poorer ones are unable as
the costs of adoption are higher than the returns. Also, the Tsimane’ have weak access
to markets resulting from the remoteness of their communities and the lack of infrastruc-
ture. Wealthier Tsimane’ households participate to a greater extent in the market whereas
poorer Tsimane’ households are more dependent upon those traders who offer lower prices
than on the market. The Tsimane’ do not have access to financial and insurance mar-
kets. All credits reported have been obtained on an informal credit system in which cattle
ranchers and loggers lend to the Tsimane’ they know who may repay them directly out
of wages. Only Tsimane’ working with outside agents would receive such loans, which
creates an immediate barrier to those not participating in such activities.
Secondly, incomplete information resulting from the low levels of education of some Tsi-
mane’ households and their inability to speak Spanish impede access to better-quality
information regarding the availability of higher-yielding seeds or advanced production
techniques. The lack of infrastructure also explains why such information may not reach
all of the Tsimane’ households.
Thirdly, the lack of well-defined property rights on agricultural lands does not encourage
14Refer to appendix table A.3.
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them to invest in improving their production. Furthermore, the multiplication of legal
institutions in charge of forest resources discourages them from undertaking more forest-
related activities such as jatata extraction and sales which could have higher returns.
Their poverty situation, dependence upon natural resources and the existence of different
exclusionary mechanisms justify the focus on testing for the existence of a poverty trap
for these Tsimane’ households.
1.3.5 Summary of the descriptive analysis and justification of a poverty
trap test
To resume, the Tsimane’ appear to be a poor population even when comparing to an
average rural Bolivian household. They have low levels of earnings and their consump-
tion which relies mainly on natural resources and home-production fluctuates over time.
Households in a high-return strategy appear to be better-off than other households but
they are only a minority of the Tsimane’ households.
Considering non-income measures of welfare, the Tsimane’ are less educated than the av-
erage rural Bolivian. Over time, there appear to be no improvements in their education
since younger Tsimane’ do not reach higher grades than their parents. When looking at
the different strategies, households in a high-return strategy have slightly higher average
educational attainment but it remains lower than the average rural Bolivian household.
With respect to their BMI, more women than in rural Bolivia have their BMI below the
normal line.
Furthermore, large majority of households being engaged in a low-return strategy justifies
the fact that poverty for the Tsimane’ households is a persistent phenomenon. Even if
some households seem to accumulate assets and increase their earnings, poorer households
do not catch up; different mechanisms suggest that welfare improvements are difficult to
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achieve for poorer households but easier to achieve for wealthier ones.
Overall there does not seem to be a sharp distinction between high- and low-return strate-
gies since very few households are in a high-return strategy. Apart from differences in
their earnings and assets (which result from construction), the Tsimane’ appear to be
quite an homogeneous group in terms of household characteristics. Different mechanisms
and circumstances impede some households raising their welfare which may create differ-
ent equilibria in the accumulation process.
As a result, it seems relevant to test whether a majority of households is caught in a
poverty trap as defined by Carter and Barrett (2006) and if the other households have
managed to overtake the Micawber threshold and are in a high-equilibrium, or whether
there exists a single (low) equilibrium toward which all households are converging. In
order to test for the existence of a poverty trap, the following section presents the asset
index used in the test and this asset index is also used to assess where the Tsimane’ are
according to different values of asset index.
1.4 Poverty status and dynamics using an asset index
Asset data are preferred since they better describe forest household livelihoods and provide
better measures of their welfare. Assets as many non-monetary measures to counterbalance
problems related to measure of welfare with consumption or income data (Gunther and
Klasen, 2007) but it requires to choosing a method to aggregate the assets. Besides adding
up values of assets which here may not be appropriate, there exist different methods.
Primarily one may use the coefficients of a regression of assets on consumption or income
normalised to a poverty line to determine the weights of each asset and construct an asset
index (Adato et al., 2006). Another technique, this one more flexible, consists in combining
all assets in an asset index using the patterns of correlation between assets to determine
the weights of each asset in the asset index (Sahn and Stifel, 2000, 2003).
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I prefer this last method for building the asset index since in this instance the weights are
not defined by consumption aggregates, the latter being in my opinion not reliable. The
resulting asset index seems then more relevant to look at poverty status and dynamics of
forest households.
1.4.1 Methodology for the construction of an asset index
To build an asset index, I select a factor analysis methodology which “consists in repre-
senting a set of variables in terms of lower number of hypothetical variables” (Lawley and
Maxwell, 1973, Friel, 2007). Factor analysis aims at identifying the hypothetical unob-
served variables, called underlying factors, and at explaining that the assets are created
out of these underlying factors (Lawley and Maxwell, 1971, Lewis-Beck, 1994). A single
common underlying factor accounting for a larger part of the variance of the variables is
selected when its eigenvalue is above 1 (Lewis-Beck, 1994, Friel, 2007).
This common factor is used to divide the variance of each asset into a “common vari-
ance” and a “unique variance” which is “a combination of the reliable variance specific to
the variable and a random-error variance” (Lewis-Beck, 1994). As a result, the common
factor is a weighted average of multiple assets in which the weights are the factor scores
estimated through the projection of an unobserved common factor on household assets
(Sahn and Stifel, 2000).
Various types of factor analysis methodology are available, the most common being princi-
pal component analysis (PCA) and principal factor analysis (PFA). The difference between
these techniques rests on the manner in which the factors explain the variance. Regarding
PCA, this technique forces all components to explain totally the variance of the variables,
while PFA permits the variance of the variables not to be fully explained by the factors
(Lewis-Beck, 1994, Sahn and Stifel, 2000). I use here PFA in order to allow for the exis-
tence of elements that cannot be measured but that account for the part of the variance
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not explained by the assets.
In order to proceed to a factor analysis, the first step is to determine by running two
tests whether or not the assets are correlated. The Bartlett’s test for sphericity consists
in measuring the strength of the correlation between variables and its null hypothesis con-
sists in stating that the correlation matrix comes from a sample in which the variables
are non-collinear. Rejecting the null hypothesis from this test leads us to affirm that the
variables share at least one common factor explaining their variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy compares the magnitude of the observed
coefficients of correlation to the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients (Lewis-
Beck, 1994, Naschold, 2005). If this magnitude is strong enough then a factor analysis is
a relevant technique to define an asset index.
The second step consists in estimating the different coefficients required to construct an
asset index, as described by Sahn and Stifel (2000), whose form is
AIi = γˆ1ai1 + ...+ γˆKaiK (1.1)
AIi is the asset index estimated for the i households in the sample; it is a function of their
k different assets, aik, whose weights γk have to be estimated through factor analysis.
There exists a common factor accounting for a portion of the variance of each asset, the
remainder being explained by a unique element whose variance is not correlated across
assets (Sahn and Stifel, 2000).
aik = βci + uik (1.2)
Both the common variance c and its coefficient β are not observed and must be estimated.
This estimation would lead us to construct a matrix of factor loadings that reflect the
relationship between the assets and the common factor. The common factor is then
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derived from this unique matrix of factor loadings (Bhorat et al., 2006).
ci = f1ai1 + f2ai2 + ...+ fkaik (1.3)
The common factor is a linear combination of the scoring coefficients fk of each asset and
the asset holdings ak; a large factor score would mean that the asset associated with this
score is more suited to explain the differences of welfare between households (Sahn and
Stifel, 2003).
The asset index is calculated as a weighted normalised sum of asset holdings using the
factor scoring coefficients as weights and normalising around the mean and the standard
variation of each asset (Sahn and Stifel, 2000, Bhorat et al., 2006)
AIi = f1(ai1 − a¯1)/σa1 + ...+ f1(aiK − a¯K)/σaK (1.4)
where fk are the factor scores for each asset, a¯k are the mean value of each factor and σak
the standard deviation.
Pooling asset data over the 5 years, an asset index is estimated for each Tsimane’ household
in each year (Naschold, 2005). After constructing such an asset index for each household,
this latter is employed to investigate poverty at a single point in time and over time, and
to confirm whether households accumulate assets or not.
1.4.2 Asset index through factor analysis
In order to erase any time-specific effect, I start the factor analysis by pooling all Tsimane’
asset data (Naschold, 2005). Since the Tsimane’ livelihoods and way of life require holding
different types of assets, I include assets employed in agricultural production, for hunting
and fishing, their ability to speak Spanish and their mathematical skills, assets facilitating
communication with the other communities and the external world, and assets facilitating
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interactions among Tsimane’ households according to their culture (table 1.11). All these
different assets reflect Ellis (2001) forms of capital in the sustainable livelihood framework.
Table 1.11: Description of assets included in asset index (pooled data)
Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
Axe Number of axes used for agriculture
and timber logging
1.40 0.98
Bike Number of bikes used to go to market
to sell NTFPs and agricultural prod-
ucts
0.35 0.73
Bow Number of bows used for hunting 1.61 1.38
Canoe Number of canoes used for fishing and
to go to market to sell NTFPs and agri-
cultural products
0.47 0.69
Cow Number of cows owned by households 0.48 2.09
Hook Number of hooks used for fishing 5.47 3.57
Knife Number of knives used for hunting,
fishing and agriculture
3.50 2.28
Machete Number of machetes used for hunting,
agriculture and NTFPs
3.51 1.96
Mosquito net Number of mosquito nets used as first
protection against insects and snakes
4.19 2.28
Net Number of nets used for fishing 0.79 1.02
Radio Number of radios used to communicate
between communities, with traders
and with markets
0.89 0.87
Rifle Number of rifles used for hunting 0.51 0.59
Shotgun Number of shotguns used for hunting 0.42 0.56
Size plot Total size of plots used for agriculture
(tareas)
10.10 7.53
Gifts Number of gifts received by households
from other households
1.13 1.30
Spanish Number of household members speak-
ing Spanish
1.22 1.14
Maths Dummy whether households have a
member having maths skills
0.92 0.26
Physical assets encompass different durable goods such as bike, canoe, mosquito net and
radio, which are relevant for increasing the welfare of the Tsimane’. Households with bikes
and canoes are better able to go to San Borja and to benefit from its amenities. Having
a mosquito net is their only means of protection against insects, snakes and mosquitoes.
The Tsimane’ communicate by broadcasting radio messages which justifies the importance
of having a radio.
Productive capital is composed of axe, bow, hook, knife, machete, net, rifle and shotgun.
These assets are used either for agriculture (axe, machete, knife), hunting (bow, rifle,
shotgun and knife) or fishing (net, hook and knife). Having an axe can increase Tsimane’
earnings through the creation of larger agricultural plots and consequently greater agri-
55
cultural outputs, or through sale of trees. Rifles and shotguns are better hunting weapons
than a bow but create additional costs in purchases of powder or bullets. With a fishing
net, catches of fish tend to be larger than with a hook and a line.
Natural capital is composed of the number of cows they have and the size of cleared for-
est. The Tsimane’ use cows as savings and safety nets, purchasing them when means are
available and selling them at last resort in the case of an emergency. Having bigger plots
increases earnings through an increase in agricultural production.
The proxy for social capital is the number of gifts received by the households. Human
capital takes into account both the number of Spanish speakers within a household and
whether any member holds mathematical skills (either addition or subtraction).
Proceeding to the factor analysis, the Bartlett’s test gives a determinant of the correlation
matrix equal to 0.023 which allows us to reject the null hypothesis so that the variables
are collinear. The KMO measure supports this conclusion; its value is 0.849 which is high
enough to conclude that a factor analysis is useful and relevant.
These two tests confirm that there exists at least one common factor explaining the own-
ership of the assets and that we could proceed to a PFA confining the analysis to a single
factor.
The matrix of correlations (table A.4 in appendix) and the screeplot of eigenvalues (figure
1.2) show that the first two factors have values above 1. However, since the first factor
explains around 80% of the variance and its value is larger than 1, I retain only one factor
to proceed with the analysis.
From the factor loadings (table A.5 in appendix), the factor scores (table 1.12) are es-
timated as a linear combination using a Bartlett’s methodology. All factor scores have a
positive sign and explain positively the variance in assets between households (Sahn and
Stifel, 2000).
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Figure 1.2: Screeplot of eigenvalues from factor analysis
The assets that better explain the variance in assets are mosquito nets, machete and knife;
having more of one of these assets would increase the value of household asset index. On
the other hand, having better math skills at the household level helps little in explaining
the variance in assets.
For each household in each year, the asset index is estimated as a weighted sum of each
Table 1.12: Factor scores estimated through factor analysis
Variable Factor scores
Axe 0.14
Bike 0.05
Bow 0.12
Canoe 0.06
Cow 0.03
Hook 0.16
Knife 0.20
Machete 0.26
Mosquito net 0.27
Net 0.08
Radio 0.09
Rifle 0.04
Shotgun 0.07
Size plot 0.09
Gifts 0.03
Spanish 0.04
Maths 0.01
asset normalised around its mean and standard deviation whose weight is the factor score.
Over time, the average asset index has increased along with the median value of asset in-
dex (table 1.13). Differences between mean and median values of the asset index decrease
between 2002 and 2006, though not monotonically.
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The scatterplots show that some households do not greatly modify their asset index
Table 1.13: Asset index for each year 2002-2006
Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max Median
AI 2002 172 -0.16 1.07 -2.12 3.95 -0.39
AI 2003 172 -0.14 1.06 -2.05 3.24 -0.42
AI 2004 175 -0.094 1.07 -1.91 5.47 -0.28
AI 2005 175 0.12 1.21 -1.53 5.55 -0.12
AI 2006 176 0.30 1.10 -1.92 4.38 0.14
from one year to the next as there exists some concentration around the 45 degree line.
Still some dispersion in the left-hand or right-hand parts of the figure prove that certain
households have moved either upward or downward their values of asset index. The Ker-
nel densities show that the distributions are shifting to the right over time meaning that
households tend to accumulate assets.
Overall, 68% of households have higher values of asset index in 2006 than in 2002. For 30%
of these households, this increase in asset index is constant since they have higher values
of asset index in 2004 compared to 2002, higher values of asset index in 2006 compared to
2004. 60% of the households with higher values of asset index in 2002 still remain with
the higher values of asset index in 2006.
In 2006, the distribution of the asset index is more dispersed its peak being lower than in
the previous years (figure 1.3).
Both scatterplots and Kernel densities of the asset index show that the Tsimane’ are
Figure 1.3: Scatterplot and Kernel densities of asset index
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an homogenous population and no polarised groups with clustered values of asset index
appear on these graphs.
However, neither the scatterplots nor the Kernel densities curve lead us to reject the idea
that there could be some non-linearities and discontinuities on the asset accumulation
process over time and studying the asset accumulation seems relevant.
Before studying asset index accumulation, this asset index is used to define poverty, severe
poverty and chronic poverty for the Tsimane’. Looking at poverty status and dynamics
can shed light on whether asset index holdings are increasing or not, and can help with
comparing values of asset index among households.
1.4.3 Poverty status and dynamics
I define severe poor households, households whose level of assets index is in the first two
deciles of asset index and poor households, households with an asset index in the first four
deciles.
A components definition of chronic poverty is used to look at households whose mean
levels of asset index over the five years is always below the fourth decile of pooled asset
index (Yaqub, 2000).
Severe poverty and poverty in terms of asset index
Considering values of asset index over time, non-severely poor households have increased
their asset index and so have severely poor households. However increases in asset index
are higher for the non-severely poor than for the severe poor (table 1.14).
Non-severely poor households have the same total wealth in 2002 and in 2006 while
severely poor households increase their asset holdings; for both categories of households
household wealth has fluctuated over the five years.
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Table 1.14: Asset index, household asset holdings and household earnings according to
severe poverty (deflated values to 2006 Bolivianos)
Year Number Asset index Total wealth Total earnings
Non-
severe
Severe Non-
severe
Severe Non-
severe
Severe Non-
severe
Severe
2002 142 34 0.13 -1.34 4145.9 1620.9 260.1 196.0
2003 142 34 0.13 -1.26 4021.8 1832.5 324.9 104.1
2004 141 35 0.21 -1.32 4613.1 1710.1 316.6 232.9
2005 141 35 0.43 -1.13 4848.1 2016.5 461.8 173.1
2006 140 36 0.64 -1.04 4158.9 1733.8 398.3 184.5
Looking at total earnings, severely poor households have fewer earnings than non-severely
poor households, which confirms the idea that earnings and assets are positively corre-
lated. Severely poor households in the last two years have fewer total earnings than in the
first year, while non-severely poor households have greater earnings.
With respect to poor households with asset index in the first four deciles, values of asset
index fluctuate over time and in 2006 these values are greater than in 2002 (table 1.15).
On average, non-poor households have values of asset index increasing over time.
Household total wealth decreases over time for non-poor households while earnings of
Table 1.15: Asset index, household asset holdings and household earnings according to
poverty (deflated values to 2006 Bolivianos)
Year Number Asset index Total wealth Total earnings
Non-
poor
Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-
poor
Poor
2002 108 68 0.43 -1.07 4663.3 2076.8 283.8 190.5
2003 107 69 0.46 -1.05 4563.8 2126.2 332.0 205.1
2004 106 70 0.51 -1.01 5225.4 2234.3 356.2 214.8
2005 106 70 0.78 -0.85 5379.8 2627.1 502.9 255.2
2006 106 70 0.96 -0.71 4555.1 2311.8 446.7 215.2
non-poor and poor households increase.
Poverty dynamics and overlaps between chronic poverty and extreme poverty
Having determined poverty at a specific point in time, it would be interesting to estimate
how many households are poor in several periods. Because the panel covers five years,
using a components definition of chronic poverty seems more appropriate and robust than
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using a spells definition (Yaqub, 2000). A components definition of chronic poverty con-
sists in comparing the mean value of the asset index against a poverty line.15
With this definition of chronic poverty, 68 households have their mean asset index below
the poverty line and are chronically poor while 108 are non-chronically poor (table 1.16).
Over time, the chronic poor have increased their values of asset index which have nearly
doubled between 2002 and 2006. In 2006, chronically poor households have greater total
wealth than in 2002 although total wealth has been decreasing between 2005 and 2006.
Such a decrease in household wealth can be potentially explained by the 2006 floods and
one can wonder whether chronically poor households are accumulating assets or whether
this downward trend will persevere.
Non-chronically poor households have their asset index increasing between 2002 and 2006
Table 1.16: Asset index, household asset holdings and household earnings according to
chronic poverty (deflated values to 2006 Bolivianos)
Year Asset index Total wealth Total earnings
Non-
chronic
Chronic
poor
Non-
chronic
Chronic
poor
Non-
chronic
Chronic
poor
2002 0.37 -1.01 4587.6 2194.9 296.1 170.9
2003 0.37 -0.96 4484.9 2143.2 338.9 192.3
2004 0.44 -0.94 4996.5 2510.0 341.1 234.5
2005 0.69 -0.76 5234.2 2777.4 520.4 220.2
2006 0.86 -0.59 4470.0 2380.9 448.8 205.1
while their total wealth decreases between 2002 and 2006, following an increase between
2003 and 2005.
Looking at total earnings, total earnings have increased for both chronically poor and
non-chronically poor households while consumption has decreased.
Comparing with severe poverty, 94% of the severely poor in 2002 are chronically poor over
time and 86% of the severely poor in 2006 have been chronically poor.
To summarise even if some households seem to accumulate assets, others have very low
15I pooled all asset index data and I estimated a normal poverty line at the maximum asset index value
in a fourth decile, which is equal to -0.44 asset index unit.
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values of asset index over time which causes poverty to persist.
Livelihood strategies have shown that some households have managed to implement po-
tentially high-return strategies while other households have strategies with lower returns.
Coupling this information with poverty dynamics, a poverty trap test seems relevant.
The problem is now to identify whether there exist different equilibria with different lev-
els of returns such that some households cannot accumulate assets or whether there is a
slow growth process with only one single equilibrium towards which all households would
converge.
In the following section various tests to find evidence for the existence of a poverty trap
are applied and their results are discussed.
1.5 Tests for a poverty trap for the Tsimane’ households
To be able to test for a poverty trap I have to assume that households are the same over
time and that the asset accumulation process is the same for each household (Naschold,
2005, Carter and Barrett, 2006). Testing for a poverty trap by defining an accumula-
tion process for each household or for each household strategy would never be practical.
Assuming that there exists an identical pattern of asset accumulation sets an important
limit because in reality, strategies lead to different uses of the assets and to different asset
accumulation preferences.
Nonetheless, proceeding with the tests consists in demonstrating that there are non-
linearities and non-convexities in the asset accumulation leading to several equilibria which
could be either stable or unstable. To deal with non-linearities, different parametric, non-
parametric and semiparametric regression techniques are available such as parametric high
degree polynomials, nonparametric locally weighted scatterplot smoother (LOWESS) or
penalised splines and semiparametric penalised splines (Naschold, 2005).
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1.5.1 Specifications of the test
Analysing a non-linear asset accumulation process consists in regressing the current value
of asset index against its lagged value such that:
AIi,t = α0 +
M∑
m=1
βmA
m
i,t−1 + γZi,t + Tt + εi,t (1.5)
where AIi,t is the value of the asset index of household i at time t with t = 2, ..., T , Zi,t
are household characteristics (age of household head, household size, education...) and Tt
are time-dummies that take value 1 if time is t and 0 otherwise (Naschold, 2005).
However identifying an unstable threshold requires either to use a parametric specification
with a large sample or more flexible forms (Naschold, 2005).
Parametric - High-degree polynomial regression
Certain tests for the existence of a poverty trap have employed polynomial regression
techniques to estimate the asset accumulation process (Ruppert et al., 2003, Barrett et al.,
2006). Likewise, I use a fourth-degree polynomial regression to estimate the relationship
between the change in asset index and its lagged value.
Use of the change in asset index instead of its current value is supported by the fact that
there could be some over/underestimations in asset index values which would bias the
model. Furthermore, using the change in asset index leads to the elimination of some
individual effects potentially correlated with the lagged values (Jalan and Ravaillon, 2001,
Naschold, 2005).
∆AIit = β0 + β1AIit−1 + β2AI2it−1 + β3AI
3
it−1 + β4AI
4
it−1 + ΓiZi + Tt + εit (1.6)
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with εit v N(0;σ2ε), 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
The change in asset index over time is a function of a fourth-degree polynomial of its
lagged value AIt−1, of household characteristics Zi, e.g. the age of the household head, the
squared age of the household head, the size of the household and the average educational
attainment of household members, and of time dummies Tt.
Naschold (2005) affirms that the age of the household head and its squared value are used
to include life-cycle effects in the analysis. Only one single lag in the asset index is possible
due to the shortness of the survey period (Naschold, 2005).
Nonparametric - Penalised splines and LOWESS
Contrary to parametric regressions, nonparametric regressions assume that the relation-
ship between the asset index and its lagged value is unknown and must be estimated by
fitting a function f through a scatterplot without any assumptions on its functional form
(Ruppert et al., 2003, Naschold, 2005).
The following function is estimated
AIit = f(AIit−1) + εit, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (1.7)
with εit v N(0;σ2ε).
Different estimation techniques could be used to smooth this relationship and I privilege
a smoothing first through penalised splines and then through LOWESS.
Penalised splines Adapting the notation from Ruppert et al. (2003) and Naschold
(2005), in a spline model, the function f takes the following form
f(AIit−1) = β0+β1AIit−1+. . .+βpAI
p
it−1+
K∑
k=1
uk(AIit−1−κk)++εit, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ T
(1.8)
64
with εit v N(0;σ2ε), u = [u1, ..., uK ]′ v N(0;σ2u).
κ represents a knot and there areK number of knots (Ruppert et al., 2003, Naschold, 2005).
The penalised spline model can be explained by a mixed model methodology where:
y = Xβ + Zu+ ε (1.9)
with β = [β0, β1]′, X =


1 AI11 . . . AI1J
...
...
. . .
...
1 AIn1 . . . AInJ

 and Z =

(AI11 − κ1)+ . . . (AI11 − κK)+
...
. . .
...
(AI1t − κ1)+ . . . (AI1t − κK)+
...
. . .
...
(AIn1 − κ1)+ . . . (AIn1 − κK)+
...
. . .
...
(AInt − κ1)+ . . . (AInt − κK)+

u is treated as a random effect with cov(u) = σ2uI and σ
2
u = σ
2
ε/λ
2.
λ is a smoothing parameter that controls for the amount of smoothing. It is estimated
through a restricted maximum likelihood (REML) since the penalised splines (equation
(1.8)) are estimated as best linear unbiased predictors (BLUPs) from a mixed model
(Ruppert et al., 2003). The parameter λ penalises the knot coefficient uk (Ruppert et al.,
2003, Naschold, 2005).
LOWESS The locally weighted smooth scatterplot is a method for smoothing the scat-
terplot (AIit−1AIit) with i = 1, . . . , n being the number of observations in each period
t. At each value of AIit−1, a fitted value is estimated by running a regression in a local
neighbourhood of AIit−1 using weighted least squares. The neighbourhoods are defined as
a proportion of the total number of observations (Naschold, 2005, Cleveland, 1979). The
weight is large if AIit−1 is close to the fitted value, and small if it is not, and therefore
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the points close to AIit−1 play a larger role in the determination of the fitted value of AIit
while the ones further away play a smaller role (Cleveland, 1979).
Then n weighted local regressions would be estimated at each value of AIit−1 in order to
find the smoothed value of AIit (Naschold, 2005).
Semiparametric - Penalised splines
As explained by Ruppert et al. (2003), semiparametric regressions consist in combining
both parametric and nonparametric regression techniques (Ruppert et al., 2003). Here
this consists in adding to the nonparametric specification of equation (1.7) the parametric
element of equation (1.6). The semiparametric model could be written as
Ait = β0 + βxXit + f(Ait−1) + εit (1.10)
with 1 ≤ i ≤ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T and ε v N(0;σ2ε).
The equation (1.10) introduces to the nonparametric equation (1.7) different parametric
elements, Xit such as household characteristics (education, size of the household, age,...),
or time dummies taking the value 1 at time t and the value 0 otherwise. These time
dummies as well as the age of the household head and its squared value, absorb the
time-specific effects, while the household-specific effect are contained by household char-
acteristics (Naschold, 2005).
To fit the regression, the nonparametric element are smoothed using penalized splines
through a mixed model as described before (Ruppert et al., 2003, Naschold, 2005).
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1.5.2 Results of these different estimation techniques
Parametric - high-degree polynomial results
The estimation of a fourth-degree polynomial regression is done using the variables pre-
sented in table A.7 in appendix. Over the whole period the change in asset index is on
average equal to 0.12 but this change varies over time. The change in asset index between
2002 and 2003 is on average equal to 0.02 while it is on average equal to 0.21 between
2004 and 2005.
A household fixed-effect estimation is selected since an Hausman test fails to accept the
null hypothesis that the random-effect estimators are more efficient than the fixed-effect
estimators. It seems that the regressors are correlated with the household effect; house-
hold fixed-effect estimators are consistent and efficient.
The coefficients obtained from the parametric regression show that the lagged asset index
at a first-degree power has a negative and significant impact on the change in the asset
index, while all lagged asset indices with higher degree powers have no significant effects
on the change in the asset index (table 1.17). The negative sign of the lagged asset index
illustrates the fact that the higher the asset index in the previous period, the lower the
change in the asset index at the current period.
None of the high-degree coefficients being significant means that there are not any non-
linearities in the accumulation of assets. Plotting the values of the lagged asset index using
these coefficients show greater are the values of asset index, smaller the changes. Over
time, asset accumulation by the Tsimane’ seems to follow a linear process and household
asset index may converge towards a single equilibrium.
It seems that changes in asset index are linked to the age of the household head. As
household head ages, the changes in asset index increase from one year to the other but
at a decreasing rate. Also, as expected, larger households need more assets than smaller
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Table 1.17: Estimation of change in asset index (Household fixed effects)
Variables Change asset index (1) Change asset index (2) Change asset index (3)
Lagged asset index -1.071*** (0.0824) -1.048*** (0.0610) -1.075*** (0.0826)
Squared lagged asset index 0.0528 (0.0363) 0.0548 (0.0360) 0.0536 (0.0363)
Cubed lagged asset index -0.00366 (0.0233) -0.0125 (0.00838) -0.00379 (0.0234)
Fourth degree lagged asset index -0.00155 (0.0038) -0.00151 (0.00382)
Age household head 0.0449** (0.0224) 0.0441** (0.0223) 0.0441* (0.0225)
Squared age household head -0.000449** (0.0002) -0.000440** (0.000208) -0.000442** (0.000209)
Education household head 0.02 (0.0261) 0.0217 (0.0261) 0.0206 (0.0262)
Household size 0.280*** (0.0266) 0.280*** (0.0266) 0.280*** (0.0266)
Children -0.0152 (0.0170)
Dummy for 2002 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Dummy for 2003 -0.189**(0.0733) 0 (0) -0.197***(0.0739)
Dummy for 2004 -0.1 (0.0731) 0.0929 (0.0705) -0.102 (0.0734)
Dummy for 2005 0 (0) 0.187** (0.0730) 0 (0)
Dummy for 2006 0.170**(0.0733) 0.360*** (0.0735) 0.165** (0.0736)
Constant -2.902***(0.5759) -3.075*** (0.576) -2.833*** (0.581)
Observations 580 580 580
Number of hhid 176 176 176
R-squared 0.595 0.595 0.596
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
households and are incentivised to accumulate assets from one period to another.
With the parametric coefficients from regression (1), the values of the current asset index
can be predicted. A plot of these predicted values of the asset index against its lagged value
(figure 1.4) shows that there is no S-shape in the asset accumulation and no Micawber
threshold that would keep household in a poverty trap.
The asset accumulation process seems linear which is consistent with the result that only
Figure 1.4: Scatterplot predicted asset index against its lagged value
the lagged asset index at a single power is significant.
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Nonparametric - Penalised splines and Lowess results
Penalised splines The estimations of nonparametric and semiparametric penalised
splines have been done using the package SemiPar 1.0 on R (Wand et al., 2005). 3.335
degrees of freedom and 35 knots have been retained.16 Having a small number of degrees
of freedom suggests that the asset accumulation may be not very non-linear (Naschold,
2005).
The curve (figure 1.5) confirms that there are not any non-linearities. It seems that there
is not an S-shape as required to obtain a poverty trap mechanism. However there is a
smooth concavity in the asset accumulation leading to conclude that asset accumulation
would be larger for smaller values of asset index (Naschold, 2005).
Figure 1.5: Scatterplot asset index against its lagged value using penalized splines (non-
parametric)
The asset accumulation would reach a single equilibrium around [0.9, 1.1] represented by
the intersection of a 45-degree line and the curve. However, the slope of the curve suggests
that reaching this asset equilibrium would take time.
16I have tried with different degrees of freedom and different number of knots, but I have obtained the
same results, no S-shape and no Micawber threshold; only the slope changed.
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LOWESS The estimation of the asset accumulation with a LOWESS used as smoothing
parameter has been plotted using STATA 10 and gives a curve quite similar as the one
obtained with nonparametric penalised splines.
Figure 1.6 shows that there are no non-linearities or non-convexities in the asset accumula-
tion. There is no S-shape and no evidence of a poverty trap situation. On the other hand,
Figure 1.6: Scatterplot asset index against its lagged value using LOWESS (nonparamet-
ric)
the curve confirms that there could be a single equilibrium that lies between [0.9; 1.1] asset
units.
Semiparametric - Penalised splines results
I attempted different specifications starting by considering only the time dummies, then
all the time dummies and some household characteristics, but these tests have failed. The
specification finally retained consists in estimating the level of asset index at the current
period as a function of the household size at the current period, of a time dummy for
200617, and of a nonparametric function. In this specification, time-specific effects are
only captured by a time dummy for 2006.
17I try different specifications starting by considering only the time dummies, then all the time dummies
and all household characteristics of the high-polynomial but the regressions could not converge and the
coefficients be estimated. The only other specification that could be estimated includes the age and squared
age of household head and a time dummy for 2003 and I obtain the same results as the ones presented
here.
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2.194 degrees of freedom and 35 knots are retained to proceed to the smoothing of the
lagged asset index.
In this specification, both the household size and the time dummy have positive and sig-
nificant effects on the current asset index. Here as well, there is no S-shape in the asset
Figure 1.7: Scatterplot asset index against its lagged value using penalized splines (semi-
parametric)
accumulation, and there is no evidence of a poverty trap situation. Asset accumulation
seems to be concave.
The asset accumulation would reach a single equilibrium also around [0.9; 1.1] asset index
units.
Even when introducing more flexibility in the estimation of the asset accumulation by
using semiparametric regression, none of these models show that a poverty trap could
arise while considering the Tsimane’ assets.
All these models have a concave shape with a single equilibrium around [0.9; 1.1] asset
index units. The concavity of the curves implies that even if asset accumulation is larger
for households with small quantities of assets, these households need more time to reach
the equilibrium than the households with higher levels of assets.
As a consequence, even if there is no evidence of the existence of a poverty trap, the
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Tsimane’ households are really poor in terms of asset index and escaping their low welfare
level situations seems quite infeasible. The concavity of the different curves suggest that
reaching an asset index equilibrium would take time for the Tsimane’ households.
1.6 Discussion on the non-existence of a poverty trap
Testing for a poverty trap has required a number of flexible specifications, however even
when using flexible functional forms, none of these estimations has brought any evidence
for the existence of a poverty trap for the Tsimane’. The accumulation of assets seems to
be linear and a single equilibrium towards which the households should converge appears
to exist.
The hypothesis of the existence of a poverty trap and of a Micawber threshold as formu-
lated by Carter and Barrett (2006) is rejected. This conclusion contradicts what Lybbert
et al. (2004) and Carter and Barrett (2006) have found in their own studies but it also con-
firms what Naschold (2005), Quisumbing and Baulch (2009) and Giesbert and Schindler
(2010) have established in other countries. It seems though that the nature of the Tsi-
mane’ livelihoods and their asset diversification impede to find evidence of a threshold and
an S-shaped curve.
However, even if there is no poverty trap as Carter and Barrett’s definition, it is quite
plausible that the single equilibrium found in the previous estimations correspond to an
equilibrium in the lower part of the S-shaped curve. The Tsimane’ households are poor
and more likely to remain poor all their life than to escape poverty.
1.6.1 Absence of poverty trap for the Tsimane’...
Most studies identifying a poverty trap (Lybbert et al., 2004, Carter and Barrett, 2006)
look at the accumulation of a single asset: cattle. For Ethiopian and Kenyan herders, cat-
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tle is an asset but also has a religious value and can be used as food. The loss of livestock
and the absence of other means to generate their livelihood and fulfil consumption needs
explain why some herders are trapped into poverty while others can manage to have a
herd size large enough to improve their welfare. On the contrary, the Tsimane’ have a
wider range of assets upon which they rely to generate their livelihood; when a Tsimane’
household loses one asset used in activity, it can switch to another asset to sustain its
livelihood. As a consequence, this diversification tends to smooth the differences between
households and creates a linear pattern in asset accumulation.
Using an asset index, Adato et al. (2006) has found evidence of a poverty trap but in their
study, households seem more heterogenous; there are more observations at different levels
of assets which allows the detection of an S-shaped curve. On the contrary, the values of
the asset index for the Tsimane’ are clustered around 0, and there are no sharp differences
in the values of asset index between households over time. There are too few observations
at high and low values of asset index and even less observations to capture the unstable
threshold.
Naschold (2005) has not found any asset poverty trap neither in Ethiopia nor in Pakistan
and he affirms that asset accumulations in both countries are smoothly concave, which im-
plies that poorer households accumulate assets and recover from shocks more slowly than
wealthier households. Quisumbing and Baulch (2009) explain that the lack of evidence of
an S-shaped curve in Bangladesh is due to an absence of the exclusionary mechanisms as
defined by Carter and Barrett (2006) and to a lack of sharp differences between household
livelihoods. Giesbert and Schindler (2010) have not found the S-shaped curve in the asset
accumulation in Mozambique arguing that rural livelihoods are too homogenous and that
households may actually be in the lower equilibrium.
These latter studies conclude that as it is the case for the Tsimane’, not finding the poverty
trap does not mean the end of poverty; households are more likely to stay poor and ex-
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ternal aid is required to help them to improve their welfare.
1.6.2 ...but not the end of poverty
Failing to prove that a poverty trap does exist among the Tsimane’ households does not
imply that they are able to escape the low levels of economic development in which they
persist. What seems a more plausible story is that even if the model does not show evi-
dence of a poverty trap situation, the Tsimane’ are stuck into poverty and the equilibrium
may be the low equilibrium toward which households converge. Poor living standards,
poor quality of assets and volatile consumption confirm that the households are more
likely to live all their life into poverty than reaching higher levels of welfare.
Considering their BMI, the average BMI of the Tsimane’ adult has not improved over
time. On average, the BMI for the children aged less than 5 years old has decreased from
17.06 to 16.56 between 2002 and 2006. Malnutrition does not seem to affect the majority
of adults but Tsimane’ children may suffer from it.
Furthermore, lack of increase in education levels proves that persistent poverty is a reality
for the Tsimane’ households. Between 2002 and 2006, average education has stagnated
at a 2nd grade in primary education for household members aged more than 15 years old
meaning that on average young adults have not reached higher grades than older adults.
No improvements in average education have been observed in younger individuals, aged
6-15 years old, for whom average grade remains a first grade in primary education.
Persistence of poverty is confirmed by the estimations. According to these latter, the Tsi-
mane’ should reach an equilibrium found at [0.9; 1.1] asset index units; however, in all five
years, more than 80% of the households have their asset index below 0.9 asset index units
during the period. Defining chronic poverty as equal to half of the equilibrium in asset
index units (0.5 asset index units), 75% of the households in the sample are chronically
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poor.
Most Tsimane’ households are far from the equilibrium and even if accumulating assets,
80% in 2006 of the households in a low-return strategy have their asset index smaller than
[0.9;1.1] asset index units. 60% of the households in a high-return strategy have their
asset index above the equilibrium in 2006 with higher wage and sales earnings. However,
since the number of households in the high-return strategy is small, the large majority of
Tsimane’ households is more likely to remain poor.
Even if household wealth increases, the estimations show that asset accumulation is a slow
process that won’t help households to escape poverty in their lifetime.
Furthermore, a majority of changes in asset holdings is to some extent related to external
aid. During the last decade, the Tsimane’ have faced many floods that have attracted
attention from international NGOs and increased their interventions in the area. After
the 2006 floods, 67% of the households answered receiving small assets such as machete,
knives and buckets from the Red Cross. External aid and interventions of international
NGOs appear to be one of the main reasons why households are able to slowly accumu-
late assets and without such interventions, one can wonder whether the Tsimane’ living
conditions would not be even worse.
1.7 Conclusion
My results show that there is no evidence of a poverty trap as Carter and Barrett’s
definition. But this result does not rule out the existence of a poverty trap situation for
the Tsimane’. The Tsimane’ have low levels of earnings and assets and they are poor
when compared to an average Bolivian household.
With respect to the asset index, the majority of households are below the equilibrium in
the last year of the survey and even if they are accumulating assets, this is a slow process
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starting from low levels of assets. As a result, the Tsimane’ households won’t escape
poverty in their lifetime.
But clearly, asset diversification is important for the Tsimane’ in order to reduce poverty
pressures through the creation of earnings from one or several sources. Even if they are
low values, earnings and sales are more important when households have higher levels of
asset holdings, and agricultural production also increases when asset holdings increase.
It seems that households are using their labour in activities that may or may not be related
to forest resources. As a consequence, further research should deal with determining and
analysing those factors pushing households to allocate their labour to different activities
and, furthermore, whether allocations of labour in forest-related activities could provide
an improvement in household welfare.
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Chapter 2
Welfare impacts from non-timber
forest product extractions in
South Cameroon
Households living within forests are assumed to combine non-timber forest product (NTFP)
extraction to other activities in order to cope with shocks or manage risks. The poten-
tialities of participating in NTFP extraction to improve household welfare are often un-
dermined. This study is aimed at analysing whether participating in NTFP activities and
combining these activities with others can improve household welfare. A non-separable
household model of production is estimated to analyse labour supply and allocations
employing data I collected in February-May 2009 in the Province South of Cameroon.
Marginal and average shadow wages are respectively estimated through production func-
tions and through the quotient of earnings on time. Endogeneity problems are controlled
for using relevant instrumental variables. Welfare analysis is derived from all empirical
results, theoretical model and descriptive analysis. Poorer households depend more on
NTFP extraction than wealthier households but on average, households engaged in NTFP
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extraction appear to be better off than households not engaged in such activities. Labour
supply estimations report that household marginal shadow wage and income have respec-
tively positive and negative effect on leisure. Whether agricultural prices increase and
increase shadow income, this has a positive or negative effect on consumption depend-
ing whether household is net-buyer or net-seller and an indeterminate effect on leisure.
However, according to labour allocations estimations, households would work more in agri-
culture and off-farm activities after an increase in agricultural earnings. On the contrary,
if the increase in household shadow income results from an increase in NTFP prices, this
has a net positive effect on household consumption and an indeterminate effect on leisure,
but it seems quite likely that the effects on consumption outweigh any effects on leisure.
An increase in NTFP prices allows households to get better off without pushing them to
spend more time extracting NTFPs.
2.1 Introduction
Households living within forests use forest resources to implement activities such as non-
timber forest product (NTFP) extraction or hunting, agriculture, logging or raising ani-
mals (Byron and Arnold, 1999, Wunder, 2001). Households also develop off-farm off-forest
activities and participate in wage activity or create their own self-employed activity. How-
ever even if forest households seem to have diversified livelihoods combining a wide range
of activities, it is generally acknowledged that these households are poor and that they
diversify into NTFP activities in order to manage their risks or cope with shocks (Arnold
and Townson, 1998, Byron and Arnold, 1999, Angelsen and Wunder, 2003, Sunderlin et al.,
2007). However, such a conclusion is generally acknowledged without any strong empirical
findings.
Little empirical evidence exists on forest household’s welfare and even less is known
whether households can improve their welfare through the extraction of different NTFPs
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or the combination of NTFP activities with other activities. Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor
(2008) report that households extracting a single NTFP in Mexico are able to improve their
welfare through this extraction. However, their analysis fails to explain how households
combine this activity with others and what are the effects from different combinations of
activities.
As a consequence, the lack of evidence on forest household’s welfare and on the role of
forest activities to improve it, has motivated this study. This chapter intends to provide an
analysis on how forest households supply their labour and what are the factors explaining
activity combinations, and it investigates whether or not NTFP extraction can improve
households’ welfare.
Following pioneering studies like Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994), I use a non-separable
household model of production as specified by Singh et al. (1986) and Benjamin (1992)
to analyse household labour supply. Prior to estimating household labour supply, I esti-
mate the marginal shadow wage from agriculture and NTFP production functions, and
I calculate shadow income, both shadow values explaining household labour supply. As
in Fisher et al. (2005), Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor (2008) and Sikei et al. (2009), labour
allocations to different activities are also analysed in such a framework. Average shadow
wages in agriculture, NTFP activities and off-farm employment are estimated using the
quotient of earnings over time since marginal values in off-farm employment and NTFP
activities are respectively not estimable and implausible. Since some households do not
participate in the latter two activities, Heckman specifications control for the selection
bias. Endogeneity problems occur in most estimations and these are controlled for using
appropriate and relevant instrumental variables. Finally I combine these results with the
model and the descriptive analysis to examine how to improve household welfare.
Since household data usually do not focus on the specificities of forest activities, I have
collected my own data in February-May 2009 in thirteen villages of the Province South
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in Cameroon. Following a 1999 survey, forest households in this Province are engaged in
a wide range of activities and the data collected focus on production and time spent in
agriculture, NTFP extraction, hunting, wage and self-employment activities.
Overall, I find that for households in the research area, NTFP extraction and hunting
contribute to 8 and 2% of their total production respectively. Poorer households depend
more on NTFP extractions than wealthier households but on average, households engaged
in NTFP extraction appear to be better off than households not engaged in such activities.
Labour supply estimations report that household marginal shadow wage and income have
respectively positive and negative effect on leisure which is an inferior good. Whether
agricultural prices increase and increase shadow income, this has a positive or negative
effect on consumption depending whether the household is a net-buyer or a net-seller, and
it has an indeterminate effect on leisure. However, according to labour allocations esti-
mations, households work more in agriculture and off-farm activities after an increase in
agricultural earnings. On the contrary, if the increase in household shadow income results
from an increase in NTFP prices, this has a net positive effect on household consumption
and an indeterminate effect on leisure, but it seems quite likely that the effects on con-
sumption outweigh any effects on leisure. An increase in NTFP prices allows households
to get better off without pushing them to spend more time extracting NTFPs.
The different steps to reach these conclusions are as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
research area and the 1999 survey as well as the questionnaire used in 2009 and the field-
work. Section 2.3 gives a detailed description of the forest households and their activities.
The theoretical model and the existing literature are presented in section 2.4. Section
2.5 is dedicated to the estimation of agricultural and NTFP production functions and the
estimation of the total labour supply function. Section 2.6 looks at labour allocations
to agriculture, NTFP extraction, off-farm employment and hunting. Section 2.7 analyses
whether households engaged in NTFP extraction are better off and how they can im-
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prove their welfare. Section 2.8 concludes and gives some policy implications linked to the
management of forest resources.
2.2 Fieldwork, research area and data collection
Analysing labour allocations and livelihood strategies of people living near or within forests
requires data on NTFP extractive activities but also agriculture, wage activities, self-
employment, and their different levels of output, inputs and sales. It is also relevant to
know about their non-labour income and consumption levels to have a full analysis of
households’ livelihood.
However the lack of detailed household data on all these questions in forest areas forces
me to collect my own data. Searching for areas with forest covers and with households
using natural resources and intervening in agricultural and NTFP markets, the Province
South in Cameroon seems to be a suitable research area. Besides, the fact that in 1999
a survey has been done by Tropenbos International motivates the collection of another
round of data.
2.2.1 Tropenbos International in Cameroon and the 1999 survey
In the late 1990s, Tropenbos International, a Dutch non-governmental organisation (NGO)
launched an innovative research project in some villages of the Province South in Cameroon
to promote community involvement in the sustainable management of forest resources.
The research area was about 200,000 hectares of forest land in the plains and mountains
of the Bipindi-Akom II area (figure 3.2) which was a former concession of a Dutch logging
company. This area was not densely populated and main tribes were Bulu, Ngoumba,
Bassa, Fang and Pygmies. Poor infrastructure limited trade among villages and small
towns and households were mainly engaged in subsistence agriculture (van Dijk and Wier-
sum, 1999).
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Tropenbos International’s goal was “to develop methods and strategies for natural forest
management directed at sustainable production of timber and other forest products and
services” (Jonkers and Foahom, 2004). They implemented 14 research projects to assess
the legal, ecologic, economic and social aspects of forest uses in the area (Lescuyer et al.,
1999).
In relation to ecological and forestry management issues, these research projects showed
that land uses were not intensive and had only modest impacts on flooding, erosion and
draughts. According to their findings, villages were poorly organised and households have
no legal title on their land which they secure through customary property rights. The
projects recognised that forest management should ensure forest regeneration and growth
through forest conservation and animal protection. Furthermore, if they organise in small
cooperatives, villagers could take control of this management (Jonkers and Foahom, 2004).
In 1999, one of these research projects was a household survey collecting “socio-economic
information about the households living in the area and determining what were their differ-
ent economic activities related to forest cover” (Lescuyer et al., 1999). Its objectives were
four-fold: to describe the different types of villages in the area; to report households’ main
activities; to estimate their uses of forest cover; and to define which forest conservation
measures could be implemented in the area (Lescuyer et al., 1999). The questionnaire en-
compassed questions about households’ characteristics, the different food and cash crops
cultivated, households’ participation in wage activities and their food and non-food ex-
penditures. The researchers listed all NTFPs collected and game hunted.
To summarise, this survey found that a household was on average composed of five mem-
bers and their average educational level was the certificate of primary school (“CEPE”).
In terms of participation, food crop agriculture was households’ main activity and was
mainly done by women. Cocoa cultivation was the second activity and was mainly done
by men. The third highest participation rate was in wage activities (Lescuyer et al., 1999).
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Manioc is their main source of production and sale, followed by macabo (cocoyam) and
plantain. Cocoa was an important source of production and sales for households living in
the south of the research area. Considering NTFPs, ndo’o (wild mango, irvinga gabonen-
sis), palm nut (elaeis guineensis) and ekouk (alstonia boonei) represented respectively 24,
12 and 10% of total NTFP extractions, other NTFPs being quite marginal; all NTFPs
were aimed at home-consumption. Porcupine, palmist rat and hare were the most impor-
tant game hunted and they were mainly consumed (Lescuyer et al., 1999).
They reported that households generated 32% of their monetary revenues from sales
of agricultural products and 26% from self-employed activities and non-labour income.
Household average income was CFAF 470,000 per year and half of the households had an
income below CFAF 200,000 per year. Considering their cash expenditures, households
spent yearly around CFAF 272,000; 30% of these expenditures were food expenditures
whereas health, school and other expenditures represent each 15% of total expenditures
(Lescuyer et al., 1999).
Starting from this report I wanted to do a follow-up survey on the research area to esti-
mate whether changes had occurred over 10 years and whether community forests were
implemented as Tropenbos had recommended villages to do so.
2.2.2 Description of research area and sample definition.
At first, my objective in collecting these data was to create a panel dataset which involved
interviewing the same households as were surveyed in 1999. Unfortunately, the loss of the
original household list made this impossible and instead of surveying identical households
as ten years ago, the survey was limited to interviewing households in the same villages.
In 1999, 18 villages were surveyed; out of these 18, I decided to undertake the data col-
lection in 13 villages that are located in 5 districts. The research area consists of villages
organised around three small-size towns: Lolodorf, Bipindi and Akom II. Lolodorf was not
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surveyed but both Bipindi and Akom II were. The capital of the region South is Ebolowa
and another important town is Kribi, though I did not survey any villages close to these
towns. The villages surveyed are (ranged in order of data collection dates): Mbango-
Bitouer, Ebom, Mekalat, Bipindi, Lambi, Bidjouka, Ebimimbang, Bongwana, Akom II,
Nkomakak, Abiete, Mvie and Nyangong (table 2.1 and figure 2.1).
Table 2.1: Villages: district, size, distance to market and remoteness
Villages District Village sizea Distance Market (km) Remote villageb
Mbango-Bitouer Lolodorf 75 8 No
Ebom Efoulan 60 20 No
Mekalat Efoulan 50 20 No
Bipindi Bipindi 200 0 No
Lambi Bipindi 100 3 No
Bidjouka Bipindi 100 10 No
Ebimimbang Bipindi 100 15 Yes
Bongwana Bipindi 20 10 Yes
Akom II Akom II 300 0 No
Nkomakak Akom II 100 3 No
Abiete Akom II 70 18 Yes
Mvie Akom II n/a 12 Yes
Nyangong Ebolowa 70 60 Yes
aNumber of households
bWhether commuting to main town is not easy and cannot be done all year round
The first three villages are well-connected to Lolodorf from where bus services connect
the town to Yaounde´, the capital city, to Ebolowa and to Kribi. Lambi and Bidjouka
are on a road between Lolodorf and Bipindi but are closer to Bipindi. Ebimimbang and
Bongwana are close to Bipindi but poor roads make the connection to the town incredibly
difficult. Bipindi has road infrastructure to go to Lolodorf, Yaounde´ and Kribi. Akom II is
well-connected to Kribi and Ebolowa. Nyangong is reachable from Ebolowa and Akom II
through a road that goes deep into the forest and requires a four-hour drive from Ebolowa
and Akom II but access is unfeasible when it rains.
From the 1999 survey, I had an idea about the size of these villages, and using the original
sample size (380 households) I decided that I should interview the same number of house-
holds. When planning the course of the survey, such as the number of days in each village,
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Figure 2.1: Research area: Former Program Tropenbos Area
Source: GoogleEarth c©
the number of enumerators and the number of interviews they could do in a day, I estab-
lished an objective of 450 households. This estimation was drawn from the assumption
of having at least five or six enumerators, with each of them doing three questionnaires a
day. I estimated that in 49 days, we should be able to interview 450 households.
2.2.3 Description of the key parts of the questionnaire
The questionnaire I designed is based upon different World Bank Living-Standard Mea-
surement Surveys (LSMS) and in particular upon the Kagera Health and Development
Survey (KHDS). However my questionnaire is shorter than the aforementioned and focuses
more on forest resources and their uses, as well as hunting and fishing.
It is structured around 7 main parts that are described below. The questionnaire and
code-book are presented in the appendix of this chapter.
Household roster Household definition requires determining whether or not to include
in consideration multiple wives, servants or other relatives (Deaton, 1997). In this case,
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household and household members are defined as being all individuals living under the
same roof, sharing meals and cultivating the same agricultural plots.
In this part of the questionnaire, the household head lists all household members, their
relationship and age. For members over the age of 16, I asked the household head to
report their marital status and their partners.
Education and health The household head or the most knowledgeable person has
to report educational attainment (been to school, highest grade, literacy...) and health
conditions (ill, health care and chronic diseases) of the different household members aged
1 or more.
Agriculture Regarding agricultural production, I designed a chart where each row refers
to a crop reported as being cultivated in the 1999 survey (Lescuyer et al., 1999). I obtained
a table with seven different products: manioc, macabo (cocoyams), plantains, peanuts,
cucumber, corn and cocoa and I included two additional lines for any other products
households could cultivate.
For each product, households reported conventional elements of production and sales us-
ing local units, values of sales, and whether crops they stored for seeds or consumption.
Households described the different tools used for production, the number of hours spent
in agriculture in the peak and slack season, the number of plots and sizes as well as ex-
penditures on seeds, fertilizers and large equipments.
A final set of questions looked at animals raised by households (chicken, pig, goat or sheep)
in terms of number of animals owned, bought and sold in the last 12 months.
Forest resources extraction From the 1999 socio-economic report, I selected seven
products households often extract from forest: ndo’o (wild mango, irvinga gabonensis),
palm nuts (elaeis guineensis), ekouk (alstonia boonei), cola (nuts), mushrooms, essok
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(garcinia lucida) and okok (gnetum africanum) (Lescuyer et al., 1999, Kekeunou et al.,
2006).
For each product, households reported quantities extracted, sold, consumed and trans-
formed using local units as well as values of sales. I also questioned them about the month
they could find more products, time dedicated to NTFP extraction, distance to extraction
sites and tools.
With respect to hunting and fishing, I previously selected certain types of game and fish
from the 1999 report; for each type of game and fish, households reported quantities
caught, consumed or sold and what were the techniques employed to catch these animals.
When first started the fieldwork, I was particularly keen to understand forest management
designing a set of questions on this particular issue asking all households if they had taken
part in collective initiatives linked to forests and how. Unfortunately few households an-
swered these questions. A lack of involvement in forest management and a small number
of community forests in the research area1 show that there is still much to do in relation
to forest management.
I also asked households whether they were members of any village organisations (religious,
tontine, agricultural...).
Wage and self-employment activities A following part focused on wage and self-
employment activities looking at their different activities, earnings and time spent in each
wage or self-employed activity.
A final set of questions in this part concerned non-labour earnings (remittances, pen-
sions,...).
1Only one village, Mbango-Bitouer has a community forest.
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Credit In this part, I interrogated households on whether they received credit from a
bank, other households or tontine, and whether they reimbursed it.
Consumption and expenditures In this last part, I looked at their food consumption
(both autoconsommation or market products) regarding a large range of products. I
finished the questionnaire with questions about their non-food expenditures.
2.2.4 Implementation and progress of the survey
Prior to beginning the actual survey,a week-long pilot survey was conducted for the purpose
of determining length and accuracy of the questionnaire, and sourcing and training the
enumerators. After finalising the questionnaire and practicalities, the core survey lasted
6 weeks during which I went to 12 remaining villages.
Pilot questionnaire and team training
Tropenbos International helped me to find an assistant with whom they had worked ten
years ago in the South of Cameroon. With him, I went down to Lolodorf to run the
pilot-survey in Mbango-Bitouer which is about 30 minutes from Lolodorf. In Lolodorf, I
hired two local people who had already worked with Tropenbos and in Mbango-Bitouer
two other persons were added to our group.
The qualifications of the five enumerators were pretty basic; I required them to be able to
read and write in French and to know at least one local tongue. Enumerators had to be
able to commit themselves to travel with the project for more than a month.
In Mbango-Bitouer, I started the interviews with the whole team to show them how to
introduce themselves and the project, how to do an interview and what I expected from
the interviews. Afterwards, taking turns the enumerators ran interviews under my ob-
servations, receiving my help whenever they encountered difficulties. In a third step, I
paired them and they went to interview households. I observed each enumerator at least
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once and following each interview, I gave each of them advice. Their main difficulty laid in
understanding the system of codes for units or frequencies; consequently, for the beginning
I asked them to report each unit in letters without entering its code.
In Mbango-Bitouer, interviews were conducted early in the morning so that households
would be found before they went to their plot. Further interviews were done later in the
day. We tried as much as possible to ask people in the morning if they could be home in
the afternoon to do the interviews. However, the system was not successful and house-
holds were not ready to meet us at the time agreed. I had to find another way to contact
households before the enumerators arrived in their house.
After Mbango, I had to dismiss two enumerators who appeared not to have the qualifica-
tions required and I hired three new enumerators. I had then a team of six enumerators
which would be more practical for interviewing 450 households. We went to another vil-
lage Mvog-Esson, not part of the sample, to train the new enumerators and to be sure that
all six were ready. At the end of this second village, I left the enumerators with samples
of the questionnaire as well as instructions on the purpose and methods of the survey. I
agreed with them to meet in two-week time to start the survey.
After the pilot survey, I made small changes to the questionnaire2 which appeared to last
between one hour and one hour and a half. Knowing that I could hope that each enumer-
ator would interview three households per day, then with the objective of 450 households
to survey, I estimated that the fieldwork would last six weeks.
During the pilot-survey, my assistant and I organised practicalities such as traveling be-
tween villages, and eating and sleeping arrangements in each village. Back in Yaounde´,
I had to finish preparing the fieldwork, sequencing a final planning, determining the or-
der to be taken between villages and days spent in each village. I also used this time
2Data from Mbango-Bitouer are comparable to data from the rest of the survey since changes concerned
mainly codes, products that were not listed and the way of writing the questions
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to organize transport from and back to Yaounde´ with the Institut de Recherche pour le
De´veloppement (IRD), to print the questionnaire and to buy all the soaps and presents
for the households and village chefs.
Course of the fieldwork
In any village we arrived, immediately, we had to present ourselves to local and traditional
authorities. In the bigger towns we had to present ourselves to the “sous-pre´fet” and the
commandant of gendarmerie, to provide them documents authorising my research in their
district and to register at the gendarmerie in order not to have trouble with the local
population.
After visiting local authorities, I presented myself and the project to the village chef; I
interviewed him about the different characteristics of the village and asked him if he could
prepare a list of households residing in the village. In the first day, I also had to settle the
team in a hotel or at the village “chefferie”, arrange meals with a cook and find drivers if
the village was big.
From the household list prepared by the chef, I randomly selected half of the households
and went to each selected to introduce myself, the project and my team, and to make
an appointment for the enumerator to come to interview the household head. This way,
I wanted to be sure that households would be home and available when the enumerator
would come to their house.
The interviews started at seven in the morning, enumerators either interviewed another
household at eleven or two households in the afternoon. In any case, we tried neither to
disturb their daily life nor to be intrusive. Households were happy to talk to us, they
respected their appointments and we encountered no major difficulties. Local authorities
were also helpful in the good implementation of the survey.
The interviews lasted on average one hour and at the end of each interview, the enumer-
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ators gave the household two soaps as a present. Most days, the enumerators interviewed
three households and at the end of the fieldwork, we managed to survey 457 households
in all 13 villages.
2.2.5 Data entry and limits faced during data cleaning
Data entry on CSPro
During the fieldwork, I tried as often as possible to input data using CSPro but the lack
of electricity made this impossible. Thus I was forced to read the questionnaires and to
ask clarifications of enumerators and households.
CSPro requires the creation of a data dictionary, defining all variables, their length and
their nature (numeric or alphanumeric). In the majority of cases, I created codes before
starting the survey but in other cases I had to create codes when households used local
units that were not coded yet. After creating the dictionary, an item was defined for each
section and for each question and a form was attached to each questionnaire. At the end
there were as many forms as households interviewed.
After inputting data I exported them to STATA where I could clean them and solve any
problems arising with the units.
Cleaning data and limits of data
Since I asked households to report how often they were producing and the quantities,
cleaning the agricultural data and searching for extremely high or low values required
standardising units of time to a single period; I decided to convert every production for a
period of two weeks.
I also converted quantities in value since quantities were reported using local units (bag,
“filet”, basket and bucket) and I had only an incomplete set of conversion factors. It
seems as legitimate to add up values of different products as adding up kilograms and the
91
majority of studies estimating agricultural production employ production values rather
than quantities (Jacoby, 1993, Skoufias, 1994, Abdulai and Regmi, 2000).
To define values of production, I first estimated a median price for each commodity in each
unit in each district depending on the available number of observations. In a few cases,
for instance bucket of maize or bucket of peanuts, the small number of observations for
a particular crop in a particular unit forced me to estimate research level median prices
instead of district prices. With respect to NTFPs, I estimated prices at the level of the
research area since the number of price data at the district level was fairly small. Overall,
prices for cash crops did not vary much between districts while prices for kilograms of
manioc or macabo can vary by two to six times between districts.
The last step of this process consisted in looking for extremely high or low values. Ex-
tremely high values occurred when a small size household reported harvesting large quan-
tities of crops quite frequently while selling smaller quantities less frequently. For instance,
four, five and eight households report strangely high quantities harvested for respectively
manioc, macabo and plantain while quantities sold were small; as a result for the frequency
of harvest I substituted to that of sales, the latter frequency data being more plausible.
Five households had extremely low values and reported sales greater than harvest without
having stored from previous seasons; again for the frequency of harvest I substituted to
that of sales.
In the end, I had 30 cases that could not be used for the purpose of this study because of
missing or unusable answers in most parts of the questionnaire. In these cases, households
gave qualitative instead of quantitative answers for their production or did not give any
frequency data. The following analysis is drawn on 427 households instead of 457.
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2.3 Descriptive analysis and findings from the survey
2.3.1 Villages and household description
Observing that the sample surveyed in each village represents half of the village popula-
tion, a succinct description of the villages can be done (table 2.2).
Generally in the research area, households seem to be from a “Bulu” ethnicity although in
Mbango-Bitouer, Lambi and Bidjouka, households are mostly from the “Ngoumba” eth-
nicity. Villages where “Bulu” households are predominant are less ethnically diversified
than other villages; Bipindi is the most ethnically diversified.
From my observations and conversations with households, Mbango-Bitouer, Bipindi,
Table 2.2: Villages: number of households, ethnicity, religion and language
Ethnicity
Villages Sample size
Main Second
Religion Language
Lolodorf
Mbango-Bitouer 29 Ngoumba (90%) Bulu(7%) Protestant(60%) French (45%)
Efoulan
Ebom 32 Bulu (93%) Fang (3%) Protestant (85%) French (65%)
Mekalat 17 Bulu (100%) Protestant (72%) Bulu (55%)
Bipindi
Bipindi 74 Bassa (53%) Other (14%) Catholic (53%) French (72%)
Lambi 28 Ngoumba (91%) Fang (5%) Protestant (70%) French (50%)
Bidjouka 35 Ngoumba (75%) Fang (16%) Catholic (41%) French (64%)
Ebimimbang 42 Fang (78%) Bulu (9%) Catholic (57%) Other (43%)
Bongwana 16 Fang (78%) Ngoumba (22%) Catholic (66%) Other (77%)
Akom II
Akom II 46 Bulu (84%) Bagyeli (14%) Protestant (53%) French (63%)
Nkomakak 18 Bulu (78%) Bagyeli (22%) Protestant (94%) French (100%)
Abiete 21 Bulu (95%) Other (5%) Protestant (90%) French (90%)
Mvie 21 Bulu (100%) Protestant (53%) Bulu (66%)
Ebolowa
Nyangong 48 Bulu (98%) Other (2%) Protestant (77%) French (51%)
Lambi and Bidjouka have more degraded forest areas than other villages. Size of these
villages associated with a greater competition over land, and better road infrastructure
seem to be positively correlated with forest degradations. On the other hand, both Akom
II and Nyangong are fairly large villages but both have quite well-preserved forest areas;
competition over land is low in both villages and in addition, Nyangong remains very
remote due to poor road infrastructure.
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Households are mainly protestant and no households report being animist in the survey.
Against all expectations, households seem to have answered more often in French than in
their local tongue to the questionnaire.
Pursuing with a description of household characteristics, households are generally equal
in size across the research area; a household is on average composed of 4 to 5 members
(table 2.3). The size of households varies from one to thirteen members and households
composed of 7 members or more live in bigger villages.
Households are composed on average of 2.5 adults (16-64 years old) most of them being
young adults (16-40 years old) and 2 children (less than 15 years old); 20% of the house-
holds are headed by someone aged more than 65 years old (figure 2.2). Households are on
average older in Mvie where young adults seem to have migrated leaving the village with
a predominantly older population.
As common in African countries, households often consist of extended families with several
generations. Around 22% of the households take care of their grand-children and 6% of
their own parents or one of their siblings. Some households practice polygamy; 5% of the
household heads have two or more wives and 21% of household heads are either widowed,
divorced or single.
Table 2.3: Household characteristics: size, age and grade
Household Age Grade
District
size Head Mean Mean Max
Lolodorf 4.6 58.6 40.2 3 4
Bipindi 4.9 48.6 30.0 3 4
Akom II 4.8 53.0 34.3 4 5
Ebolowa 4.8 46.0 29.1 3 4
Efoulan 4.6 49.9 30.1 3 4
Total 4.8 50.2 31.7 3 4
Looking at the age distribution in the research area, the average age of household heads
is about 50 years old and the average age of household members is around 31.7 years old.
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Households living in the district of Lolodorf are on average older than households in the
other districts.
The maximum educational attainment for individuals aged more than 15 years old is
Figure 2.2: Household composition in each district
secondary school (Colle`ge but without a “Brevet”) and the average level of education is
the last years of primary school (CMI1-CM2). Educational attainments do not vary be-
tween districts (figure 2.3) however there exist some differences with respect to the average
education of household heads. In the villages of Akom II and Nkomakak, household heads
have higher levels of education with more household heads holding a Brevet certificate.3
When looking at education across age categories, older individuals have lower levels of
education while those younger tend to have been enrolled in lower secondary school.
92% of the households with children aged between 6 and 15 years old have their children
still attending school. During the survey it became apparent that children tend to repeat
school grades since farm labour obligations impede their attending all classes. It is worth
noting that a lack of committed teachers was a commonly expressed complaint during the
survey.
3Grading certificate at the end of secondary school
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Figure 2.3: Education in each district: average grade (educational levels) of individuals
more than 15 years old and of household head
2.3.2 Productive activities: description of different sources of produc-
tion and revenue and their related productive process
408 out of 427 households confirmed that they cultivate agricultural products in the sam-
ple. 379 households confirmed that they extract NTFPs. After normalising for two weeks
I have 5 missing values in agricultural production and 31 in NTFP extraction.4 Some
missing values are either due to the fact that households report quantity but not the fre-
quency of harvest or collection for all products or because households use units for which
I cannot estimate a price (e.g. a single piece of manioc or a plate of mushrooms).
There were 15 missing values for animal raising, 6 for hunting, 13 for wage activities and
8 for self-employment activities. In these latter cases, missing values were due to the fact
that households recounted performing a certain activity but yet failed to provide quantity
or earning data.
As said earlier, prices for agricultural products were estimated at the district level for
each commodity in each unit when enough observations were available, and these prices
were equal to the median prices received by households when selling the commodity. Since
4NTFP extraction values are underestimated because ekouk does not have a price and some missing
prices for some units for okok and essok
96
less households were engaged in sales of NTFPs or hunting products, prices for NTFPs
and the ones for hunting were estimated for the whole research area. Since there were no
prices for fishing products, I did not include fishing in the productive activities even if 255
households reported fishing.
In the end, I rejected households from a productive activity for which I had missing
production values, but I kept them in the analysis of the other productive activities for
which I could estimate production values. As a result, the descriptive analysis of different
productive activities is still based on 427 households but with 403 households working
in agriculture, 348 households extracting NTFPs, 169 households hunting, 88 households
with wage income and 136 with self-employment earnings.
Sources of revenue
Production values from agriculture, NTFP extraction and hunting, earnings from wage
and self-employed, and income from non-labour sources presented in the table 2.4 below
seem plausible. On average, household total production5 per capita for two weeks is equal
to CFAF 25,792 which is about PPP US$1056 per capita for two weeks.
Because the villages are all located in rural areas, agriculture, as expected, is their main
source of production (table 2.4). It seems that wage earnings are on average more impor-
tant than expected; but such result should not lead us to underestimate the importance
of NTFP extraction to household total production.
Looking at the data, on average, during two weeks agricultural production represents
CFAF 16,485 per capita which is around 64% of household total production while NTFP
extraction for the whole sample is about 8% of household total production. Wage earnings
5I refer here as household total production being the value in CFA Francs equal to the sum of agricultural
production in value, NTFP extraction in value, hunting production in value, wage and self-employed
earnings, livestock earnings and non-labour income.
6Implied PPP exchange rate in 2009 US$1=244.832CFAF. Source EconomyWatch.com
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account for 13% of household total production and the remainder is from self-employment
and hunting, and more marginally from livestock earnings and non-labour income (table
2.4).
The most remote village, Nyangong in the Ebolowa district is the poorest village in the
research area, while Mbango-Bitouer in the Lolodorf district is the wealthiest one. House-
holds in the Efoulan district seem to be better off than households in the districts of
Bipindi and Akom.
Agricultural production accounts for most of the variation in household total production
between villages. In Lolodorf, households have on average greater agricultural production
both in absolute terms and as a share of their total production; on average agricultural
production in Mbango-Bitouer accounts for 84% of household total production while ac-
counting for between 42% and 70% of household total production in the other districts.
The importance of agriculture for households in the district of Lolodorf could result from
better soil quality, since households reported clearing their plots more recently, and from
easier access to bigger markets in Lolodorf and Yaounde´. In addition since I did not survey
the main town, wage activities are quite marginal for households in this district.
With respect to NTFP extraction, households in the district of Ebolowa have on average
10% of their total production from such activity. While I expected households in Akom
II to have similar contribution, only 5% of their total production is explained by NTFP
extraction. This is quite unexpected for Akom II since the district has large forest cover.
Hunting contribution tends to be linked to forest depletion. Villages with depleted forest
areas, e.g Lolodorf and Bipindi, have households with 1 and 3% of their total production
coming from hunting respectively. In Ebolowa where forests are better preserved, hunting
represents about 10% of household total production. Similarly as NTFP extraction, house-
holds in the Akom II district have smaller hunting values than expected since I observed
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Table 2.4: Production values of different economic activities (CFA Francs per capita for
two weeks)
Agriculture Animal Non-timber Hunting Wage Self- Non-labour TOTAL
raising forest products employment income
Districts
Lolodorf 46107.8 29.4 6875.2 958.6 568.9 25.8 294.7 54860.8
Bipindi 16202.5 140.7 1924.1 770.3 2200.7 1414.3 281.9 22934.6
Akom II 10276.6 230.6 1397.4 704.8 7292.0 3336.1 662.6 23900.3
Ebolowa 9485.6 152.8 2021.9 2103.5 2359.7 3217.2 187.7 19528.5
Efoulan 20365.6 275.0 2168.8 1526.2 3003.5 2683.6 168.3 30191.3
Per capita production quintile
Lowest 2082.5 82.6 561.3 165.3 168.7 321.3 221.9 3603.7
2nd 4421.7 122.3 758.4 395.9 877.3 756.9 317.9 7650.5
3rd 8901.2 192.4 1400.4 619.7 1537.6 1210.9 431.4 14293.8
4th 16321.6 212.0 3012.6 1591.7 2117.7 3049.9 336.6 26642.2
Highest 50957.4 252.7 5138.6 2259.0 12679.1 5420.4 461.0 77168.4
Total 16485.1 172.2 2168.7 1003.4 3463.8 2145.4 353.7 25792.5
that many restaurants were serving game. Such a result could be linked to the presence
of a nearby national reserve which pushes households to under-report hunting.
Overall, wage activities account for 13% of household total production; households living
in the Akom II district have more than 30% of their total production from wages. In
the latter district, I surveyed the main town and here the importance of wage may be
explained by the presence of administrative infrastructure.
Looking at the distribution across quintiles of per capita production, total production in
the lowest quintile is fairly small but households in this quintile are larger households
with more children and elders than households in the other quintiles. In addition, 14%
of the households in this first quintile do not participate in agriculture and generate their
livelihood through NTFP extraction, self-employment and non-labour income.
In values, NTFP extraction increases with the quintile but at a slower rate than agricul-
tural production. Contribution of agriculture to total production also increases with the
quintile; agriculture accounts for about 57% of the total production in the lowest quintile
and 66% in the highest one. This increase seems quite counterintuitive but is explained
by the fact that households in the lowest quintile have a greater share of their production
from NTFP extraction (15%) and hunting (5%) than households in the highest quintile
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for which NTFP and hunting activities contribute respectively to 6 and 2% of household
total production. Poorer households in the lowest quintile are more dependent upon forest
resources than wealthier households.
However, across all quintiles households participating in NTFP extraction but not in wage
activities have on average greater production values than households not participating in
NTFP activities but in wage, although households in the highest quintile generate around
16% of household total production from wage activities. Self-employment activities and
non-labour income represent respectively 8% and 6% of poorer household total production
while accounting respectively 7% and only 0.6% for households in the upper quintile.
Figure 2.4: Percentage of households in each quintile of total production per district
Combining both tables and figure 2.4, it seems that wealthier villages (Mbango-Bitouer,
Ebom and Mekalat) are in districts closer to Yaounde´ and have either a specialisation in
agriculture, as in Mbango-Bitouer, or more diversified and balanced sources of revenue,
which allow them to generate sufficient income.
Households living in Nyangong, even if more dependent upon forest resources for gener-
ating their production values, manage to be less poor than households living in Akom II
where NTFP extraction values are smaller.
To summarise, agriculture accounts for a large part of household production for both
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poor and rich households, while wage activities account for a significant part of household
production of richer households. With respect to NTFP extraction, wealthier households
seem to be less dependent upon these resources than poorer households but it still ac-
counts for a non-negligible part of their total revenue. Overall, households participating
in NTFP extraction have greater production values than households not participating in
these activities.
Agricultural production
Households cultivate mainly manioc, macabo, plantain, peanut, cucumber, maize and co-
coa. While most crops can be sown once or twice a year, cocoa is cultivated only once
a year. 85% of the households in the sample cultivate manioc, macabo and plantain and
nearly half of the households cultivate peanut, cocoa or cucumber.
Households usually work daily on their plots and collect manioc, macabo and plantain
required for their consumption or for selling when they are participating in agricultural
markets. They pick peanut and cucumber once or twice a year depending on how often
they have planted these products. Cocoa is collected once a year and sold to traders gen-
erally along the road or in the village.
Agricultural production is not capital intensive; households use mainly a machete (99%)
and a hoe (95%), and only few of them use a pick (26%) or a sickle (10%). Overall, 60%
of the households have purchased seeds, most commonly to cultivate peanut, cucumber
and maize; 43% of the households purchasing seeds are in the highest quintiles. 6 and 27
households which are on average wealthier have bought respectively fertilizer or pesticides
which are mainly used for cocoa production.
The production process starts using a machete to clear the plot before the rainy season
and after the plot is cleaned and burnt, they sow the different products. On the same
plot, they mix indifferently manioc, macabo, plantain, peanut and cucumber but tend to
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plant cocoa on a separate plot further into the forest.
The average total area of all plots cultivated is about 2.3 hectares and ranges from 1.4
hectares in Mbango to 3.1 in Nyangong. Households in Mbango have opened more plots
more recently than other households; soil for households in Mbango may contain more
nutrients and be of better quality. Furthermore, opening a larger number of plots can
help mitigating the risk of losing all the production if a negative shock arises.
When looking at production values, on average manioc, macabo and plantain production
account respectively for 29, 27 and 21% of the total agricultural production; the impor-
tance of these crops in terms of contribution to agricultural production and their ranking
do not vary when looking across districts (table 2.5).
On average, cocoa contributes to 9% of agricultural production; its contribution to agri-
Table 2.5: Crop production in values (CFA Francs per capita for two weeks)
District Manioc Macabo Plantain Peanut Cucumber Maize Cocoa Total
Lolodorf 17247.7 15423.7 4649.1 2771.2 2172.8 2352.3 1490.9 46107.8
Bipindi 4047.4 3785.0 4775.2 877.5 243.0 820.5 1653.6 16202.5
Akom II 3329.4 3120.7 1469.2 818.2 278.3 659.1 601.8 10276.6
Ebolowa 2546.2 2051.3 1020.1 904.0 902.6 384.5 1676.8 9485.6
Efoulan 5362.5 6828.7 4951.7 899.4 424.3 684.2 1214.7 20365.6
Per capita production quintile
Lowest 579.5 419.1 388.7 141.4 90.6 129.6 333.4 2082.5
2nd 1102.8 1153.0 638.7 254.3 141.0 202.6 929.1 4421.7
3rd 2138.5 2439.4 1520.2 521.0 634.0 404.8 1243.1 8901.2
4th 4530.4 4152.1 3370.2 1127.9 715.4 899.6 1526.0 16321.6
Highest 15467.6 14735.0 11863.4 2955.4 810.6 2475.4 2649.8 50957.4
Total 4747.8 4565.0 3544.1 996.9 477.8 819.8 1333.7 16485.1
cultural production varies across districts. In Ebolowa, cocoa represents on average 17%
of agricultural production while only 3% in Mbango-Bitouer. Cocoa production seems to
be linked to the location of the households, the southern part of the research area being
more suitable.
The other crops remain quite marginal in terms of contribution to agricultural production
both at the level of the research area and across districts mainly as a result of small values
of these products in comparison to others.
Across quintiles of per capita production, production of manioc, macabo and plantain
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slightly increase with the quintile. 30 and 29% of the agricultural revenue of wealthier
households is generated through the production of manioc and macabo respectively while
for poorer households manioc and macabo account for 27% and 20% of their total agricul-
tural production. The production of cucumber and of cocoa decreases with the quintiles.
This result is quite surprising since both products have high unitary prices but it can be
explained by the fact that on average across quintiles, the production values of manioc
and macabo have more increased than the production values of cucumber and cocoa.
With respect to sales, around 84% of the households engaged in agriculture sell their prod-
ucts in the markets or to traders. 90% of households in the upper quintile sell agricultural
products while 75% of the poorer ones do so. Households sell mainly manioc, macabo and
plantain and to a lesser extent households sell peanut and cucumber.
Non-timber forest product extraction values
348 households in the research area extract a wide range of NTFPs which are either
perennial (palm nuts, mushrooms) or annual (ndo’o). I focus on ndo’o, palm nuts7, ekouk,
wild nuts, okok, essok, cola and mushrooms. Households explain that they collect ndo’o
and wild nuts once or twice a year while other products can be collected at any time.
When considering production values, I have not included ekouk because this product is
not sold and its price cannot be estimated. However 60% report extracting ekouk from
the forest and they extract this bark to prepare an anti-malaria medicine.
31% of the households in the area collect ndo’o; more than 44 and 56% of the households
in Mbango and Nyangong collect ndo’o but less than 23% and 14% do it in the districts
of Bipindi and Efoulan. 72% of the households extract palm nuts but only 37% of the
households in Mbango-Bitouer do so. Considering the other NTFPs, 35% of the households
7regimes of palm nuts which are used to prepare red oil and are more important than thatch palm or
the wine from palm nuts.
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extract mushrooms, 15% essok, 10% cola and 5% okok.
Overall, palm nuts and ndo’o are the most important NTFPs for the households and they
represent respectively 40% and 29% of the total NTFP production; the other products are
quite marginal (table 2.6).
Ndo’o extractions in Lolodorf have extremely high values and represent 85% of household
total extraction; 6 households in the district of Lolodorf are bigger extractors of ndo’o
extracting greater quantities than any household in the other villages. Both the facts that
I went to this village close to the end of the ndo’o season and that there may be more
ndo’o trees in this district can explain why households living in the district of Lolodorf
have higher extraction values.
Palm nuts account for 63% of household total extraction in Akom II, around 50% in
Table 2.6: Non-timber forest product extraction values (CFA Francs per capita for two
weeks)
Districts Ndo’o Palm nut Nuts (cola) Mushrooms Essok Okok Total
Lolodorf 5855.6 171.2 750.1 98.3 0 0 6875.2
Bipindi 347.1 937.6 9.7 282.7 184.7 162.1 1924.1
Akom II 161.4 889.4 12.8 192.0 141.7 0 1397.4
Ebolowa 361.8 1056.9 25.1 270.5 306.5 0.9 2021.9
Efoulan 45.4 952.0 33.2 193.7 109.0 835.4 2168.8
Per capita production quintile
Lowest 54.8 439.6 16.6 12.3 20.4 17.5 561.3
2nd 84.1 455.0 5.7 169.8 39.4 4.3 758.4
3rd 248.8 872.0 23.4 80.6 133.7 41.8 1400.4
4th 515.8 1367.7 52.9 489.7 302.8 283.5 3012.6
Highest 2318.9 1314.4 228.3 432.4 338.2 506.1 5138.6
Total 642.2 888.7 65.2 236.1 166.5 170.0 2168.7
Bipindi, Efoulan and Ebolowa and only 2% in Lolodorf. Contrary to households in the
district of Ebolowa who have to produce their red oil, households in the district of Lolodorf
can more easily buy red oil in the main town which reduces their incentives to extract
palm nuts. Only in Efoulan is okok important (38% of NTFP extraction).
Looking at NTFP extraction across quintiles, wealthier households extract more ndo’o
than regimes of palm nuts, the latter representing 25% of household total extraction and
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ndo’o 45%.8 Households in the lowest quintile have 78% of their NTFP extraction from
palm nuts and less than 10% from ndo’o.
For the other products, differences between quintiles are not that important but households
in the highest quintile have more diversified extraction than households in the lowest
quintile.
Extracting NTFPs does not require a large amount of inputs. 80% of the households
answered they use a basket for collecting NTFPs.
Overall, 37% of households extracting NTFPs sell what they collect; more than a third
of these households are in the highest quintile of household total production and these
households sell 4 times more than households in the lowest quintile.
Considering transformation of NTFPs, 35% of the households transform ndo’o into cake
and sauce they consume themselves and only 37% of these are likely to sell the present
products. 85% of the households derive from palm nuts a red oil they consume while 28%
of these processing palm nuts are also likely to sell the red oil produced.
When looking at where they extract the products, 85% of the households extracting ndo’o
say the site is far from their house. Palm nut extractions are generally close to their home
although 43% of the households extracting palm nuts reporting the site as being far from
their house.
Hunting production values
Hunting occurs either on agricultural fields or within forests using traps, machetes or rifles;
25% of the households hunt with a rifle and 87% hunt using traps. 46% of the households
hunting with a rifle are in the two highest quintiles of total production.
Around 58% of the hunting households report catching their game in the forest with an
8This result is quite driven by the fact that a few of these households are households living in the
district of Lolodorf and extracting only great values of ndo’o.
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average distance to their hunting zone being 4.9 kilometers. Hunting is essentially done
by men though it happens that women may have traps around their agricultural plots.
In the sample, 175 households report going hunting9 and 124 of them have caught at least
one rat during the last two weeks. Around 75-80 households have caught at least one
porcupine, hedgehog or snake during the last two weeks, while 25 and 11 households have
caught at least one antelope or doe during the last two weeks respectively. Households
use their rifle mainly to capture monkeys and birds.
Porcupine appears to be their main source of hunting production (22%), while hedgehog,
rat, antelope and monkey each account for around 10-14% of the hunting production, the
remaining products accounting for 4% or less of hunting production.
When looking at the distribution of hunting production across districts (table 2.7), house-
holds in the district of Ebolowa generate 36% of their total hunting production catching
porcupines while households in the district of Efoulan generate only 10% from porcupines
but more than 15% from antelopes, hedgehogs and rats.
Poor and rich households tend to have the same composition of their hunting production.
Table 2.7: Hunted game values (CFA Francs per capita for two weeks)
District Rat Hare Porcupine Antelope Monkey Hedgehog Doe Snake Birds Total
Lolodorf 0 75.4 301.3 94.8 30.8 221.5 177.8 56.9 0 958.6
Bipindi 70.6 66.5 131.5 147.6 112.0 114.0 20.8 76.0 30.9 770.3
Akom II 82.6 76.5 167.4 46.8 62.2 134.4 2.9 86.1 45.7 704.8
Ebolowa 294.4 261.2 771.1 201.4 198.3 115.1 33.1 110.6 118.2 2103.5
Efoulan 228.1 78.4 151.9 242.9 177.8 262.0 117.3 188.0 79.6 1526.2
Per capita production quintile
Lowest 23.4 9.5 29.5 24.9 8.9 29.0 8.7 15.5 15.8 165.3
2nd 67.4 37.2 50.7 41.8 64.8 50.7 15.0 50.3 17.9 359.9
3rd 71.9 64.6 159.4 60.1 47.4 118.2 0 67.8 30.3 619.7
4th 238.0 71.5 363.3 232.3 121.6 219.1 34.9 173.0 137.8 1591.7
Highest 160.9 282.8 531.1 323.1 316.1 302.1 139.7 164.6 38.4 2259.0
Total 112.0 92.9 226.2 136.0 111.4 143.5 39.5 94.0 47.9 1003.4
Porcupine hunting accounts for 18 and 25% of hunting production, followed by hedgehogs
with 13 and 17% for respectively poor and rich households. Richer households are less
9I have only 169 production values due to missing frequency of hunting.
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likely to hunt rats (only 7% of their hunting production) preferring hunting monkeys which
account for 14% of hunting production for wealthier households and only for 5% of poorer
households’ hunting production.
Other sources of earnings: wage, self-employment and non-labour income
Considering the 88 households with wage income, their main activities are clearing a
plot for somebody else (41 households), unskilled labour (14 households) and driving (9
households). Regarding self-employment activities, 58 households, among the 138 engaged
in self-employed activities, have a shop, 19 households a handicraft activity (tailor, sculptor
or repairing motorbikes) and 8 a restaurant, the remainder being composed of drivers,
health practitioners...
Half of the households with either a wage or self-employment activity live in Bipindi;
households with unskilled workers are mainly in the upper quintiles, while households
with a shop are spread across all quintiles of total production.
With respect to non-labour income, 145 households have received remittances while 25
and 26 households respectively have received interests from a bank account or a pension.
The main source of non-labour income is through receiving remittances which represent
64% of the household total non-labour income while pension represent on average 21% of
household non-labour income. For poorer households, remittances contribute to 48% of
their total non-labour income and pension to 44%.
2.3.3 Food consumption and non-food expenditures
Food consumption: autoconsommation and purchases
Households have two sources of food consumption: autoconsommation or market food
expenditures. Using values of expenditures on food products, I estimated buying prices
for the whole sample in order to value autoconsommation. The following table presents
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values for the 8 main products consumed by households during the last two weeks (table
2.8). Autoconsommation in the research area accounts for 67% of household consumption
and around 80% for households in the most remote village. Autoconsommation does not
seem to be correlated with the quintiles; if anything, wealthier households have a higher
share of consumption from autoconsommation than poorer households.
Consumption figures validate the data; production and consumption values are plausi-
ble and consumption values (table 2.8) are smaller than production values (table 2.4) in
each district and quintile. Comparing production and consumption, inequalities between
districts are smaller when looking at consumption but the ranking of districts is similar.
Mbango-Bitouer remains the wealthiest district in terms of consumption and households
living in Akom II or Ebolowa are the poorest ones. When looking at the distribution
across quintiles, consumption is less unequal than production but the amplitude of change
between quintiles is quite similar.
The most valuable consumption goods consumed by the households in the research area
are fish, plantain and macabo which represent each around 11% of the total consumption
(table 2.8).
In all districts, consumption of staples is most important and rice represents less than
Table 2.8: Consumption values (CFA Francs per capita for two weeks)
District Manioc Macabo Plantain Cucumber Rice Fish Chicken Game TOTAL
Lolodorf 1917.6 4045.0 2783.7 9614.2 0 1684.8 338.1 654.3 26993.6
Bipindi 667.3 1600.9 1844.2 381.3 737.2 2090.5 231.2 623.5 12024.5
Akom II 721.1 816.7 1311.5 711.2 651.9 1563.6 377.6 847.4 11210.1
Ebolowa 1395.5 1663.9 1254.1 737.4 892.5 936.7 379.6 961.7 11378.9
Efoulan 1567.4 2596.3 1252.2 1463.0 847.6 1910.6 189.5 438.1 21340.9
Per capita production quintile
Lowest 596.8 869.3 846.5 433.4 552.9 1122.5 111.7 457.7 7801.9
2nd 639.8 824.0 1196.7 531.7 625.6 1434.6 173.2 611.8 8891.4
3rd 673.7 1395.6 1613.5 803.1 804.4 1798.8 269.5 580.6 12963.0
4th 782.4 1702.8 1847.9 571.5 399.3 2087.6 5545.6 811.7 12271.1
Highest 2068.4 3689.1 2712.6 3947.3 1098.7 2473.1 626.0 1032.0 27331.1
Total 950.7 1693.5 1641.5 1254.4 696.1 1781.8 286.6 697.9 13835.5
5% of food consumption. Game represents around 8% of household consumption in Akom
II and Ebolowa. Fish represents more than 17% of household consumption in Bipindi.
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Across quintiles of per capita production, values of total consumption increase with the
quintiles. Wealthier households have consumption values more than three times those of
poorer households and this is mainly explained by an increase in consumption of man-
ioc, macabo and rice. Such a difference between consumption values is fairly small when
compared to the differences in production of manioc and macabo between the highest and
lowest quintiles of production.
Across quintiles, households have quite similar consumption patterns, the main difference
being between fish and cucumber consumption. Households in the highest quintile con-
sume more cucumber (14% of total consumption) than fish (9%) while households in other
quintiles consume more fish (15%) than cucumber (5%).
Non-food expenditures
Non-food expenditures are computed for 16 items. Compared to total expenditures10, non-
food expenditures represent 16% of total expenditures, varying between 23% of the total
expenditures of households in the district of Akom II and 4% for households in Lolodorf.
Overall, households mainly buy soap (96% of households), gasoline (88%) and medicines
(74%). On average, for two weeks, households spend the most for medicines which rep-
resents 4% of their total expenditures (table 2.9) while expenditures in the other items
represent less than 1% of household total expenditures.
Across districts, households make similar purchases, medicines always being the most
important items. In Lolodorf and Efoulan, school fees are higher than in the other dis-
tricts; more than 20% of households in these two districts pay school fees while 10% of
households pay such fees in the other districts.
Across quintiles of total production, non-food expenditures increase with quintiles of total
production, except between second and third quintiles, this being due to remittances. Ra-
10Sum of consumption values and non-food expenditures.
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Table 2.9: Non-food expenditures (CFA Francs per capita for two weeks)
District Medicines Soap School fees Batteries Gasoline Transport Sent remittances TOTAL
Lolodorf 601.8 131.4 605.1 99.5 4.3 156.2 0 2189.4
Bipindi 520.8 196.0 62.1 157.7 201.9 315.3 486.9 2406.7
Akom II 945.3 176.9 78.7 66.5 192.2 435.7 448.5 3414.7
Ebolowa 570.1 143.4 17.7 52.9 216.4 287.8 413.8 2473.2
Efoulan 525.7 106.8 552.6 63.5 184.1 154.7 232.1 2065.8
Per capita production quintile
Lowest 681.1 101.2 43.1 40.2 115.1 252.7 253.0 1836.0
2nd 639.2 157.8 64.7 58.0 170.3 336.6 741.1 2549.0
3rd 500.2 181.7 236.8 72.5 182.7 263.5 239.5 2138.0
4th 616.4 197.7 86.0 77.2 180.0 329.9 359.6 2232.9
Highest 753.2 215.8 341.8 295.9 281.0 382.9 444.7 4311.3
Total 637.8 170.7 154.4 108.5 185.7 312.9 406.8 2610.5
tio of non-food expenditures on total expenditures varies quite irregularly across quintiles
of production but broadly decreases from 19% in the lowest of production to 13% in the
highest. When looking at quintiles of total expenditures, wealthier and poorer households
have non-food expenditures contributing to respectively 15 and 18% of their total expen-
ditures.
Households tend to have a similar pattern of purchases, although those in the lowest quin-
tile spend more on medicines than other households; medicines purchases account for 6%
of poorer households’ total expenditures.
Overall, people seem to spend a lot more on food than on non-food. Greater shares of
their total expenditures are accounted for by food products which are mainly from auto-
consommation. The importance of autoconsommation and the small shares of non-food
expenditures would indicate that though not desperately impoverished, households remain
quite poor. In addition, while one can ask whether certain items have not been taken into
account, I did not observe during the data collection that any non-food products were
missing from the list here presented.
2.3.4 Activity combinations and time use
Up to this point, households’ activities have been analysed independently one from the
other. However, since the objective of this chapter is to look at the factors that influence
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their labour allocations to different activities, it is important to understand how house-
holds’ total production result from combining different activities and how they devote
their time to these activities.
Activity combinations and livelihood strategies
In what follows, I focus on how these 427 households diversify their labour from agri-
culture in NTFP extraction, hunting and off-farm off-forest activities. Defining 5 most
common livelihood combinations, 362 households fit in these livelihood combinations, the
65 remaining ones having marginal livelihood combinations, for instance agriculture and
hunting only or off-farm activities only.
Among these 362 households, 25% of them combine agriculture with NTFP extraction,
18% combine these two activities with hunting, or with off-farm activities, or with both
and 5% of the households only work in agriculture.
When looking at production values and income from each activity in each combination
(table 2.10), households engaged in the four activities have higher values of production
than households engaged in agriculture only or combining agriculture with NTFPs and
hunting.
Overall, agriculture remains the main source of household total production.11 Except
when households combine agriculture and NTFP extraction with off-farm off-forest activ-
ities, the latter explain 50% of household total production while agriculture accounts for
44%.
When households combine only agriculture and NTFP extraction, NTFP extraction con-
tributes to 13% of household total production. For the other strategies, NTFP and hunting
contributions to household total production are fairly homogenous, on average 9% each.
11In all activity combinations, residuals are accounted for revenues from animal raising and non-labour
income
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However when households are engaged in agriculture, NTFP extraction and off-farm ac-
tivities, NTFP extraction accounts for only 5% of household total production.
At the district level (figure 2.5), 62% of the households living in the district of Lolodorf
Table 2.10: Production values in each activity combinations (CFA Francs per capita for
two weeks)
Combinations Obs. Agriculture NTFPs Hunting Off-farma TOTALb
Agriculture 24 15956.3 0 0 0 16385.0
Agriculture & NTFPs & Hunting 75 18576.2 2408.4 2300.1 0 23985.9
Agriculture & NTFPs 109 23048.5 3653.0 0 0 27270.2
Agriculture & NTFPs & Off-farm 76 13106.9 1419.3 0 14451.8 29497.8
Agriculture & NTFPs & Hunting & Off-farm 78 17372.6 2907.8 2969.5 7873.4 31401.4
a
Off-farm is sum of revenues from wage and self-employment
b
Total encompasses revenues from these 4 activities plus animal raising production and non-labour income
combine agriculture and NTFP extraction with the latter contributing to 16% of household
total production. In the other districts, combinations are better balanced, more house-
holds participating in 3 or 4 activities. In Efoulan and Ebolowa, combining agriculture,
NTFPs and hunting with or without off-farm activities are the most important strategies.
Across quintiles of total production, agriculture only decreases sharply with the quintile;
Figure 2.5: Livelihood strategies in each district
households in the highest quintile more often combine 3 or 4 activities with 27% of house-
holds in the highest quintile working in all 4 (figure 2.6).
However when looking at household strategies by quintiles of total expenditures, 23%
of the households in the highest quintile of total expenditures are engaged in agriculture
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Figure 2.6: Livelihood strategies in each quintile
and NTFP extraction and only 16% of households in this quintile are engaged in all 4
activities.
Being engaged in all 4 activities does improve households’ production but does not seem
to allow them to increase their consumption of food and non-food products. On aver-
age, households engaged in agriculture and NTFP extraction or in agriculture, NTFP
extraction and hunting have higher expenditures on food and non-food products.
Time use
Considering time use defined as household hours per week, the average total time spent
working per household is equal to 73 hours per week (table 2.11). On average, an adult
works 32 hours per week and half of these adults work less than 25 hours a week. On the
other hand, a quarter of the adults in the sample work more than 40 hours per week with
40% of them working more than 60 hours a week. Adults spend most of their time in
agriculture while time spent in NTFP extraction, hunting or off-farm off-forest activities
remain small, diminishing respectively (figure B.1 in appendix).
In terms of time use, agriculture remains the main activity, households spending on it on
average 48 hours per week.12 Time spent in NTFP extraction is quite important (14 hours
12These are hours per household and on average 2.7 members participate in agricultural production
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a week) and represents 19% of total time use while wage and self-employment activities
represent only 6% each.
Across districts, households living in the district of Ebolowa spend more than twice as
much time working than households living in the district of Lolodorf. In Lolodorf, house-
holds dedicate around 84% of their time to agriculture and only 2% to wage employment
while in the other districts, households spend around 60% of their time in agriculture,
20% in NTFP extraction and around 5% in wage activities.
Across quintiles of total production, households in the highest quintile of production do
Table 2.11: Time spent (hours per week) in each activity
District Agriculture NTFP Hunting Wage Self-employment TOTAL
Lolodorf 34.6 5.1 0 0.9 0.4 41.1
Bipindi 45.9 10.9 0.9 4.9 4.7 67.5
Akom II 49.7 18.1 2.0 4.6 7.4 81.9
Ebolowa 63.4 21.5 4.9 7.4 5.5 102.8
Efoulan 45.1 14.2 1.8 5.5 1.8 68.5
Per capita production quintile
Lowest 40.8 10.9 0.7 2.4 4.9 59.8
2nd 47.6 12.6 1.6 6.4 3.7 72.0
3rd 57.4 18.2 1.9 4.6 3.9 86.2
4th 50.4 16.3 3.1 4.2 5.9 80.1
Highest 43.4 11.4 1.03 6.9 5.8 68.6
Total 47.9 13.9 1.6 4.9 4.9 73.3
not spend more time working than other households. Time and production seem not to
be correlated; time does not increase with the quintiles of total production and household
total production does not increase with the total of time working.
Across all quintiles, households allocate more than 60% of their time to agriculture. Both
poorer households and those in the 3rd and 4th quintiles allocate more than 19% of their
time to NTFP extraction. Wealthier households dedicate more than 10% of their time to
wage work while poorer households only 5%.
In addition, time does not increase across quintiles of per capita total expenditures, house-
holds in the highest quintile of per capita total expenditures spending more time in agri-
culture and NTFP extraction than in wage and self-employment activities.
Across activity combinations, households participating in 3 or 4 activities work more and
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they tend to reduce time spent working in agriculture in order to dedicate more labour to
other activities.
Household size and composition affect time spent in different activities; bigger households
spend more time working in agriculture and NTFP extraction. Time spent working in
wage activities tends to remain constant over household size. On average households with
more young adults spend more time in wage activities and less time hunting than house-
holds with more old adults.
Although possible, calculating leisure time remains too imprecise for my purpose and I
refrained from collecting such data during my survey.
2.3.5 Summary of descriptive analysis
According to the descriptive analysis, the data looks plausible. Household consumption
confirms the ranking of districts. However, inequalities between districts or between quin-
tiles of total production are smaller when looking at household consumption than when
looking at household production.
In the research area, on average, households remain mainly dependent upon agriculture
to generate their livelihood. Similarly as in the 1999 survey, households produce and sell
mainly manioc, macabo and plantain. Cocoa constitutes a larger share of household pro-
duction for households in the southern part of the research area but compared to the 1999
survey, an increasing number of households in the other parts of the research area tends
to cultivate cocoa.
In my data, NTFP extraction represents a non-negligible part of their total production
and as in 1999, households extract mainly ndo’o and palm nuts. On average, households
not participating in NTFP extraction have lower production values than households ex-
tracting NTFPs.
Poorer households and households living in Ebolowa are more dependent upon forest
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resources than others, both in terms of contribution of NTFP extraction to their total
production and in terms of time spent extracting NTFPs. Households in the highest quin-
tile of total production tend to reduce time spent in agriculture in favour of time spent in
wage; on average time spent in NTFP extraction varies little across quintiles.
In addition, across quintiles of per capita total expenditures, households in the higher
quintiles do work more in agriculture and NTFP extraction than households in the lower
quintiles.
Households do not seem to have a time constraint even though a quarter of them have
adult members working more than 40 hours per week, 40% of these being in the district
of Bipindi. However, it seems that working more has a positive effect on household pro-
duction and consumption since 50% of the households with adult members working more
than 40 hours per week are in the two highest quintiles of total production and 44% in
the two highest quintiles of total expenditures.
Household livelihoods are diversified and greater diversification encourages households to
reduce time spent in agriculture while keeping time spent in NTFP extraction constant.
30% of the poorer households work only in agriculture and NTFP extraction while richer
households tend to have more diversified livelihoods. The latter are less dependent upon
NTFPs but still tend to spend a non-negligible share of time in NTFP extraction.
The descriptive analysis highlights that households allocate their time to a greater number
of activities so as to modify their levels of production. The following analysis studies the
factors encouraging households to supply labour and to combine activities, and looks at
the resulting impacts on welfare.
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2.4 Theoretical framework and theoretical model: litera-
ture and specification of agricultural household model
To look at households’ decisions in terms of labour supply and allocations, Singh, Squire
and Strauss’s agricultural household model is commonly used (Singh et al., 1986). But
since households are constrained in their time working in wage activities, households de-
cisions are non-separable and an extension of Singh and co-authors’ model like the one by
Benjamin (1992) seems more appropriate.
2.4.1 Literature review on household model and applications to NTFP
extraction
Empirical studies have used this household model to look at household labour supply
(Jacoby, 1993, Skoufias, 1994). This theoretical model has also been used to look at
households’ labour allocations to agriculture and off-farm activities including NTFP ex-
traction (Cooke, 1998, Fisher et al., 2005, Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor, 2008, Sikei et al.,
2009).
Methodology and findings from previous studies on labour supply
In these studies, since households are constrained in their labour, a “shadow wage” deter-
mined from within the household must be estimated in order to analyse labour supply. A
shadow wage is a value of household time that at the equilibrium is equal to the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (Skoufias, 1994). The shadow wage
is a function of both consumption preferences and production technology (Singh et al.,
1986).
Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994) estimate the shadow wage for both men and women de-
riving their marginal productivity of time spent in agriculture either using a Cobb-Douglas
or a translog production function. They obtained shadow wages significantly lower than
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the market wage although the difference can be put down to transaction costs and market
imperfections (Jacoby, 1993, Skoufias, 1994).
To capture the income effects, a “shadow income” is estimated as a sum of farm profits
and exogenous income with farm profits being the difference between output and value of
time calculated with the shadow wage. Labour supply is then a function of shadow wage
and shadow income which are endogenous, and of household characteristics. Both studies
use instrumental variable (IV) procedures to control for the endogeneity of these param-
eters. They found that labour supply among men and women vary not only with their
own shadow wages but also with that of the other gender (Jacoby, 1993, Skoufias, 1994).
Furthermore shadow income has a negative impact on labour supply, showing that when
getting wealthier, both men and women increase their leisure (Jacoby, 1993, Skoufias,
1994).
Methodology and findings from previous studies on labour allocations
There is a broad literature analysing labour allocations to agriculture and off-farm activ-
ities; from this literature I select studies on labour allocations to forest-related activities.
Earlier studies on labour allocations to NTFP extraction and different activities have es-
timated demand systems for time spent extracting different NTFPs (Cooke, 1998), labour
share equations (Fisher et al., 2005, Sikei et al., 2009) or labour time (Lo´pez-Feldman and
Taylor, 2008).
To estimate such models, either the opportunity cost of time spent in non-NTFP activities
defined as the quotient of earnings from non-NTFP activities on time spent in these activ-
ities (Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor, 2008) or a predicted shadow wage for NTFP activities
(Cooke, 1998, Fisher et al., 2005, Sikei et al., 2009) can be used. In order to estimate an
NTFP shadow wage for all households, although some do not participate in such an activ-
ity, the shadow wage, equal to the quotient of earnings on time spent in NTFP extraction,
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is predicted by using a Heckman model. The latter corrects the sample selection bias
since it determines simultaneously the participation in NTFP activities and the quotient
of earnings on time spent in NTFP activities.
When estimated as hours or days spent in NTFP activities (Cooke, 1998, Lo´pez-Feldman
and Taylor, 2008), no constraint on time spent in these activities is included in the models
while estimating labour share models following an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
introduces restrictions and constraints on time and wage effects, the latter being binding
(Fisher et al., 2005, Sikei et al., 2009).
What these studies conclude is that poorer forest households are more dependent upon
forest resources. They find that forest activities are for most households substitutes to
off-farm activities (Fisher et al., 2005, Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor, 2008, Sikei et al., 2009);
off-forest employment should be promoted and wealthier households tend to allocate less
time to NTFP extraction.
These studies show that households’ labour allocation to NTFPs activities increase with
the price of NTFPs which could lead to over-exploitation of NTFPs. However according
to Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor (2008) such an increase in NTFP price while likely to in-
crease time spent in NTFP activities would not necessarily encourage a greater number
of households to engage in NTFP extractions. As a result, such pressures may even be
attenuated, improving the welfare of the original NTFP extractors.
2.4.2 Theoretical model: household model of production
As previously said, the studies looking at labour supply and labour allocations in different
activities are set up in a household model of production. In this model, a representative
household decides to allocate its labour to agricultural production, to NTFP extraction,
to hunting and to off-farm activities.
In this model, reflecting the Cameroonian situation described above, households are able
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to easily sell their agricultural products and NTFPs in the market or to traders, but they
rarely sell hunting products. They can work outside agriculture in wage activities but
the small degree of urbanisation and the presence of a few administrative offices are an
impediment to selling as much labour as they would like. I assume also that there is no
market for agricultural labour since households claim not to hire labour from outside their
households to cultivate and harvest with them.
Consequently, since the labour market is underdeveloped and the market for hunting prod-
ucts is absent, consumption and production decisions are non separable. Both the shadow
wage and the shadow price for hunting are determined from within the household (Singh
et al., 1986, Skoufias, 1994, Sadoulet and De Janvry, 1995). Here, I estimate only the
shadow wage and not the shadow price for hunting since I am interested in analysing
labour supply and related effects on welfare.
In order to include all four activities the Cameroonian households are commonly engaged
in, I base the following model, with some modifications, on Singh et al. (1986) and Skoufias
(1994).
In the resulting model, the agricultural production function is assumed to be a function of
household labour (la), different inputs (x) and farm characteristics (Za) such as the size
of land.
The NTFP production is a function of household labour devoted to NTFP collection (lf )
and different fixed factors associated with the forest (Zf ) such as the distance to forest
areas.
The hunting production is only a function of household labour to hunting (lu) and the dif-
ferent fixed inputs associated with hunting (Zu) that could be the distance to the hunting
area and whether households hunts with guns or traps.
Households may also participate in off-farm activities and receive a wage w. The time
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they can allocate to labour lw is constrained by the availability of off-farm work in the
village and by households’ skills.
Households maximise their utility subject to several production, budget and time con-
straints. They derive their utility from the consumption of market goods (Cm), agricultural
goods (Ca), NTFPs (Cf ), hunting game (Cu) and leisure (l). Their utility is a function
of fixed household characteristics (H) which could include the size of the household, the
number of adults and children within the household, the education of the household head...
Both agricultural goods and NTFPs may be bought in the market place or produced by
households. Households’ utility maximisation programme takes the following form:
MaxU(Cm, Ca, Cf , Cu, l : H) (2.1)
subject to different constraints. Households have a budget constraint defined as follows:
pmCm = paQa(La, x;Za)− paCa − pxx+ pfQf (lf ;Zf )− pfCf + wlw + Y (2.2)
where li, i = a, f, w are the different labour allocations, pi, i = m, a, f, x refer to the prices
of the different goods and inputs, and Y is the exogenous household income (remittances,
pension and bank account interest).
Households have a fixed time endowment E given exogenously (Cooke, 1998, Bagamba
et al., 2009) which takes the following form:
E = l + la + lf + lu + lw (2.3)
The labour time constraint takes the following form:
lw = lmaxw = E − l − la − lf − lu (2.4)
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with l, la, lf , lu, lw ≥ 0. There is a limited amount of time households can sell to off-
farm employment because there is a limited number of wage opportunities available in the
research area.
The absence of a market for hunting products creates an equality between consumption
and production:
Cu = Qu(lu;Zu) (2.5)
The Lagrangean function can be written as
Γ = U(Cm, Ca, Cf , Cu, l;H) + λ(pmCm − paQa(La, x;Za) + paCa + pxx− pfQf (lf ;Zf )
+ pfCf − wlmaxw − Y ) + ψ(lmaxw − E + l + la + lf + lu) + η(Cu −Qu(lu;Zu))
(2.6)
Maximising the Lagrangean with respect to Cm, Ca, Cf , Cu, la, lf , lu and l, yields the
following set of first-order conditions:
∂U
∂Ci
= −λpi (2.7)
with i = m, a, f meaning that the equilibrium condition implies that the marginal utility
from consuming one good (market, agricultural or forest) will be proportional to its price
in the market.
∂U
∂Cu
= −η (2.8)
The first-order condition (2.8) associated with hunting good consumption equates the
marginal utility to the shadow price.
First-order conditions are also derived from production functions:
pi
∂Qi
∂li
= w +
ψ
λ
= w? (2.9)
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with i = a, f . This optimal condition stipulates that at the equilibrium, households equate
their marginal productivity of labour to their shadow wage w?. In the case of hunting
production
η
λ
∂Qu
∂lu
= w +
ψ
λ
= w? (2.10)
When maximising household utility with respect to leisure, the marginal utility of leisure
is proportional to the shadow wage.
− 1
λ
∂U
∂l
= w +
ψ
λ
= w? (2.11)
Since the Lagrangean multiplier λ is negative and ψ is positive, the shadow wage w? is less
than the market wage w. The shadow wage is function of both consumption parameters
through λ and production parameters through ψ which confirms that household decisions
are non-separable.
The shadow price of hunting is
η? =
λw?
∂Qu/∂lu
(2.12)
and it is function of the shadow wage and of the marginal productivity of hunting.
The full income constraint can be written as
V ? = Π?a(w
?, x;Za) + Π?f (w
?;Zf ) + Π?u(w
?;Zu) + Y (2.13)
where Π?a = paQa(la, x;Z
a)− w?la − pxx
Π?f = pfQf (lf ;Z
f )− w?lf
Π?u = η
?Qu(lu;Zu)− w?lu
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The model can be rewritten as
MaxU(Cm, Ca, Cf , Cu, l : H) (2.14)
subject to
pmCm + paC?a + pfC
?
f + η
?C?u + w
?l = V ? + w?E (2.15)
where the left-hand side of the equation is the value of household full expenditures on goods
and leisure, including imputations; C?a denotes the amount of agricultural goods consumed
at at the optimum l?a, C
?
f the amount of forest products consumed at the optimum l
?
f ,C
?
u
the amount of hunting products consumed at the optimum l?u with w
? being the shadow
value of time defined above. The expression on the right-hand side is the ”shadow full-
income” (Skoufias, 1994).
Maximising this problem with hunting production, the structural demand function for
leisure is expressed as being a function of exogenous and endogenous parameters:
l? = l(pm, pa, pf , η?, w?, V ?;H) (2.16)
Household labour supply function is:
L?S = LS(pm, pa, pf , η
?, w?, V ?;H) (2.17)
and household labour supply function can be seen as the sum of all labour supply functions
to different activities:
L?S = E − l? = l?a + lmaxw + l?f + l?u (2.18)
Here the shadow wage w? and the shadow full income V ? are endogenous and functions
of different parameters. Having an estimate of the shadow wage w? would lead to find the
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shadow full income V ? and derive the demand for leisure l? and supply of labour L?s.
Given this theoretical framework, I model total labour supply (section 2.5) and labour
allocations which consist in supplying labour in each activity (section 2.6).
2.5 Estimations of production function, shadow wages and
total labour supply
In the estimations, all households being already engaged in agriculture decide whether or
not to diversify their total labour supply among other activities. Focusing on agricultural
households, the estimations of production function, total labour supply and later labour
allocations are derived on a sub-sample of 384 households all devoting at least 7 hours per
week to agriculture. Out of these 384 households, 304 extract NTFPs13, 184 participate
in an off-farm activity and 160 in hunting.
To analyse household labour supply, I first calculate household shadow wage estimating
Cobb-Douglas and translog production functions for agriculture and NTFP activities.14
The shadow wages are proportional to the value of marginal productivity of labour. I test
whether shadow wages from both production functions are equal and I estimate the full
shadow income. Labour supply is estimated as a function of the household shadow wage
and income, household characteristics and village characteristics.
In the production functions, as response to weather or other production shocks, households
can modify their labour and other inputs to use. Decisions about labour time and other
inputs and the resulting output are simultaneous, and the former two may be endogenous.
Since both time and inputs may be correlated with the error term, I instrument them
13317 extract NTFPs but only 304 report time spent in NTFP extraction different from 0
14I look only at Cobb-Douglas production function for NTFPs.
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using valid and strongly correlated IVs (Jacoby, 1993).
In the labour supply function (equation (2.17)), there exists simultaneity between labour
supply defined as households’ weekly hours in all activities and shadow wage and income
(Skoufias, 1994, Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor, 2008). I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimation identifying relevant, valid and consistent IVs to reduce the bias of ordinary
least-squares (OLS) (Murray, 2006).
The IVs need not to explain the original dependent variable nor to be correlated with
the error term but to be correlated with the endogenous variables (Murray, 2006, Baum,
2006). To find valid IVs, I select instruments that economically explain the endogenous
explanatory variables but have no direct effect on the dependent variable in the original
equation. I check their validity looking at correlation matrices and testing for significance.
All instruments presented here are not correlated with the dependent variable but have
a significant effect on the endogenous variables and these instruments seem to be valid
instruments (Murray, 2006). I look at a Sargan test of overidentification that shows
the validity of the instruments, at a weak identification test that determines whether
instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, and an underidentification
test which reports whether instruments are relevant (Murray, 2006, Baum, 2006).
2.5.1 Estimating shadow wages from an agricultural production function
From the theoretical model (equation (2.9)), the empirical specification to find the shadow
wage w? consists in estimating the value of the marginal productivity of labour from the
agricultural production function.
Estimation of the marginal productivity of labour is first performed using a Cobb-Douglas
form in which coefficient of an input represents the elasticity of that input (Abdulai and
Regmi, 2000); I also try using a translog functional form (Jacoby, 1993).
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The Cobb-Douglas agricultural production function takes the following form:
lnQia =
∑
βai lnX
a
ij + v
ia (2.19)
where Qia is the total value of agricultural crops produced by household h, βa are param-
eters from the agricultural production function, Xaij is the quantity of inputs j used by
household i in agriculture, and va is an error term summarizing the influence of all other
variables. Inputs used are the hours of household labour in agriculture, the total land size,
the total values of agricultural expenditures for fertilizers, pesticides and transportation,
and the total values for seeds (table B.1).
Since a quarter of households have no expenditures in inputs, so as not to lose these
observations when log-linearising the Cobb-Douglas function, I add 1 to all the inputs,
except hours spent in agriculture and land. No bias is introduced in the estimates since
the expenditures are in thousands of CFA Francs and adding 1 to these numbers will not
change much the estimates (Skoufias, 1994, Battese, 1997).
Since the number of hours in agriculture and of the input expenditures are endogenous,
instrumental variables are required. I have tried as instrumental variables different house-
hold composition variables (household size, number of adults, number of elder, dependency
ratio) and different measures of welfare (dummy for holdings of equipment, value of large
equipment, different dummy for each type of equipment, equipment index,...) and the
results here presented are obtained using two valid and relevant instruments: household
size and an index for the large equipment owned by the household.15
Household size explains time spent in agriculture; I expect that bigger households would
spend more time in agriculture. I expect that wealthier households with higher values of
15I create an equipment index using a factor analysis methodology retaining only 1 factor explaining
all the different assets households own; the assets I included are big equipments such as motorbike, spray,
chainsaw, agricultural buildings...
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equipment index are those with higher expenditures on inputs. Neither IV has an influence
upon the level of production, rather affecting it through the endogenous variables.
All instruments have the expected signs and the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is over 10
meaning that the instruments are not weakly correlated with the endogenous variables.
The Sargan test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (Murray,
2006, Baum, 2006) and the underidentification test reports that instruments are relevant.
However, the coefficients for hours in agriculture and inputs are not significant when using
a 2SLS procedure while when using OLS, both variables have a significant and positive ef-
fect on household agricultural production. Furthermore, the coefficients in OLS are nearly
identical to those obtained in 2SLS.
Using a Wu-Hausman test, it seems that if there is endogeneity among the regressors,
using 2SLS does not improve the bias in the estimation and since OLS gives better re-
sults I prefer using the latter. The small effect of endogeneity on the estimations results
from the way I collected the data on time, since I asked households how much time they
usually spend working in agriculture. As a consequence, the bias of an OLS estimation is
minimised by the fact that the data on time and expenditures are unable to capture any
shocks or disturbances in the production process.
I can use the OLS estimations (regressions (3) and (4) in table 2.12) which have smaller
standard errors and give better results than 2SLS.
As generally expected, time spent working in agriculture has a positive and significant
effect on agricultural production. This is an interesting result since in the descriptive
analysis, household agricultural production and household time in agriculture were not
correlated.
Both total expenditures and total cultivated area have a positive and significant effect.
Expenditures on seeds have no significant effect on agricultural production which shows
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that expenditures on seeds are not as important as expected. This results from the fact that
households generally buy seeds for cucumber, peanuts and maize that are less cultivated
than manioc and macabo for which households do not buy seeds.
The results from the translog function are not satisfactory; the size of land has the only
significant effect on household agricultural production while labour and all interaction
terms are insignificant. There are similar village effects than when using a Cobb-Douglas
function.
Following the theoretical model, the shadow wage is estimated using the fitted value of
household total agricultural production and is equal to
W ?ia =
Qˆia
lia
βˆa (2.20)
with Qˆia being the fitted value of agricultural output by household i predicted with the
estimated coefficient βˆa.
Estimating the shadow wage using the two OLS regressions and the translog regression, on
average, the agricultural shadow wage is on average equal to CFAF 194.2, 201.6 and 376.8
per household per week for regressions (3),(4) and (5) respectively (table 2.13). Focusing
on the estimates from the Cobb-Douglas functions (regressions (3) (4)), households living
in the district of Lolodorf have higher shadow wages than households living in the district
of Ebolowa or Akom II, these latter being poorer when looking at their total production.
Across quintiles of household total time, households working less have higher shadow
Table 2.13: Agricultural shadow wages by quintiles of total time [95% Confidence interval]
Quintiles Shadow wage Shadow wage Shadow wage
Cobb-Douglas (3) Cobb-Douglas (4) Translog (5)
Lowest 327.7 [269.2;386.2] 339.4 [277.8;401.1] 610.8 [508.8;712.9]
2nd 191.0 [162.5;219.5] 199.2 [169.7;228.6] 376.1 [319.4;432.8]
3rd 184.8 [156.0;213.7] 192.6 [161.6;223.6] 368.9 [311.9;425.9]
4th 151.5 [129.9;173.1] 155.3 [133.3;177.3] 313.5 [258.8;368.3]
Highest 111.7 [96.6;126.8] 116.8 [101.1;132.5] 207.1 [177.4;236.9]
Total 194.2 [177.5;211.0] 201.6 [184.1;219.1] 376.8 [345.2;408.1]
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wages than households working more. Households’ marginal productivity seems to de-
crease when households work more; time spent working and shadow wage seem to be
inversely correlated.
2.5.2 Estimating shadow wages from NTFP production function
Following the same methodology, the shadow wage could be estimated from a Cobb-
Douglas NTFP production function:
lnQif = βf lnlif + vif (2.21)
where Qf (h) is the total value of NTFP extraction by households h, βf is the parameter
from the NTFP production function, lf (h) is the time allocated to NTFP extraction by
household h, and vf (h) is an error term summarising the influence of other variables. I
tried using several dummies for small tools households could use to extract NTFPs but
none of them were significant. I present here the best estimates that exclude these tools.
NTFP extraction requires only labour but I control for whether household extracts ekouk
and ndo’o.16 I include an interaction term for the distance of ndo’o being a function of
whether households extract ndo’o and whether it is far away or not17 (table B.1).
Here as well, time spent extracting NTFPs may be endogenous. After different tests,
I select two instruments to control for the endogeneity of time: size of households and
number of ill adults. At the household level, bigger households imply spending more
time in NTFP extraction, and so does the presence of ill adults since sickness requires
households go extracting medicinal plants in the forest. Again the instruments explain
the time spent in NTFP extraction but not the NTFP production.
16I consider these two products because ekouk is often extracted but does not have a value but is often
extracted by households while ndo’o is only extracted twice a year when it is the season.
17I have tried without these two variables and I have obtained the same results.
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Both instruments have the expected positive sign on the endogenous variable; having more
members would increase time spent extracting NTFPs and so does having more ill adults
(table B.3). The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic shows that the instruments are not weakly
related to the endogenous variable and the Sargan test fails to reject the invalidity of the
instruments.
However, with a 2SLS procedure, hours spent extracting NTFPs has no significant effect
on NTFP production while with OLS, time spent in NTFP extractions has a positive effect
on production. Most coefficients are nearly identical when using OLS to the ones obtained
with a 2SLS estimation and all standard errors with OLS are smaller. As with the test for
agricultural time and inputs, a Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity of hours spent in NTFP
extraction fails to reject the null hypothesis; using 2SLS does not reduce the bias from
endogenous variable. Again, the way I collected the data on time spent in NTFPs, asking
households how long they usually spend in this activity, may not capture any responses
to eventual shocks, which could explain why OLS gives better results (regressions (3) and
(4) in table 2.14).
Controlling for other effects, spending more time extracting NTFPs and extracting ekouk
or ndo’o increase NTFP production.
The distance between the house and the ndo’o extraction site has no effect on NTFP
production. There are no significant effects derived from where households live.
Here as well the shadow wage is estimated using the fitted value of household total NTFP
extraction and is equal to
W ?if =
Qˆif
lif
βˆf (2.22)
with Qˆf being the fitted value of forest product output by household i predicted with the
estimated coefficient βˆf .
For respectively regressions (3) and (4), shadow wages in NTFP extraction are fairly
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Table 2.14: Estimations of Cobb-Douglas NTFP extraction production functions
Variables Log NTFP prod Log NTFP prod Log NTFP prod Log NTFP prod
(2SLS) (1) (2SLS) (2) (OLS) (3) (OLS) (4)
Log hours NTFP 0.142 (0.231) 0.158 (0.231) 0.283*** (0.0773) 0.286*** (0.0776)
Ekouk 0.507*** (0.175) 0.500*** (0.179) 0.461*** (0.164) 0.456*** (0.167)
Ndo’o 0.856** (0.380) 0.848** (0.379) 0.738** (0.342) 0.742** (0.343)
Age head -0.00385 (0.00509) -0.00410 (0.00522)
Secondary edu. head -0.0534 (0.157) -0.0695 (0.158)
Distance ndo’o -0.230 (0.360) -0.250 (0.360) -0.325 (0.337) -0.336 (0.338)
Mbango 0.893** (0.417) 0.950** (0.423) 0.892 (0.564) 0.915 (0.566)
Ebom 0.607 (0.398) 0.612 (0.399) 0.379 (0.522) 0.372 (0.523)
Mekalat 0.108 (0.482) 0.132 (0.482) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Bipindi -0.0531 (0.291) -0.0477 (0.290) -0.215 (0.482) -0.226 (0.485)
Bidjouka 0.369 (0.324) 0.379 (0.323) 0.207 (0.505) 0.199 (0.506)
Lambi 0.449 (0.364) 0.479 (0.365) 0.365 (0.534) 0.370 (0.536)
Ebimimbang 0.294 (0.297) 0.298 (0.297) 0.147 (0.487) 0.129 (0.489)
Bongwana 0.111 (0.394) 0.0966 (0.393) -0.0140 (0.564) -0.0529 (0.567)
Akom -0.375 (0.284) -0.352 (0.287) -0.501 (0.493) -0.495 (0.498)
Nkomakak -0.317 (0.403) -0.232 (0.419) -0.409 (0.559) -0.341 (0.568)
Abiete -0.333 (0.374) -0.313 (0.375) -0.416 (0.539) -0.423 (0.540)
Mvie 0.351 (0.378) 0.388 (0.381) 0.178 (0.547) 0.200 (0.549)
Nyangong -0.109 (0.493) -0.133 (0.496)
Constant 6.644*** (0.385) 6.828*** (0.446) 6.567*** (0.466) 6.814*** (0.556)
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 17.16 16.91
Sargan Test P-value 0.807 0.779
Observations 304 304 304 304
R-squared 0.228 0.232 0.237 0.239
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
low, being on average equal to CFAF 91.8 and 92.7 per household per week respectively.
Households living in the districts of Akom II and Ebolowa have lower shadow wages while
they spend more time extracting NTFPs than households in Lolodorf. This shows that
households’ marginal productivity decreases when they work more.
Across quintiles of total time spent working, there is an inverse correlation between
Table 2.15: NTFP shadow wages by quintiles of total time [95% Confidence interval]
Quintiles Shadow wage Shadow wage
Cobb-Douglas (3) Cobb-Douglas (4)
Lowest 160.4 [121.2;199.6] 157.8 [117.9;197.6]
2nd 104.3 [87.5;121.0] 106.6 [89.3;123.8]
3rd 89.9 [73.4;106.5] 91.7 [74.4;108.9]
4th 79.9 [63.7;96.2] 80.0 [63.5;96.5]
Highest 53.4 [39.0;67.8] 54.3 [39.7;68.9]
Total 91.8 [82.4;101.1] 92.4 [83.3;102.2]
shadow wages and time since households working less have higher shadow wages from
NTFPs than other households.
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2.5.3 Equality of shadow wages and full shadow income
According to the theory, shadow wages found in agriculture and NTFP extraction should
be equal since both are measures of the value of time. Looking at the distribution of
shadow wages18 for households engaged in both activities, half of the households have
their NTFP shadow wages below CFAF 65 per household per week (figure 2.7). Even
if most of households have a higher agricultural shadow wage, 60 of them have higher
shadow wages from NTFP extraction.
However, I still want to test the equality of shadow wages as Barrett et al. (2005) did.
Figure 2.7: Distribution of agricultural and NTFP shadow wages using Cobb-Douglas
The test can be written as follows:
W ?ia = α+ βW
?
if +  (2.23)
where  is the iid error term. The null hypothesis of this test is that α = 0 and β = 1.
A F-test rejects the null hypothesis. The shadow wages from NTFP extraction and from
agricultural production are not equal.
In this regression, the coefficient associated to shadow wage in NTFP extraction is positive,
18In this test, I am using the agricultural shadow wage from regression (3) and the NTFP shadow wage
from regression (3) and I find similar results when using agricultural shadow wage from regression (4) and
NTFP shadow wage from regression (4).
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significant and equal to 0.85 (SE=0.092) while the constant is equal to 101.8. The F-test
is equal to 69.98 and its probability allows me to reject the null hypothesis that both
shadow wages are equal.19
Inequality between the shadow wages may arise due to joint-production; households often
extract NTFPs while on their way to their agricultural plot or during their agricultural
work, leading to an overestimation of time devoted to NTFP extraction.
Here I assume that households’ value of time is equal to a shadow wage derived from the
agricultural production since households spend most of their time working in agriculture.
The shadow wage estimated from the NTFP production is too low to be plausible.
In addition, since some households do not extract NTFPs and do not have any NTFP
shadow wage, these households would be excluded from the rest of the analysis if I were
using the NTFP shadow wage.
Consequently, agricultural shadow wage is used to estimate the shadow income. Such
shadow income is derived from the profits in agriculture, profits in NTFP extraction and
profits in hunting20 and takes the following form:
V ?i = Q
?
ia − w?ialia − pxXi +Q?if − w?ialif +Q?iu − w?ialu + Y (2.24)
in which Q?ik, with k = a, f, u, are the predicted productions from a Cobb-Douglas esti-
mation, lik is the labour allocated to each activity and valued by the agricultural shadow
wage w?ik and Y is the exogenous income.
Using respectively agricultural shadow wages from regressions (3) and (4), the values of
shadow income are on average CFAF 22,499 and 22,234 per household per week (table
19I have tried with agricultural and NTFPs shadow wages from model (4) and I have found the same
results.
20Hunting production function is estimated using a Cobb-Douglas and while I assumed first that time
spent hunting and use of a rifle might be endogenous, the Wu-Hausman test reports that 2SLS does not
improve the regression. Through OLS, time spent hunting and dummy for rifle explain positively hunting
production. Results are presented in table B.4 in appendix.
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2.16). Across districts households living in the district of Lolodorf are wealthier while
households in Ebolowa are the poorest, which is consistent with what seen in the descrip-
tive analysis.
Across quintiles of total time, there is a positive relationship between shadow income
Table 2.16: Shadow income by quintiles of total time [95% Confidence interval]
Quintiles Shadow income Shadow income
with shadow wage from (3) with shadow wage from (4)
Lowest 16542.0 [13355.2;19728.8] 16250.3 [13070.2;19430.4]
2nd 18545.5 [15743.5;21347.5] 18369.8 [15599.9;21139.7]
3rd 19825.4 [15233.8;24417.0] 19606.0 [14990.6;24221.5]
4th 24398.3 [19561.9;29234.8] 24018.9 [19174.4;28863.4]
Highest 33533.1 [18883.2;48183.0] 33266.3 [18613.3;47919.3]
Total 22499.7 [19201.7;25787.5] 22234.1 [18934.2;25521.2]
and time spent working (table 2.16); households working more have higher shadow income
while households with greater per capita total production do not seem to work more (table
2.11). Another way, households with lower shadow income have more leisure; there exists
an inverse association between shadow income and leisure.
Figure 2.8 representing the distribution of shadow income with shadow wage from re-
gression (3), shows some extreme values on the right and a concentration close to the
median which is equal to CFAF 16,026 per week per household. Three households seem
to have negative full shadow income because of negative profits in agriculture or NTFP
extraction. Shadow income is smaller than household production since calculating shadow
income consists in considering expenses in inputs and time values.
Knowing the shadow wage and the shadow income, I can estimate a labour supply function
corresponding to the equation (2.17) log-linearising the model which results in dropping
from the analysis the three households with a negative shadow income.
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of shadow income
2.5.4 Estimating household labour supply function
To analyse how households supply labour to all activities, I estimate total time spent
working during the seven days as being a function of the agricultural shadow wage, the
shadow income, different household characteristics and other control variables (table B.1
in appendix).
Both shadow wage and shadow income are endogenous requiring the use of IV estima-
tors in order to obtain unbiased and consistent coefficients. Here are presented different
specifications relying on different sets of instruments which are valid, consistent and not
correlated with the error term. Overall, I use expenditures in durable goods, a dummy
for whether household receives non-labour income, a dummy for whether household hunts
with a rifle, a village average level of input expenditures, a village wage for clearing plots,
a district price of a bag of cocoa21 and the number of sheep. I assume that spending
more on durable goods, the number of sheep and having non-labour income are measures
of household wealth and are expected to have positive effects on household shadow in-
come. Hunting with a rifle shows that households are wealthier, being able to afford such
a weapon to go hunting, and is assumed to have a positive effect on household shadow
21I have tried with other crop prices such as manioc or cucumber but these prices were correlated with
the error terms and not valid instruments.
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income. A village level of input expenditures is assumed to have a positive effect on
household shadow wage since it represents how easy it is for households to access inputs
which would improve their productivity. The village wage for clearing plots is a measure
of several village wages and it should also have a positive effect on household shadow wage.
The district price of cocoa should be positively correlated with the shadow wage and all
its effects go through this shadow wage.
Looking at model (2) which gives the best estimates, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
reported in table 2.17 is equal to 6.310 and greater than the Stock-Yogo critical values at
20%. In addition, the Sargan statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instru-
ments are valid (Murray, 2006, Baum et al., 2007).
Looking at first-stage coefficients (regression (2) in table B.5 in appendix), the instruments
have expected signs except for the district price of cocoa which was assumed to have a
positive effect on the shadow wage. This negative effect of the price of cocoa on the shadow
wage may capture a geographic effect since prices of cocoa22 are greater in Ebolowa in
which households have smaller shadow wages. Furthermore, having non-labour income
has a negative effect on household shadow wage since households receiving money without
working tend to give less value to their time.
Looking at the instruments for shadow income, having income-oriented hunting practices
and more expenditures on durable goods shows that households are wealthier than others,
and both instruments have a positive effect on shadow income. Having more liquidity
from non-labour income and living in a village where expenditures on inputs are more
important also have a positive effect on shadow income. Some household characteristics
have significant and expected effects on shadow wage or income.
Moving to the the second-stage results in model (2), the shadow wage does have a sig-
22Price of bag of cocoa has four values and varies between CFAF 34,100 in Akom II up to 50,000 in
Ebolowa.
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nificant effect on total labour supply and its sign reflects a negative relationship between
shadow wage and time. When having higher shadow wages, households decrease their
labour supply.23 In this estimation, an income effect dominates; the income effect out-
weighs the substitution effect between work and leisure and household demand for leisure
increases when shadow wage increases. This effect could be explained by the fact that
shadow wage and labour supply are measured at the household level and may actually be
heterogenous within households. Distinguishing labour supply and shadow wage accord-
ing to gender and age categories could give different results since it is the women who
are occupied in agriculture and NTFP extraction while the less time-consuming activities
tend to be male occupations.24
Shadow income has a significant and positive effect on household labour supply; this sug-
gests that leisure decreases when households become wealthier, implying that leisure is an
inferior good. This result can be explained by the fact that in the sample most house-
holds do not seem to be constrained in the time they are working; and this lack of hours
constraint associated with poverty tend to push households to work more when having
higher shadow income25 (Barrett et al., 2005). On the other hand, in a quarter of the
households, adults work more than 40 hours a week26; for these households, an increase
in labour supply when shadow income increases may be harder to achieve.
Looking at household characteristics, having more children has a positive effect on total
labour supply which suggests that adults need to work more to sustain the needs of the
23Here I am only interested on the effect of shadow wage and income on labour supply and using IV
procedure allows me to control for the reverse effect that labour supply has an effect on shadow wage and
shadow income.
24According to my observations, women spend more time working than men but the way I collected the
data does not allow me to separate labour supply according to gender.
25All regressions here confirm this result; I also check it looking at total labour supply for all households
except households living in Mbango-Bitouer redefining the shadow income in this case and I find similar
results.
26However I have tried with households with adult members working more than 40 hours per week,
leisure-scarce households, and I have the same results as for the whole sample; only the coefficient associated
with the shadow wage is higher than for the whole sample.
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children. This effect is also explained by the fact that children participate in both agri-
culture and NTFP extraction which leads to an increase in total labour supply.
The age of the household head is positive and significant while its squared value is nega-
tive and significant; this means that when the household head gets older, the total labour
supply increases but at a decreasing rate. Labour supply is always increasing with the age
of the household head and reaches a maximum when household head becomes 52 years
old.
Households with higher average education work more but the education of the household
head has no effect on labour supply.
Reduced forms of labour supply estimations (table B.6 in appendix) confirm these results.
Larger, older and more educated households work more while households with agricul-
tural plots away from their house work less. These reduced form estimations report the
price of manioc does not have any effect on household labour supply which can illustrate
that overall households consume manioc and the price of manioc would not affect their
production.
To conclude this section, the marginal productivity of agricultural labour estimated through
a Cobb-Douglas production function seems to be a more plausible value of households’ time
than the estimated shadow wage in NTFP extraction. The latter suggests that households
have really low productivity but this could either result from an over-estimation of time
spent collecting NTFPs or the lower price of NTFPs compared to agricultural products.
The agricultural shadow wage is used to estimate the shadow income which is an esti-
mation of households’ total income for a budget constraint. Regressing labour supply on
these two variables, controlling for different household composition, education, activities
and location effects, shows that total labour supply decreases with the shadow wage and
increases with shadow income. Household unconstrained in their labour supply prefer
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working presumably more in order to have higher welfare through increasing consumption
and decreasing leisure.
However the estimation of total labour supply does not show in which activities households
are engaged and does not reflect the importance of forest activities for households’ welfare.
In order to examine such questions, I proceed with the analysis of factors affecting labour
supply to the four activities, e.g. agriculture, NTFPs, off-farm off-forest and hunting.
2.6 Labour allocations to agriculture, NTFP extraction, off-
farm activities and hunting
Estimating household labour allocations requires the analysis of how labour returns in
different activities affect households’ decisions, i.e. how households allocate their time
considering the earnings they forego by substituting out in other activities (Fisher et al.,
2005). Unable to estimate marginal shadow wages from a production function for off-farm
off-forest activities and obtaining only a somewhat implausible value of marginal shadow
wage from NTFP production function, in what follows I define an alternative concept of
shadow wage and use an average shadow wage equal to the average earnings per unit of
time. Indeed, estimating household production function for self-employed activities is a
complex exercise that the data do not allow since households can develop a wide range of
self-employed activities differing in services and products offered, and in inputs and cap-
itals required. Analogously, because NTFPs are different by nature and require different
inputs, and because households do not grow such products, estimating household produc-
tion function for NTFP extraction is not as straightforward as agricultural production and
provides less reliable results for the NTFP shadow wage.
As a consequence, instead of using households’ marginal shadow wage, I estimate shadow
wages as being the ratio of earnings on time dedicated to the activity. I predict such value
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in all three activities for all households, controlling for a censorship problem in the case of
NTFP extraction or off-farm off-forest activities since some households may decide not to
participate in such activities. I need these shadow wages for everyone in all three activities
in order to analyse why some households do participate in one activity while others do
not.
Households decide whether or not to extract NTFPs and they may or may not be able
to work off-farm depending on the existence of wage opportunities, their skills or their
capacity to develop a self-employed activity. As a result, predicting their shadow wages
requires the use of a Heckman model. This model estimates jointly participation in one
activity and the quotient of earnings per unit of time in this activity correcting for the
sample selection bias. If such predictions are not undertaken, households not participating
in these activities will be dropped when estimating labour allocations, which would bias
the analysis (Fisher et al., 2005).
The labour allocation specifications try to explain how households allocate their time to
one activity given the wage predicted above in this activity and the opportunity costs in
the other activities but also controlling for households characteristics. All three shadow
wages are potentially endogenous. However, since I could not find relevant instruments27 I
decide in each allocation estimation to control for the endogeneity of the own-shadow wage
and not for the endogeneity of the cross-shadow wages.28 I define specific instruments for
each shadow wage and the majority of these succeeds the tests for weak identification and
overidentification (Murray, 2006).
I estimate the time allocated to agriculture through a 2SLS procedure, the time in NTFPs
and off-farm off-forest activities through ivtobit regressions and the time in hunting through
27Using the most relevant and well-defined instruments, I have tested whether these cross-shadow wages
are endogenous or not, and according to a Wu-Hausman test it appears that controlling for their endo-
geneity does not improve the estimations.
28The shadow wage in the alternative activities.
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a tobit since in the three latter, labour allocations can either be null with a positive proba-
bility or continuous over positive values, which leads to a censoring problem (Wooldridge,
2002, Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor, 2008). Estimation of time allocated to hunting appears
not to have any endogenous shadow wages since hunting does not have own shadow wage.
In the case of an ivtobit, following Lo´pez-Feldman and Taylor (2008), I select the instru-
ments in a 2SLS regression by looking at the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic and the Sargan
statistic, and I check their significance and relevance in the ivtobit.
2.6.1 Average shadow wages in agriculture, NTFP extraction and off-
farm activities
Estimating agricultural shadow wage does not require the use of a specific procedure since
all households participate in such activity. Table 2.18 shows that overall, only village con-
trol variables explain the differences in shadow wages across households while household
characteristics do not affect households’ agricultural earnings.
On the other hand, to estimate the shadow wages for NTFP extraction and for off-farm
off-forest estimations, Heckman models are implemented in which at least one instrument
in the participation estimation is different from the instruments in the shadow wage speci-
fication (Wooldridge, 2002). I use a maximum-likelihood procedure to predict the shadow
wages for NTFP extraction and for off-farm employment in order to relax the hypothesis
that the factors determining the participation and the wage are identical and of same
sign. Such a procedure is also consistent and efficient in a small sample (Fisher et al.,
2005, Baum, 2006).
In these models, the different explanatory factors refer to household composition, house-
hold education, the availability of NTFPs, different district and village control variables.
The identifiers for NTFP participation and off-farm off-forest participation include the
number of ill adults, the number of children at school, the size of land, a dummy for
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whether households have earnings from livestock, a dummy for non-labour income or be-
longing to a tontine. Additionally, in the estimation of participation in NTFP extraction I
use a dummy for whether households have a self-employed activity, and, in the estimation
of participation in off-farm off-forest activities, a dummy for whether households extract
palm nuts (appendix table B.7).
I assume that households with ill adults are more likely to participate in NTFP extraction
so as to directly extract medicinal products or to participate in off-farm activities so they
can purchase medicinal products. Households with more children at school are less likely
to participate in NTFP extractions since children participate to a fair share in NTFP
extraction and when at school, they won’t be able to participate in NTFP extraction. In
the light of the dummy variables I assume that households with other sources of income
are less likely to participate in NTFP extraction or off-farm activities. The identifiers
affect a household’s decision to participate in NTFP extraction or in off-farm employment
without affecting directly its wage (Fisher et al., 2005).
For the NTFP model, the value of rho allows to reject the null hypothesis that rho equals
to 0, meaning that participation and shadow wage are not correlated (Greene, 2002). On
the contrary, the value of rho in the off-farm estimation fails to reject the null hypothesis
that rho is equal to 0; participation and average earnings appear not to be correlated.
In both estimations of participation, the instruments have the expected effects.29 House-
holds with children attending school are less likely to participate in NTFP extractions
while households with a number of ill adults are more likely to participate in off-farm
activities (table 2.18). NTFP extraction and off-farm activities appear to be substitutes
since households with a self-employed activity are less likely to participate in NTFP ex-
29In the appendix table B.8, I present another specification of Heckman models using a different set of
variables but keeping the same identifiers.
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traction while reciprocally households extracting palm nuts are less likely to participate
in off-farm activities. Households with non-labour income, typically receiving it in cash,
are less likely to participate in off-farm off-forest activities.
While households with older household members and a literate household head are more
likely to extract NTFPs, younger households with a household head aged 31-55 years old
tend to have greater earnings. Households with primary or secondary education are un-
likely to participate in off-farm off-forest activities but they earn more per hour.
Households living in a village with palm nut trees30 are more likely to participate in
NTFP extraction and in self-employed activities. Such a geographical effect is associated
with the fact that villages with more palm nuts like Akom II or Nyangong are also villages
where households participate more in off-farm activities while for example in Mbango-
Bitouer fewer households extract palm nuts or participate in off-farm activities.
On the other hand, households living in villages with more palm nuts have lower earnings
per hour in NTFP extraction. This suggests that palm nuts may be a low-value NTFP
even if households extract it more than they extract ndo’o. Therefore palm nut extraction
seems to require a lot more time to have greater earnings.
Predicting all households’ shadow wages for agriculture, NTFP extractions and off-farm
off-forest activities, shadow wages in off-farm off-forest activities are higher than agricul-
tural and NTFP shadow wages. The distribution of shadow wages31 shows that NTFP
shadow wage is smaller than off-farm shadow wage in most cases but that agricultural
shadow wage and the NTFP shadow wage follow a same distribution (figure 2.9).
The agricultural shadow wage is on average equal to CFAF 482, the NTFP shadow wage to
30Villages where access to palm nut trees is easier are Ebom, Lambi, Ebimimbang, Akom II, Nkomakak,
Abiete, Mvie and Nyangong.
31NTFPs and off-farm off-forest shadow wages from respectively model (1) and (2).
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of predicted shadow wages in agriculture, NTFPs and off-farm
off-forest activities
CFAF 510 per household per week and off-farm shadow wage is on average equal to CFAF
1,381 (table 2.19). Households in Lolodorf have higher shadow wages in agriculture and
NTFP extraction than households living in the other districts but on the contrary, their
shadow wages from off-farm off-forest activities are lower. Households living in Efoulan
have higher shadow wages from off-farm off-forest activities.
Table 2.19: NTFP and off-farm shadow wages by quintiles of total time [95% Confidence
interval]
Quintiles Agriculture NTFP Off-farm off-forest
shadow wage shadow wage (1) shadow wage (2)
Lowest 614.9 [515.7;714.2] 713.5 [527.7;899.3] 1394.6 [1142.3;1646.9]
2nd 485.5 [409.5;561.5] 559.1 [439.7;678.4] 1303.9 [1100.7;1507.1]
3rd 468.1 [398.3;538.0] 505.2 [406.8;603.5] 1500.1 [1258.0;1742.1]
4th 444.4 [377.5;511.3] 427.2 [317.7;536.7] 1328.4 [1114.4;1542.3]
Highest 390.4 [356.1;424.8] 339.1 [293.8;384.3] 1381.0 [1197.2;1564.8]
Total 482.0 [449.3;514.8] 510.0 [455.3;564.6] 1381.9 [1284.9;1478.9]
Across quintiles of total time, the shadow wages for agriculture and NTFP extractions de-
crease while there seems to be no linear relationship between households’ shadow wage for
off-farm off-forest activities and total time spent working.32 Across quintiles of per capita
total production, on average, the shadow wages for agriculture and NTFP extractions
increase with the quintile; the shadow wage for off-farm activities is on average higher in
32I present in appendix the results found with the other Heckman models; changes between quintiles are
similar for these shadow wages.
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the middle quintile than in the lowest and highest quintiles in which shadow wages are on
average equal.
2.6.2 Labour allocations to agriculture, NTFP extraction, off-farm em-
ployment and hunting
Estimating labour allocation consists in estimating the number of hours spent in each
activity as a function of the shadow wages in each activity, household composition char-
acteristics, different activities characteristics and village characteristics (appendix table
B.7).
When looking at the allocation of labour to agriculture, I use a 2SLS procedure instru-
menting the agricultural shadow wage using a proxy for the wealth of the household and
the district price of cucumber. The proxy for wealth is a dummy for whether the house-
hold has any livestock or not33 and I expect this variable to explain positively the average
product in agriculture as wealthier households should be able to be more productive. The
village price of cucumber is assumed to give the level of agricultural prices within the vil-
lage; all the effect this price has on the time spent cultivating goes through the agricultural
shadow wage. The tests justify that both IVs are consistent and valid. The first-stage
regression shows that the dummy for livestock is negative but only significant at 10%,
and it appears to capture a geographic pattern with Mbango having fewer households
raising livestock than households in the other villages. On the other hand, the district
price of cucumber has the expected effect on agricultural shadow wages since it is positive
and highly significant. Households living in villages with a higher price of cucumber have
higher shadow wages from agriculture (appendix table B.11).
33I have tried different measures of household’s wealth such as dummy for large equipment, an asset
index, a dummy for each type of equipment, regional prices of gasoline or rice, receiving a credit for
medical purposes, and also different interaction terms between rainfall and size of land. However the
results presented here are the best estimates I could obtain and pass successfully all tests linked to the use
of IV.
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Considering labour allocations to NTFP extraction and to off-farm off-forest activities,
the instruments for the shadow wages in NTFP and in off-farm off-forest activities are the
village wage for clearing plots and the district price of cocoa respectively. The village wage
for clearing plots should have a positive effect on the NTFP shadow wages. The district
price of cocoa is supposed to capture the fact that villages with higher cocoa prices tend
to be wealthier with households having greater earnings from off-farm activities. Lack of
correlations of these IVs to the time spent in each activity confirms that these IVs do not
affect the time and that all impacts they may have go through shadow wages.34
I attempt to justify the use of these instruments through an ivreg2 specification. With
respect to the NTFP shadow wage, the instrument is valid and identifies the endogenous
variable since the Cragg-Donald statistic is above 10 in a 2SLS specification; unfortunately
when controlling for censorship in an ivtobit, the instrument is not significant in the first-
stage regression (table B.11 in appendix). However, I keep this IV since it is the best I
could find. Other IVs were rejected due to their being correlated to the time spent in
NTFP extraction or because they were giving even worse results.
In a 2SLS regression, the price of cocoa seems to weakly identify the off-farm shadow wages
since the Cragg-Donald statistic is smaller than 10. However, the Wald test of exogeneity
in the ivtobit regression and the significance of the instrument in the first-stage regression
suggest that the IV can control for the endogeneity of the shadow wage. Contrary to
what I expected the IV has a negative effect on off-farm shadow wages and villages with a
higher price of cocoa such as Nyangong or Mbango tend to have lower shadow wages from
off-farm activities since in these villages, households appear to participate in low earning
off-farm activities.
34I have tried including different measures of household wealth but I could not use these instruments
since either they were correlated to the dependent variables or according to the test they appear not to be
valid instruments.
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Moving to the second-stage regressions (table 2.20), the important result is that house-
holds do not allocate more time to NTFP extraction when shadow wages in this activity
increase. However, households do allocate more time to agriculture and to off-farm activ-
ities when respectively agricultural shadow wages and off-farm shadow wages increase. In
addition, when NTFP shadow wages increase, households allocate more time to hunting
and they allocate more time to off-farm activities when shadow wages for agriculture in-
crease.
The effect of NTFP shadow wages on hunting time is related to the fact that NTFP and
hunting activities may be jointly performed; households can spend more time hunting since
they have greater earnings from NTFP extraction. The effect of agricultural shadow wages
on off-farm activities may result from the fact that with greater earnings in agriculture,
households are able to invest more in self-employed off-farm activities and to spend more
time in these activities.
Some household size and composition effects exist; households with more children or wives
can allocate more time to agriculture, NTFPs and hunting. Children and wives are often
the ones working for a greater share in agriculture and NTFP extraction and they often
have small traps around their agricultural plots. Older households allocate more time
to agriculture but at a decreasing rate and, if anything, older households spend less and
less time in NTFP extractions. More educated households are able to spend less time in
agriculture and more time in off-farm off-forest activities.
Ngoumba households tend to spend less time in agriculture while Bulu households spend
more time extracting NTFPs.35 Households with a plot further away from home tend to
allocate less time to agriculture but more time to hunting activities, households checking
their traps along the way to their plot.
35Ngoumba households live mainly in Mbango while Bulu households live mainly in Nyangong and Akom
II.
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Table 2.20: Estimation results for labour allocations
Hours agriculture Hours NTFP Hours Off-farm Hours hunting
Shadow wage agriculture 0.0819** (0.0335) -0.00882 (0.0375) 0.316* (0.180) 0.0210 (0.0177)
Shadow wage NTFP -0.00614 (0.00609) -0.0361 (0.0361) -0.0323 (0.0283) 0.0124* (0.00658)
Shadow wage off-farm 0.00309 (0.00307) 0.00162 (0.00412) 0.0550* (0.0307) 0.000341 (0.00127)
Child 2.776*** (0.977) 0.249 (0.970) -0.182 (1.047) -0.0259 (0.335)
Wives 12.93*** (3.684) 8.710*** (3.220) 3.517 (3.666) 4.445*** (1.269)
Age head 2.149*** (0.491) 0.818 (0.624) -0.402 (0.822) -0.214 (0.279)
Squared head age -0.0170*** (0.00468) -0.00992* (0.00538) -0.00315 (0.00728) 0.000816 (0.00253)
Average grade 3.979 (2.533) -0.617 (2.479) 1.329 (3.677) 0.402 (0.787)
Primary education 1.092 (6.230) 4.021 (10.12) 17.56 (12.35) 0.833 (2.010)
Higher education 9.782 (8.181) 11.56 (10.49) 46.86* (24.29) 2.383 (2.974)
Education head -4.514** (2.128) -2.727 (2.958) -0.451 (2.655) -0.645 (0.694)
Secondary educ head 1.504 (6.782) 1.051 (7.200) 5.703 (7.668) 2.557 (1.987)
Ngoumba -10.57** (5.217) 3.805 (5.941) -1.444 (9.938) 2.443 (1.902)
Bulu 12.95 (8.323) 14.50** (6.589) -1.161 (3.673)
Distance field -0.164** (0.0641) 0.0113 (0.0770) -0.0678 (0.0867) 0.0497** (0.0216)
Village ethnicity 15.02* (8.259) 7.017 (10.50) -120.5* (73.18) -8.320 (7.326)
Village distance market 0.204 (0.137) 0.0312 (0.212) -1.664 (1.106) -0.136 (0.116)
More rain 1.902 (8.506) 0.357 (12.51) 66.59 (45.62) 20.82*** (7.102)
Mbango -95.27** (46.45) 67.03 (46.46) -323.5* (169.8) -135.3 (0)
Ebom -42.23*** (13.57) -0.0402 (11.68) -80.99* (44.43) -9.597** (4.671)
Mekalat -6.273 (14.05) -2.310 (17.50) -155.1* (86.33) -19.14** (9.251)
Bipindi -26.46 (18.90) -5.242 (19.70) -84.40* (43.41) 0.585 (4.819)
Lambi -16.31 (18.28)
Bidjouka 2.493 (14.59) 53.32 (39.58) 11.67** (5.417)
Ebimimbang -12.29 (11.45) 5.967 (7.434) 19.51 (15.79) -7.110* (4.085)
Bongwana -0.847 (12.81) 3.300 (8.915) -3.390 (4.232)
Mvie 10.62 (11.87) 116.6 (274.3) -110.6* (66.79) -10.16 (7.206)
Abiete -13.93 (10.20) -7.652 (24.13) -8.279* (4.591)
Constant -64.31** (25.41) 1.431 (29.11) -94.38* (56.50) -17.95* (10.45)
Observations 375 375 374 375
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat 311
Sargan Test P-value 0.356
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Village effects show that households living in villages where it has rained during the last
year allocate more time to hunting but this seems to capture mainly a geographic effect.
Since the residuals from agriculture and off-farm activities are respectively correlated with
the residuals from NTFP extractions and hunting, I estimate labour allocations through
a system, a 3SLS model (appendix table B.13) in which I control for the endogeneity of
the shadow wage in agriculture.36 Correlations between residuals are explained by the
fact either that certain households with members working more than 40 hours a week
are constrained in their labour supply and increase labour allocations in one activity by
decreasing labour allocations in another, or that certain households participate jointly in
36I am not taking into account the potential endogeneity of the other shadow wages and the censorship
problems which complicate the estimations without improving the results.
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particular activities.
However within such a model none of the shadow wage effects found in the independent
labour allocation estimations persist and there are hardly any household effects. The
absence of results supports the idea that overall, correlations are not that important and
households are not limited in time they work. Such results may also be due to the fact
that I could not control for the censorship problem in the system. Estimating a system
with an uncensored equation and three censored ones is particularly demanding.
Since the results of the estimation are poor, I prefer using the results from independently
estimated labour allocations to account for the factors encouraging households to allocate
labour to different activities.37
2.6.3 Summary of findings from labour allocation estimations
From these estimations, allocations of time to NTFP activities do not increase when the
earnings from extracting these resources increase. Households decide to participate in
these activities taking more into account the availability of the products and their inca-
pacity to implement self-employed activities.
Considering that most households are not constrained in their time spent working, house-
holds with greater earnings in agriculture or in off-farm activities increase the time spent
in their respective activities. In addition, increased earnings in agriculture allow house-
holds to spend more time in off-farm activities and increased earnings in NTFP extraction
encourage households to hunt more. As a result, whether or not time allocations in the
other activities remain unchanged households end up working more after increases in agri-
cultural, off-farm and NTFP earnings.
37I looked at different estimations using control variables whether households extract palm or ndo’o,
or whether households participate in self-employment activity, a wage activity, households have an old
business or a wage skilled activity, and all results were the same. In the appendix table B.15, I also present
labour shares in all four activities which confirm some of the results but I do not think these results are
totally consistent since I am controlling neither for the endogeneity nor for the censorship problems.
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Such an increase in the time spent working corroborates the findings from labour supply
in which an increase in the shadow income encourages households to work more. How-
ever, time spent extracting NTFPs appears not to change when earnings increase and it
seems quite likely that allocations of labour to NTFP activities does not increase when
the shadow income increases. This is quite an important result because it suggests that
increasing prices of NTFPs may not increase pressures on these resources since households
would not spend more time extracting these resources. After an increase in NTFP prices,
households engaged in NTFP extraction enjoy greater profits since without increasing
their labour they would earn more.
In order to increase prices of NTFPs and resulting earnings, forest conservation practices
could be implemented but better prices do not necessarily guarantee that households can
improve their welfare. In order to find out whether households can improve their welfare
when NTFP prices increase, the following section starts by comparing households engaged
in NTFP extraction to those not participating in these activities. Then the effects of an
increase in NTFP prices on household leisure and consumption are determined, analysed
and compared to the effects of an increase in agricultural prices.
2.7 Using NTFP activities to improve household welfare
For households in the research area, NTFP extraction appears to be an important activity
in the sense that it contributes to household total production and consumption. The liter-
ature acknowledges that households employ NTFP-related activities to manage their risks
or cope with shocks (Byron and Arnold, 1999, Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). However,
participating in NTFP extractions may have positive effects on household welfare; those
households having greater production values may be able to enjoy greater consumption or
greater leisure.
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From the model and more specifically the equation (2.15), household welfare depends on
both consumption and leisure that are in the left-hand side of this equation; household
are better off when leisure or consumption increases.
To determine whether NTFP activities can improve household welfare or not, I first in-
vestigate if households engaged in NTFP activities and extracting certain types of NTFPs
are able to consume more and work less than households engaged in other types of ac-
tivities. Afterwards, I analyse the effects of changes in prices on household welfare using
comparative statics and the results from the labour supply analysis. Such changes affect
household consumption and leisure either directly or indirectly; the indirect effects can
either go through shadow wage or shadow income, each having different effects on the
various components of household welfare.
2.7.1 NTFP activities and household welfare
To determine whether participating in NTFP extractions can help households to improve
their welfare, I investigate whether households extracting forest products are better off in
terms of consumption and leisure than other households. I detail such analysis according
to the types of NTFPs households extract and according to households’ participation in
hunting.
On average, comparing households engaged in NTFP activities to those not engaged in
these activities, the former have greater household production. Households engaged in
NTFP extraction seem to be wealthier in terms of production than those who do not
participate in such activities. Furthermore, in what follows it would be seen that in the
majority of cases, extracting NTFPs allows households to be better off in terms of con-
sumption even if having less leisure.
Distinguishing households engaged in NTFP activities but not in wage work nor in self-
employed activities from households engaged in wage work or from those engaged in self-
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employed activities, the former have greater household consumption.38 On average, house-
holds engaged in NTFP activities work more than households engaged in wage work or
engaged in self-employed activities but the values of their gains in consumption are greater
than losses of leisure. Furthermore, on average, households engaged in NTFP activities
but not in hunting activities are better off since they work less for the same levels of con-
sumption.
However, if adult members of households engaged in NTFP extraction work on average
more than 40 hours a week, the gains in consumption that result from working more are
not high enough to compensate the loss of leisure. Households engaged in NTFP extrac-
tions whose members work more than 40 hours are worse-off than households engaged in
NTFP extractions with members working on average less than 40 hours a week.
Comparing households extracting palm nuts to those extracting ndo’o, the former are bet-
ter off in the sense that even if they work more, they have greater gains in consumption
than households extracting ndo’o since even if palm nuts is a low-value NTFP, households
extract it more than they extract ndo’o. It seems that extracting both types of NTFPs
allow households to consume more but at the cost of more work, and gains in consumption
do not compensate losses of leisure.
To summarise, households engaged in NTFP extractions have greater production and are
able to enjoy higher consumption than households in other types of activities. Even if
this result comes for most households at the cost of less leisure, all households engaged in
NTFP activities are able to have greater welfare in terms of consumption.
38I look at household consumption and production to be able to compare values of extra-consumption
to values of extra-time which are calculated at the household level. Overall, if looking at per capita
consumption and production, same rankings are obtained.
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2.7.2 Impacts of price changes on welfare
Knowing that participating in NTFP extraction allows households to reach higher welfare,
the effects of changes in the price of NTFPs are determined and compared to the changes
in the price of agricultural products.
Neglecting the impacts of changes in the price of hunting, the impacts on welfare of a
change in the price of NTFPs or agricultural products can be assessed using households’
maximisation problem (2.14) subject to their full budget constraint (2.15). Households
maximise their welfare through their consumption of different market, agricultural, forest
and hunting goods (Cm, Ca, Cf , Cu) and its leisure (l).
According to the model, consumption of good i with i = m, a, f, u is a function of the
price of the good i, the price of other goods j, the price of hunting goods η, the shadow
wage w? and the full income constraint V ? + w?E; consumption can be rewritten as
Ci(pi, pj , η?, w?, (
∑
n
(pnQn − w?nl?n)− pxx+ Y + w?E)) (2.25)
with n being the different agricultural, forest and hunting activities households are engaged
in n = a, f, u.
Similarly, leisure is a function of the same parameters and can be rewritten as
l(pi, η?, w?, (
∑
n
(pnQn − w?nl?n)− pxx+ Y + w?E)) (2.26)
From these two equations, the effects of changes in the price of forest-products on house-
hold consumption can be decomposed as follows:
∂Ci
∂pf
=
∂Ci
∂pf
∣∣∣∣
u
+
∂Ci
∂w?
∂w?
∂pf
+ (Qf − Cf ) ∂Ci
∂(V ? + w?E)
∂(V ? + w?E)
∂w?
(2.27)
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with Ci being Ca, Cf , Cu.
Whether Ci represents the consumption of forest products or the consumption of other
products, the first term is respectively negative or positive. This first term ∂Ci∂pf
∣∣∣∣
u
reports
the substitution effect; to keep household utility constant, consumption of the forest-
product decreases when its own price increases and the consumption of the other goods
increases as long as goods are substitutes.
The second term ∂Ci∂w?
∂w?
∂pf
reports an additional effect through a change in the shadow
wage. According to the first-order condition (2.9), everything else remaining equal, an
increase in the price of the output increases the shadow wage w?. Thus, the second term
has a positive effect; household consumption of different products increases when the price
of NTFPs increases. However according to the data, the shadow wage does not have any
significant effect on household consumption; in our research area increasing the price of
NTFPs does not affect household consumption through the shadow wage.
The last-term describes the effect of an increase in the NTFP price on consumption through
household full income knowing that households are net sellers (Qf −Cf > 0) of NTFPs.39
An increase in the NTFP price increases both household production of NTFPs and the
shadow wage. The shadow income V ? being positively affected by household production
but negatively by shadow wage, has an indeterminate effect on consumption. However,
the full income constraint is a function of both V ? and w?E and the full income constraint∑
i(piQi− liw?i )− pxx+ Y +w?E increases since
∑
i liw
? < w?E with E = l+
∑
i li + lw.
As a consequence an increase in the price of NTFPs increases the household full income
and, households being net sellers of NTFPs, the effect of an increase in the price of NTFPs
through the full income is positive. An increase in the full income increases consumption
and such an effect is confirmed by the data.
39Households in the research area do not buy NTFPs; they consume what they have produced.
158
Overall, an increase in the price of NTFPs is likely to have a positive effect on household
consumption. Since the full income elasticity is presumably greater than the negative
substitution effect and since it is multiplied by sales of NTFPs, the income effect would
certainly outweigh the negative substitution effect on consumption of NTFPs and further-
more, adds to the positive substitution effects of other products.
The decomposition of the effects on household leisure of an increase in NTFP prices is as
follows
∂l
∂pf
=
∂l
∂pf
∣∣∣∣
u
+
∂l
∂w?
∂w?
∂pf
+ (Qf − Cf ) ∂l
∂(V ? + w?E)
∂(V ? + w?E)
∂w?
(2.28)
An increase in the price of NTFPs can have a positive effect on household leisure when
utility is held fixed; households reduce consumption of NTFPs and can increase leisure in
order to have a constant utility. Some households may substitute away from consumption
in favour of leisure.
The second effect shows that after an increase in the NTFP price increasing shadow wage,
households increase leisure. This effect is confirmed by the labour supply estimation in
which the agricultural shadow wage has a negative and significant effect on labour supply
(table 2.17). When shadow wage increases leisure increases.
If leisure were a normal good, an increase in household full income increase leisures; this
last term (Qf − Cf ) ∂l∂(V ?+w?E) would be positive. But I know from the labour supply
estimation that leisure is an inferior good for the Cameroonian households. Therefore, an
increase in the NTFP price has a negative effect on leisure through household full income
constraint. When getting wealthier, households supply more labour (table 2.17) and sub-
stitute away from leisure.
The net effect of an increase in the NTFP price on leisure is indeterminate; the first two
effects are positive and the income effect is negative. Depending on whether the income
effect predominates or not, a change in the NTFP price has a negative or positive effect
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on household leisure.
Looking now at the effects of an increase in the price of agricultural products on household
consumption and leisure, the comparative statics take the following form:
∂Ci
∂pa
=
∂Ci
∂pa
∣∣∣∣
u
+
∂Ci
∂w?
∂w?
∂pa
+ (Qa − Ca) ∂Ci
∂(V ? + w?E)
∂(V ? + w?E)
∂w?
(2.29)
After an increase in the price of agricultural products, to keep their utility constant house-
holds decrease their consumption of agricultural products but increase their consumption
of other goods. The first term has a negative sign whether Ci is consumption of agricul-
tural products or a positive sign if Ci is consumption of other goods being substitutes to
agricultural goods.
The second term is similar to the one associated with an increase in the price of NTFPs;
and since the data reveal that shadow wage has no effect on consumption, an increase in
the price of agricultural products has no effect on consumption through shadow wage.
The effect of an increase in agricultural prices on household consumption through full in-
come can take different signs depending on whether households are net sellers Qa−Ca > 0
ore net buyers Qa −Ca < 0. For net sellers, the effect is similar to the one resulting from
an increase in the price of NTFPs; households increase consumption of the different goods
after an increase in agricultural prices. However if households are net buyers, the effect
becomes negative since ∂Ci∂(V ?+w?E) is nonnegative and (Qa−Ca) is negative so the income
effect is negative.
Here as well, the income effect is expected to outweigh the substitution effect. When
households are net buyers of agricultural products, the net effect on consumption after an
increase in agricultural prices is negative and when households are net sellers, the net ef-
fect is positive and households increase their consumption after an increase in agricultural
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prices.
Similarly the effects on leisure can be decomposed as follows:
∂l
∂pa
=
∂l
∂pa
∣∣∣∣
u
+
∂l
∂w?
∂w?
∂pa
+ (Qa − Ca) ∂l
∂(V ? + w?E)
∂(V ? + w?E)
∂w?
(2.30)
Just as with an increase in the price of NTFPs, an increase in the price of agricultural
products has a positive effect on household demand for leisure. When utility is held
constant, households increase leisure substituting away from consumption of agricultural
products.
This substitution effect is augmented by another effect through the shadow wage; an
increase in agricultural prices, increasing shadow wage, increases household leisure. Ac-
cording to the labour supply estimation, households in the research area increase leisure
when they have higher shadow wage.
Finally, an increase in agricultural prices has an income effect that affects household leisure
either positively or negatively. According to the labour supply estimation, leisure is an
inferior good. Therefore, after an increase in agricultural prices, the income effect is neg-
ative for net sellers since ∂l∂(V ?+w?E) has a negative sign and Qa − Ca has a positive one.
Net seller households decrease leisure when agricultural prices increase. On the contrary,
for net buyers, an increase in agricultural prices has a nonnegative effect on leisure since
∂l
∂(V ?+w?E) is still negative but Qa − Ca is also negative; net buyer households increase
leisure after an increase in agricultural prices.
The net effect is again indeterminate for net sellers since two first terms have a positive
sign if leisure is a substitute for agricultural goods but the income effect is negative. On
the other hand, the effect on leisure is positive for net buyers since all three effects are
positive; net buyers can improve their welfare through an increase in leisure after an in-
crease in the price of agricultural products.
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To summarise, both increases in the price of NTFPs or agricultural products have positive
effects on household consumption or leisure. However an increase in the price of NTFPs
appears to have less unambiguous effects on household welfare. An increase in the price of
NTFPs allows household to consume more. The effect on leisure is quite indeterminate,
but it is reasonable to assume that the income effect on leisure is smaller than the one for
consumption. Such an assumption is supported by the fact that values of consumption are
on average greater than values of labour and that the positive coefficient of the full shadow
income on household consumption is greater than the one on labour supply. Overall, after
an increase in the price of NTFPs, households are better off and participating in NTFP
activities improve households’ welfare.
2.8 Conclusion
To conclude, this study shows that households in the Province South of Cameroon gener-
ate an important part of their livelihood from forest resources, either NTFPs or hunting
products. Poorer households depend more on NTFP extraction than wealthier households
but on average, households engaged in NTFP extractions appear to be better off than
households not engaged in such activities. The few households engaged in wage activities
and not in NTFPs are worse-off in terms of production and consumption which shows that
wage activities by themselves are not enough to improve household welfare in the research
area.
From the labour supply estimation, it appears that household marginal shadow wages and
shadow income have respectively positive and negative effects on leisure. Leisure appears
to be an inferior good; households work more when their income increases. Such an in-
crease in household shadow income according to the comparative statics has a net positive
effect on household consumption if the increase in shadow income results from an increase
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in the price of NTFPs. It is true that the effect of an increase in NTFP prices on leisure
may be indeterminate but since both consumption values and the coefficients of shadow
income on consumption are greater, the effects on consumption would certainly outweigh
any effects on leisure. Increase in the price of NTFPs allows households to improve their
welfare.
In addition, households in the research area would not spend more time extracting NTFPs
when earnings from these extractions increase, but they do spend more time in agriculture
or in off-farm activities when respective earnings in these activities increase. However, the
comparative statics show no clear positive effects on their consumption.
Consequently, increasing the price of NTFPs appear to allow households to improve their
welfare but also, since households would tend not to spend more time extracting these
resources, an increase in NTFP prices would be unlikely to have any negative impact on
forest resources. Any pressures on forest resources could be reduced if increases in NTFP
prices result from conservation and reforestation practices coupled with enhanced man-
agement of forest resources and the promotion of trade. Furthermore, households benefit
from greater prices of NTFPs but also from improvements in agriculture through better
soil conservation, better control of floods and lower levels of crop losses engendered by
animals. A better management of forest resources enables forest animals to find what
they need to eat in the forest and the latter need not to destroy agricultural cultivations,
their natural habitats being restored. Households when hunting may find animals of bigger
value.
Further research should look at how to define incentives to encourage households to par-
ticipate in forest conservation. Better quality forest resources and resulting greater prices
should influence households to conserve forest but households often do not take into ac-
count these effects and adopt unsustainable forest uses. As a consequence, it seems that
paying households could be a rational incentive to encourage them to conserve forests. To
163
find such payments, rigorous analysis of households’ livelihood must be done prior to the
implementation of a forest conservation activity.
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Chapter 3
Designing forest conservation
payments using a principal-agent
game
Forests provide goods and services whose existence is threatened when forest users adopt
unsustainable uses of forests. This loss of services decreases forest users’ and the whole
society’s welfare, and incentives need to be defined such that forest users internalise the
benefits from supplying these services. Recently, payments for environmental services have
been promoted to remunerate users when adopting sustainable uses of forest that supply
environmental services. The difficulty in developing such payments is to encourage forest
groups to conserve forests knowing that there exist tensions between forest groups’ needs
of using such resources and forest conservation. Consequently, a non-governmental organ-
isation (NGO) interested in forest conservation needs to take into account forest groups’
needs when defining payments while also compensating forest groups for their conservation
effort that the NGO cannot observe. Opposed utility functions and a lack of monitoring
justify the use of a principal-agent game. Resulting from this game, an incentive contract
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ensuring the NGO that forest groups would conserve high levels of trees is such that such
groups are only paid when a high outcome is observed. Any lower outcomes give zero
payments since the NGO does not know the effort exerted. Payments for a high outcome
include a risk-sharing element for risk-averse forest groups, and payments increase over
time if forest conservation increases the value of forest resources. Pro-poor forest conser-
vation schemes coupled with effective additionality can be achieved with low payments
so as to select poor forest groups or the ones living in highly-degraded areas. The NGO
defines a fine to reduce forest groups’ benefits from leakage. To increase the benefits for
non-participants in the scheme, the principal can either promote the development of local
infrastructures or encourage the agent to hire poor workers to conserve forests.
3.1 Introduction
The Brundtland Report has underlined that conservation of natural resources, wildlife
and diversity of resources has a positive effect on global society’s welfare because natural
resources and ecosystem in general provide free services that cannot be found anywhere
else (WCED, 1987). Ten years later, Costanza et al. (1997) estimated that if 17 freely-
provided ecosystems services ranging from water supply and regulation to food provision
or recreation came to disappear the cost to provide these services would be equal to around
US$33 trillions.
Each of these two influential studies emphasises how important and highly valuable ecosys-
tem services are when both provided freely and taking the characteristics of externalities.
Focusing on forest resources, forest users generally neglect to take into account the loss
of several environmental services, e.g. biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration,
watershed protection or landscape beauty, when deciding their land uses despite the fact
that these services enter the utility or production function of others. Therefore, in order
to encourage land users not to destroy, or to protect, these environmental services, several
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policy measures have been implemented so as to push forest users to internalise the costs
and benefits of providing environmental services. These policies range from subsidies and
taxes, and quotas and permits, to direct payments.
Among the latter payments, Payments for Environmental Services (PES), are a market-
based way of internalising the positive externalities generated when preferring sustainable
land uses rather than highly-degrading ones. PES consist of payments from consumers
who benefit from the existence of an environmental service, to producers of this service
whose forest uses influence the provision of such service (Wunder, 2005). PES lead to the
creation of a market for an environmental service in which interactions between supply
and demand define the price to be paid by the consumers to the producers.
This chapter is aimed at defining payments that would incentivise forest users to conserve
forest resources and areas, such payments depending on their efforts and intrinsic char-
acteristics such as disutility, forest resources prior conservation, and poverty. Payments
must be calculated such that both producers and consumers benefit from both payments
and forest conservation, knowing that there exist tensions between forest groups’ needs of
using such resources and consumers’ preference towards conserving these resources.
The payment programme here analysed consists in protecting tree biodiversity through
payments from an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) to forest groups
such that the latter restore and conserve trees within forests. I choose to illustrate this
scheme with respect to the situation of forest groups in Cameroon; for these groups, pay-
ments for forest conservation become an alternative source of income to timber logging
and agriculture. In this hypothetical case, forest restoration and conservation require that
a forest group acts as an environmental service supplier, planting and taking care of the
trees, while the NGO is referred to as an environmental service buyer.
The supplier and buyer do not have the same objective functions. The environmental
service buyer wants a large number of trees planted and growing to maturity at least cost,
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while the environmental service supplier wants to spend as little time and investments as
possible in planting and caring for trees, while earning more. Because the NGO cannot
observe and impose the forest group’s action, the NGO needs to define a contract in terms
of transfers related to the outcome she will observe at the end of the contract. The NGO
has for objective that the forest group produces a high level of forest conservation.
Both the opposition in their objective functions and the lack of monitoring by the NGO
of the supplier’s action make that this forest conservation scheme can be conceptualised
within a principal-agent game as developed by Laffont and Martimort (2002). In this
game, the environmental service buyer becomes the principal and needs to define an in-
centive contract such that the supplier, i.e. the agent, participates in the game and exerts
a high effort in forest conservation instead of selling concession rights to logging companies
or instead of clearing all the forest area for agricultural purposes. In this game, I assume
that the forest group can develop agro-forestry practices in the conserved area and can
extract a fixed amount of non-timber forest products (NTFPs). The principal wants the
agent to exert a high effort as opposed to a low one because there is a higher probability
to have a high level of trees planted and conserved when the high effort is exerted than
when the agent uses a low effort.
Considering first both principal and agent as being risk-neutral, I find that in order to have
the agent performing a high effort in forest conservation, the buyer should offer a non-zero
payment when the output is high and payments equal to 0 in all other cases. When the
supplier becomes risk-averse, the payment associated with a high level of trees planted and
conserved increases since the buyer has to bear a part of the risk. Over several periods, if
the NGO always observes the high outcome, the payments linked to this outcome are in
the two periods greater than if the principal observes such an outcome in one of the two
periods. In this dynamic case, payments encourage the agent to create a virtuous circle
in forest conservation.
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If the NGO wants to contract with poor or highly-degraded forest groups as opposed to
wealthier or better-preserved forest groups, she may offer lower payments. The NGO de-
fines a fine so as to reduce forest groups’ benefits from leakage when leakage results from
increased facilities for adopting more degrading techniques as a result from higher pay-
ments. To increase the benefits for non-participants in the scheme, the NGO can either
promote the development of local infrastructures or encourage the forest group to hire
poor non-participants in the group to conserve forests.
The chapter is organised such that the following section explains both what environmental
externalities are and the means by which they may be internalised. A third section fo-
cuses on PES, providing a definition, examples of existing PES, achievements and limits.
Section 3.4 presents the Cameroonian situation in terms of forest policy and the limits of
existing conservation practices. The game is presented in section 3.5 defining the transfers
in a simple game, extending the game to characterise payments when the agent is risk-
averse and when the game is repeated over time. Section 3.6 deals with the specificities
of a forest conservation programme such as dealing with several agents of different types,
reducing leakage created by the environmental service provider and increasing benefits for
poor non-participants in a forest group. Section 3.7 gives the implications of my findings
comparing these to existing PES before concluding.
3.2 Environmental externalities: review of issues and solu-
tions
When deciding upon its production process, land use or consumption, an agent’s or en-
tity’s action may have effects on another agent’s or entity’s production or utility function
without these effects being formalised by any monetary transfers. These effects are ex-
ternalities created by an agent who does not take into account the fact that its action
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may affect another agent or himself. More formally, “an externality is present whenever
some individual’s utility or production relationship include real variables whose values are
chosen by others without particular attention to the effects on the individual’s welfare”
(Baumol and Oates, 1975). Externalities can be of different types and natures, positive
or negative.
For instance, technological change, human capital accumulation and knowledge spillover
have important positive externality elements resulting from the geographical concentra-
tion of industries. Cultural diversity, better access to services and education are positive
externalities created by the concentration of population in urban areas while noise, crowds
and pollution are negative externalities from such a concentration. Depletion of natural
resources, erosion, loss of biodiversity, pollution are negative externalities resulting from
the use and exploitation of the environment. On the other hand, when adopting land uses
such as avoiding creating these negative externalities, positive externalities, e.g. control
of water flows, biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration or landscape scenery, may
arise.
In my analysis, I focus only on environmental externalities and explain the different mech-
anisms and policies developed to internalise these externalities.
3.2.1 Definition and creation of environmental externalities
A firm or land user, here referred as the agent, before starting to produce, cultivate or use
the land, proceeds to a cost-benefit analysis of its production process. It asks itself the
quantity and types of inputs required to produce or how many hectares of land to convert
from one use to another, and what would be the resulting outputs from these decisions.
By doing so, the agent only compares its private marginal cost to its private marginal
benefit and neglects any effects its decision may have on the society. However, since the
agent production process relies on environmental resources, the agent’s decision creates
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externalities that affect society positively or negatively, either locally, nationally or glob-
ally. For instance, when a company uses large amount of water for its production, cutting
down the availability of water for other users, the company clearly has only considered its
own benefits and costs while deciding upon its production levels. The company creates
a negative externality for the society which makes the society worse off. In this case,
private net marginal benefits are higher than the society’s net marginal costs; the level
of output produced by the company is higher than the society’s optimal level (Kolstad,
2000). Because the agent does not consider the society’s marginal cost of its action that
results in producing negative externalities, the agent’s costs are low. Therefore, negative
externalities are more likely to be over-produced (OECD, 2001).
On the contrary, a situation in which a land user decides to preserve trees on his land,
which regulates water flows irrigating downstream agricultural lands, constitutes a posi-
tive externality. Such situation increases the land user’s private costs while society’s net
marginal costs are smaller. In the end, the level of output produced by the land user
is smaller than the society’s desired level of output (Kolstad, 2000). The land user, not
considering the social benefit of these externalities on the society when deciding upon
the output to produce, has low private benefit from such a production. These positive
externalities are more likely to be under-produced (OECD, 2001).
Within forest areas, negative externalities arise when forest users degrade forest resources
through deforestation, over-exploitation of timber or conversion of forest land to agricul-
ture or pasture. These degradations lead to the under-provision or loss of environmental
services (ES) such as biodiversity conservation (fauna and flora), carbon sequestration by
trees, watershed protection, or recreational uses of forest. Consequently, forest degrada-
tions generate negative externalities, and the loss or under-provision of these services due
to forest degradations has a negative effect on other agents’ utility or production functions.
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On the contrary, not destroying these forest services through the conservation, protection
and restoration of forest covers and resources, generate positive externalities; the afore-
mentioned services are provided such that they enter positively into the forest user’s and
other agents’ utility or production functions.
Such forest externalities arise because of the tensions between people’s livelihoods that
rely upon forest resources and the needs of providing these forest services through for-
est conservation. Such tensions, augmented by market failures such as unclear property
rights, discourage forest users to integrate within their cost-benefit analysis the costs and
benefits of their activities on society. Furthermore, the fact that forest resources are often
used as a free public good makes that the agents do not pay to use the resources and does
not have to compensate anyone when destroying them (Kay and Silberston, 1991). In
the latter case, environmental resources have neither a price nor a market. Nonetheless,
there exist situations in which a market does exist but the price of the resources on this
market usually underestimate the total economic value of the resources. With respect to
forest resources, their values are often limited to use values, i.e. extractive uses of forests,
while forest resources also have non-extractive use values, e.g. the provision of the ES, and
non-use values such as option and existence values which reflect one agent’s willingness to
pay for conserving the forest resources (Pearce, 2001).
As a consequence the lack of institution to pay to use the resources and when the insti-
tution does exist, the underestimation of their value have encouraged the development of
different tools and policies. Such tools and policies are assumed to create the connection
between the private agent and the society in order to reestablish the equality between
private and social optimum.
3.2.2 Tools and policies to deal with environmental externalities
Pigou (1920), Coase (1960) and Baumol and Oates (1975) are the three most influential
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studies on policy responses dealing with environmental externalities. As early as the 1920s,
Pigou (1920) argued that to internalise environmental externalities the agent should pay
a tax when its actions negatively affect society. With such a tax it is more costly for the
agent to produce and it would produce less (Kolstad, 2000). Such a tax creates property
rights over the externalities, those being internalised.
Coase (1960) criticised Pigouvian tax saying that the ideal method for internalising ex-
ternalities consists not in levying a tax on the originator of the externalities, rather in
resolving the conflict in resource allocation so as to reach the social optimum (Cerin,
2006). Coase argued that in the absence of transaction costs, the originator of the ex-
ternality and the one suffering from it can bargain in order to reestablish the optimum
and the allocation of property rights over the resources does not matter. In addition, the
Coase theorem specifies that if property rights are well-defined the resulting situation is
efficient and any further actions would make everything worse (Medema and Zerbe, 1999).
However, the limits of this theorem reside in its assumptions of the existence of clear
property rights, no transaction costs or no wealth effect, these limits being an impediment
of successful negotiations (Baumol and Oates, 1975, Kolstad, 2000). As a consequence,
Baumol and Oates (1975) suggest that fees can be more efficient in resolving the problem
of externalities but they explain that knowledge of marginal damages and marginal social
costs as well as about the social optimum is required to implement efficient fees. Baumol
and Oates (1975, 1988) advance three feasible tax-subsidy programmes: a charges-and-
standards approach with or without direct control and taxes; subsidies; and a standards-
and-permits approach.
The first policy consists of setting standards as targets in terms of environmental quality
and developing taxes to reach these targets. Such policy differs from Pigou’s fees in the
sense that the objective is not to create taxes on the unknown value of marginal net dam-
ages but on the value of damages that is socially acceptable (Baumol and Oates, 1975).
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In the second policy subsidies are used instead of taxes to reward any agent that has de-
creased the negative externality. The last policy consists of distributing permits according
to standards and the information on baseline levels, permits being subsequently traded
among permit holders on a market. The price of the permits is established through trade
and so the socially acceptable levels of externalities is determined (McGartland and Oates,
1985, Baumol and Oates, 1988).
From these three mainstream schools of thought, there have arisen international pro-
grammes and policies designed to internalise the environmental externalities through the
promotion of a more sustainable management of environmental resources. These poli-
cies vary from the use of environmental taxes and subsidies, as well as land acquisition,
command-and-control policies, to integrated conservation and development programmes
(ICDPs) and payments for environmental resources (PES). All these policies are aimed at
encouraging agents to integrate the cost of using environmental resources when deciding
their productions. The agents generating an externality would either be paid or taxed
depending on whether the externality is positive or negative (Wunder, 2005). When using
an environmental tax, a producer has to pay in order to use the production process that
maximises its profit while it decreases other agents’ utility or production function, while a
subsidy encourages a producer to implement a production process which provides positive
externalities (Kolstad, 2000).
With respect to PES within forest, a scheme consists in creating a market for an ES in
which a forest user, responsible for supplying an ES when avoiding the creation of negative
externality or when increasing the levels of positive externalities, and a consumer whose
utility is positively affected by the ES, interact. Such interactions determine thus the value
of a payment made by the consumer such that the forest user adopts forest practices that
provide the amount of ES maximising the utility of the consumer.
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In what follows, I focus on PES explaining how a consumer of an ES pays the supplier
in order to encourage the latter to supply the ES. I want to understand whether or not
such payments are able to smooth the tensions between conservation of environmental
resources and the fact that people need such resources to generate their livelihood by
analysing existing PES, their achievements and limits.
3.3 Payments for Environmental Services
Markets and payments for environmental services are mainly linked to forest uses and for-
est environments. Four main types of environmental services whose threatened provisions
are in need of being secured, rely on forest resources and areas: watershed protection,
consisting in regulating water flows and quality through the restoration and maintaining
of forest covers; carbon storage and sequestration, achieved through both avoiding defor-
estation and reforestation; biodiversity conservation of endemic species (fauna and flora)
whose losses and extinction are related to forest clearance; and landscape beauty and
forest recreational values (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002, Angelsen and Wunder, 2003,
Wunder, 2005).
Because these services are generally free, poorly understood and taken for granted and
because governments have taken insufficient actions to secure these services, there has
emerged a market-based approach to their supply resulting in the creation of markets for
environmental services on which buyers and suppliers of environmental services interact
(Mayrand and Paquin, 2004, WRI, 2005, Duraiappah, 2006). In such a payment scheme,
an ES buyer would pay an ES supplier to adopt more sustainable uses of forest resources
such that the latter ensure the existence of an ES. PES schemes differ with respect to the
type of ES buyers and suppliers, the nature of the ES provided and the payments.
A great number of PES schemes exists worldwide; here I present a Costa Rican case in
which payments are made by a brewery to upstream land users in order to encourage them
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to protect a watershed, and a Nicaraguan case in which the Global Environmental Fund
(GEF) pays upstream cattle ranchers to adopt silvopastoral activities such as protecting
watersheds.
From these examples and the wider literature on case studies, the impacts on poverty and
the provision of the ES can be analysed.
3.3.1 Definition and criteria of a PES scheme
A PES scheme relies on a user-payer principle stipulating that a user should pay when he
uses an ecosystem service (Duraiappah, 2006). A PES scheme can be defined as being “a
voluntary transaction where a well defined ES (or land-use likely to secure that service)
is being bought by a (minimum of one) ES buyer from a (minimum of one) ES supplier
if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality)” (Wunder, 2005). It
consists of a payment in cash or in-kind from an agent interested in, or benefiting from,
conserving an environmental service, to an agent in charge of supplying this environmental
service through an adaptation of his techniques or an adoption of new techniques (Pagiola
et al., 2007b). PES can be an effective measure of welfare improvement in the sense that
ES buyers and suppliers voluntarily participate in the scheme as long as the benefits are
higher than the costs of providing ES, the payment creating an incentive to supply the ES
(Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). In a PES scheme, participants want ex-ante to be better off
than if they were not participating. If ex-ante they were worse off than when participat-
ing, they should not participate (Pagiola et al., 2007b). However, ex-post it could happen
that the participants end up being worse off if such a payment stimulates the interest of
more powerful agents in the appropriation of the lands that was pre-PES left to the poor
(Grieg-Gran et al., 2005).
Actors in a PES can either be local private institutions or private agents that supply
the ES and are paid by either local on-site forest residents, off-site regional (e.g. down-
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stream water users), national (e.g. State, NGOs or urban tourists) or global beneficiaries
(e.g. international community, foreign country buying certified carbon tradable offsets
(CTOs), international NGO valuing biodiversity conservation) (Angelsen and Wunder,
2003, Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). Public schemes financed by the State (national or
international) are assumed to affect larger areas of forest. While this may have a positive
impact on the scale of forests protected, it may also multiply the number of objectives in
the scheme and thereby decrease monitoring of how effectively payments have increased
the provision of the ES (Wunder, 2005).
A large majority of PES schemes implemented are area-based in the sense that the payment
corresponds to a specific number of forest units upon which ES suppliers must guarantee
the provision of the ES to receive payments. For instance, an upstream livestock raiser
would be paid to convert its pasture land back to forest in order to regulate water flows and
protect watersheds for downstream users. On the other hand, some schemes are product-
based. In this case, payments are made by consumers of a good manufactured through an
environmentally-friendly production process and these payments are the premium linked
to an agro-forestry production process of a type of coffee, ecotourism, or certified timber
logging (Wunder, 2005).
Payments would be made either to protect a service against further degradation by re-
stricting the use of some forest units to conservation (use-restricting PES) or to recuperate
a lost service or create a new service by (re)building up the natural asset base of a dete-
riorated area (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003, Wunder, 2005).
An important requirement in a PES scheme is that the ES is effectively provided such
that if there were no payments, the supply of the ES would be lower and environmental
conditions would be worse. This last requirement refers to the notions of conditionality
and additionality in receiving payments, both notions implying that the threat to envi-
ronmental services must be credible. In the absence of payments, the loss of the ES would
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be the outcome, a payment ensuring that suppliers are providing more ES than without
payments.
A last point worth mentioning, payments can either be in cash or in-kind though cash
payments are assumed to be more flexible and more appropriate when ES supplier loses
income-generating activity or factors when it has to change its forest-use income to provide
an ES. On the contrary, in some rural communities, because cash payments might increase
non-productive expenses in alcohol, cigarettes, or luxury goods, in-kind payments are pre-
ferred so as to increase the asset holdings of ES suppliers. While an ES buyer may prefer
these payments for pro-poor motivations, some ES suppliers dislike in-kind payments that
are often difficult to convert into cash and these suppliers would decide not to participate
in a PES scheme if they do not receive cash payments (Wunder, 2005).
3.3.2 Existing PES schemes and achievements
Worldwide, existing PES are generally in forest areas but programmes outside of forest,
such as the South African programme Working For Water, exist (Turpie et al., 2008), but
because my focus is on developing PES scheme in forest areas, this section focuses on
examples of well-documented PES schemes in Latin American forests.
As a general observation, PES programmes are more often implemented in Latin American
than Asian or African countries. Here I select those most relevant to my purpose, em-
phasising those elements of a PES programme defined by Wunder (2005) and highlighting
their results and limitations.
Among developing countries, Costa Rica has the largest number of PES, running for a
period long enough to determine the impacts of specific payments on the provision of
ES (Rojas and Aylward, 2003, Pagiola, 2008). In other Latin American countries, e.g.
Nicaragua, a PES scheme has been implemented to refrain from converting forest into
pasture and grassland thus improving carbon storage and protecting biodiversity (Pagiola
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et al., 2007a,b). Outside Latin America, recent PES projects in India and Nepal have been
implemented to encourage upstream forest users to plant trees to protect watersheds, wa-
ter users being as diverse as downstream communities or hydroelectric plants (Sengupta
et al., 2003, Huang and Upadhyaya, 2007, Chalise, 2008).
Example of a PES in Costa Rica: Florida Ice & Farm Brewery
In Costa Rica, the first reference to PES occurs in a 1995 Forest Law in which forest pro-
tection is promoted through payments to forest owners. As a result, a programme called
Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) was created encompassing several PES schemes
dealing with the four types of ES mentioned above (Miranda et al., 2003, Pagiola, 2008).
This programme has led to the creation of two main non-governmental organisations: a
national forestry fund, FONAFIFO, and a technical organisation, FUNDECOR. The for-
mer collects payments from the ES users and redistributes them to the ES providers while
the latter assists the forest users in designing management plans and monitors whether
these are correctly implemented (Miranda et al., 2003, Mayrand and Paquin, 2004).
One of the projects within the PSA is a watershed protection project in the upper Rio
Segundo Micro-Basin in the Virilla Watershed. While three main projects are underway in
this area, I only present the payment project undertaken by Florida Ice & Farm Brewery
which uses water resources for its production.
Forest degradations and deforestation in the upstream watershed due to urbanisation,
poultry and livestock raising and use of chemicals in ornamental plant cultivation have led
to water scarcity and water pollution, diminishing the availability of good quality ground-
water to the downstream brewery production (Miranda et al., 2003). Consequently, in
2001 the brewery signed an agreement with FONAFIFO in order to promote forest con-
servation in the upper part of the watershed and to encourage upstream forest owners to
conserve forest cover near rivers. This may involve rejecting livestock and pasture activi-
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ties so as to restore quality and quantity of water available for its downstream production
(Miranda et al., 2003, Rojas and Aylward, 2003).
The brewery pays FONAFIFO US$225,000 over seven years, equivalent to US$45/ha/yr,
for forest owners in the upper river basin. A landowner in this area can apply to receive
payments for the conservation of forest by designing a management plan incorporating
elements such as the proposed land use, land tenure and topography information, pro-
posed actions for preventing forest fires, and monitoring schedules. The landowner can
ask FUNDECOR to help him in drafting their management plan but in this case, after
contracting with FONAFIFO for a period of five years, the landowner must pay 12% of
the US$45/ha/yr to FUNDECOR (Miranda et al., 2003).
The five-year contract between FONAFIFO and the landowner is renewable according to
past performances in forest conservation and the availability of funds. The brewery gives
US$1,500/month for 12 months to contract FUNDECOR to act as an intermediary in the
evaluation of the management plans and to monitor within forests under contract that
forest users have performed the actions corresponding to their management plan.
If new land is added to the project, the brewery pays FONAFIFO US$14 for each new
hectare to cover administrative expenses and pays US$15 to FUNDECOR through FON-
AFIFO per new hectare to be used for legal and technical advice (Miranda et al., 2003,
Rojas and Aylward, 2003). As a result of this watershed conservation project, 1,000
hectares of forest land is under conservation.
However, the results from the Florida Ice & Farm project are quite ambiguous. Only a
few cases are reported in which land use has switched from pasture or livestock to forest
conservation or reforestation. Most of the forest under protection was already under forest
cover and forest owners report that they would have conserved the forest even without
payments (Miranda et al., 2003, Pagiola, 2006). As a consequence, the ES has been pro-
vided since improvements in water quality and quantity has been achieved. However, since
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the implementation of the PSA programme was concomitant with the implementation of
a number of related policies in Costa Rica, whether this achievement is a direct result of
the payments transacted or a result from these other policies remain impossible to say;
one can question about the positive impact of the PES on forest conservation (Pagiola,
2006).
The effect of payments on land users’ welfare are reported to be positive. The payments
are generally high and represent a large part of the households’ income. In addition, par-
ticipants to the PES have received environmental education and training for tree planting.
The programme has allowed participants to better secure their lands against squatters
and it has helped to create different tree nurseries, markets for organic products, to erect
fences preventing illegal logging (Miranda et al., 2003).
Nonetheless, high transaction costs in the waiting time between applications and formal
agreements prevent small landowners from participating. Miranda et al. (2003) report
that the project can thus have negative effects on small land users who not only do not
benefit financially from this scheme but are made unable to use forests set aside for grazing
livestock.
Example of a PES in Nicaragua: Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem
Management Project (RISEMP)
Another example of PES programme is the Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem
Management Project (RISEMP) launched by the Global Environment Fund (GEF) in 2002
in Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Colombia. This programme consists of protecting forests
against increases in pasture land in forested areas and such a payment scheme is intended
to promote silvopastoral techniques to restore two environmental services: biodiversity
conservation and carbon storage (Pagiola et al., 2004).
In general, silvopastoral practices consist in planting high densities of trees in pastures,
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feeding livestock with foliage of trees specifically planted for this purpose and using fast-
growing trees for fencing and wind screens (Pagiola et al., 2007a). These practices have
several positive effects on land users’ welfare and production including improved pasture
productivity and production diversification into fodder, fruit or fuelwood extraction, and
such practices are assumed to help biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration
(Pagiola et al., 2004). However, since land users do not consider the existence of these
externalities when deciding their land uses, the RISEMP has been implemented in order
to pay them to adopt such silvopastoral practices.
The RISEMP pilot project in Central Nicaragua in a microwatershed called Matigua´s-R´ıo
Blanco is designed such that land users are contracted for either two or four years receiving
a payment based on the increase in a total environmental service index (ESI) over their
entire farm area (Pagiola et al., 2007a). This index comprises two indices: an index of
biodiversity conservation, giving points for each land use taking into account the number
of species of plants, birds, small mammals and insects and their spatial arrangements, the
plot size, and fruit production; and an index of carbon sequestration attributing points
to each land use according to their capacity to store carbon in the soil and through trees
(Pagiola et al., 2004).
Payments are made ex-post by the GEF. But since the GEF assumes that the improve-
ments in productivity resulting from the adoption of more sustainable land uses would be
sufficient to motivate farmers, the payments are calculated so as not to cover the whole
opportunity cost of adopting silvopastoral practices (Pagiola et al., 2004, Van Hecken and
Bastiaensen, 2009).
Initially, a payment is done to the land users in order to eliminate the possibility that land
users recognising the potential for increased revenues as a result of a lower initial ESI,
may deliberately degrade their own forest land. The forest users are discouraged from
cutting trees in order to achieve lower ESI and receive higher future payments (Pagiola
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et al., 2004, Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2009). Associated with the annual payment,
some land users receive technical assistance in order to improve their land uses; the exis-
tence of this technical assistance seems to have been quite an important incentive for some
households towards participating in the PES programme (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen,
2009).
Impacts of this programme can felt in a stabilisation of the total pasture size, a decrease
in the size of degraded pasture in favour of improved pasture with trees, and the creation
of living fences and fodder banks. Most of these changes occurred during the first two
years of the pilot project during which increases in the ESI compared to the 2003 baseline
were more easily observed. As a result payments were higher.
However, to some extent the adoption of these silvopastoral practices have also been mo-
tivated by an increase in milk price and a better connection of the farm to milk and dairy
manufactures (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2009). When the price of milk increases,
farmers in the region have intensified their land uses, keeping cattle in pasture adjacent to
the road or to the milk production centers therefore away from river banks, and planting
trees to protect livestock from sun since, apparently, milking cows are not as resistant to
the sun as meat cow breeds (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2009).
As a result, environmental improvements have been noticed. The ESI has increased by
48% over this 6-year period with the carbon index increasing by 47% and the biodiversity
index by 50%. More specifically in the pilot area, richness and diversity of bird species
have increased and water quality improved significantly.
However this project has some limitations. These include high transaction costs linked
to the number of ES suppliers, the migration of poorer landless farmers to agricultural
frontiers in order to sell their labour, and the lack of an ability to monitor leakage that
could result in putting more pressures on land that are not in the project (Pagiola et al.,
2007a, Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2009).
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Comparing both projects, it seems that results differ both in terms of provision of envi-
ronmental services and in terms of impact on participants to payments. While in Costa
Rica, impacts from the programme on forest and watershed conservation are quite hard
to disentangle from other policies (Miranda et al., 2003), in Nicaragua, the use of an in-
dex in order to measure the adoption of silvopastoral practices seems more suitable to
the assessment of additionality from the project. In addition, in contrary to Costa Rican
land users, Nicaraguan cattle ranchers report having adopted forest-friendly practices as a
result of being paid to do so. In the Nicaraguan case, in the absence of such payments, it
does not seem that silvopastoral practices would have been adopted while in Costa Rica,
land owners answer they would have conserved forest even without payments (Miranda
et al., 2003, Pagiola, 2006, Pagiola et al., 2007a, Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2009).
With respect to impacts on participants, the programme in Costa Rica seems to improve
the welfare of wealthier households while the project in Nicaragua attempts to improve
the welfare of cattle-owners with different levels of wealth and herd size. However, neither
of these projects seem to have an effect on the poorest who are often excluded since they
do not own the land or have higher transaction costs for participating in these projects.
3.3.3 Issues and poverty impacts
When discussing PES and their effects, a number of issues arise: lack of additionality from
payments, leakage and displacement of the externalities, and exclusion of the poorest from
PES schemes (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004, Wunder, 2005).
Lack of additionality is related to the fact that PES has not brought any improvements
in the conservation of the ES; it is not unlikely that the status of the ES after the PES is
equivalent to what would have occurred without such a scheme. Proving additionality of a
PES scheme is an important requirement for demonstrating that payments have improved
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the provision of an ES. In Costa Rica, households engaged in the PSA report that even
without payments they would have conserved forest, which shows that little additionality
may have been created (Miranda et al., 2003, Pagiola, 2006).
Leakage is also another limitation in the positive effects from PES schemes; leakage con-
sists in displacing the negative externalities that occurred in the PES area to another
area not in the PES. In a carbon project, leakage results in a loss of net carbon benefits
because households that prevented from burning and degrading forests located within the
PES scheme, migrate to other areas where they are not restricted from fulfilling basic
needs through slash-and-burn agriculture (Brown et al., 2000, Aukland et al., 2002).
Integrating the participation of the poor in the provision of ES remains a challenge for
such payments programmes. PES are not designed as a tool for poverty alleviation and
even if they can have indirect positive effects, e.g. through the provision of better quality
natural resources, the prevalence of negative effects on the poor are must be dealt with if
one wants to use PES to alleviate poverty pressures. When a PES scheme is implemented,
the poor are usually excluded from providing the ES because of high transaction costs,
but they may also end up being excluded from the use of the ES on which they rely to
generate their livelihood.
By nature, PES could be a powerful tool for alleviating poverty. Payments allow house-
holds to diversify their income through provision of the ES and a well-provided ES improves
the productivity of land. Households can also receive technical assistance in adopting
more sustainable land uses, increasing their technical skills (Wunder, 2005). However,
some specificities linked to the definition of PES prevent the poor from participating in
the programme. PES require the ES suppliers to have clear and secure property rights
on the land used in the scheme, however many poor households do not have such rights
and are de facto excluded from receiving any payments. High transaction costs, e.g. costs
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for applying for a PES scheme, and costs to adopt new techniques are reported to be an
important burden on poorer small landholders (Miranda et al., 2003).
In Costa Rica, the PSA programme has not been developed to target the poor and if poor
households have received their land from the government or have received governmental
benefits and subsidies, they are non-eligible to participate in the programme. Another im-
pediment is linked to the fact that payments in Costa Rica are not high enough to allow
the poor to make all investments required to adopt land uses suitable for the provision of
the ES. These low payments associated with the lack of access impede poor households to
participate in the programme since they are unable to adopt land uses providing the ES
(Miranda et al., 2003).
In some countries, non-participants to the ES are excluded from using the land on which
the ES is supplied. These non-participants are often forced to migrate to other areas where
no such scheme exists, such migration potentially creating leakage. Furthermore, PES can
have indirect negative effect on the landless poor who generate their livelihoods through
slash-and-burn agriculture, working for timber logging companies or cattle ranchers, and
NTFP and wildlife product extractions since the implementation of a PES may prevent
their accessing to these sources of goods and income, pushing them further into poverty
(Angelsen and Wunder, 2003, WRI, 2005, Wunder, 2005).
Pro-poor PES are nonetheless achievable though reliant on improvements in their defini-
tion and design. PES can be more flexible in the way they define ES suppliers; an ES
supplier can be defined as all land users able to secure their lands impeding outsiders from
entering it and or as a group of land users. Costa Rica recently has decided to relax the
stricture that ES suppliers have a title on the land so that being able to safely secure
the land is enough to participate in the PES (Pagiola, 2006). In addition, FONAFIFO
attempts to reduce transaction costs by allowing farmers to join collectively rather than
individually, payments being made to groups rather than individuals.
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The following section develops what are the requirements to target the poor more ef-
fectively. I will present these points in the context of Cameroon looking at how PES
implementations are feasible in a rural forested area in the country and what are the cri-
teria to be sure that such a PES would be efficient in protecting environmental services
and alleviating poverty.
3.4 Cameroon as an hypothetical forest conservation pay-
ment scheme
To illustrate the theoretical model of payments, I opt for a forest conservation scheme
that consists in planting and taking care of indigenous species of trees in threatened forest
areas. Since the ES provision is undertaken by households, the latter should live within
or near forest areas vulnerable to degradation through households’ activities or logging by
external companies.
Cameroon is potentially an interesting country where to implement such a scheme; it has
large remaining forest areas representing 42% of the national territory, i.e. 20 million
hectares and these forests are threatened by diverse agents, e.g. subsistence farmers and
timber logging companies (Mongabay, 2010b). Although remaining forest areas appear
to be large, over the last decade, the deforestation rate has remained high and continues
to increase; between 2005-2010, 1.07% of forest has been lost to logging and agriculture
while only 0.94% was between 1990-2000 (Global Forest Watch, 2000, Mongabay, 2010b).
Both rapid population growth and devaluation of the CFA francs in the mid-1990s have
pushed households to clear more forest in order to meet their agricultural needs and
encouraged the government to sell more logging concession rights (Global Forest Watch,
2000, Mongabay, 2010b). Recently, in spite of presumably more frequent and systematic
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government controls, pressures due to timber logging have been increasing (Global Forest
Watch, 2000, Mongabay, 2010b). In addition, Cameroonian households, remaining poor,
have not reduced their pressures on forest resources. As a result, both unsustainable timber
logging and subsistence agriculture remain the main threats to Cameroonian forests.
This loss of forest resources is increasingly disturbing given the fact that Cameroon is
one of the richest country in the Congo Basin in terms of biodiversity, with more than
8,000 species of plants of which 1.9% are endemic (Mongabay, 2010a). In 2000, Cameroon
had more than 2,500 species of plants, mammals and birds per 10,000 squared kilometers
(Global Forest Watch, 2000). 7.2% of the birds, mammals, amphibians and reptiles are
endemic to Cameroon and because of forest losses and hunting, 6.7% of these species are
threatened of extinction (Mongabay, 2010b). Forest degradations are causing irreversible
effects and although the government tries to create protected areas, weak monitoring on
whether or not the boundaries and rules within protected areas are respected, deflates any
positive effect of these protected areas (Mongabay, 2010a).
As a response to increased pressures on forests, a new legislation, supported by the World
Bank, has been implemented in 1994 to promote forest management and conservation by
communities.
Prior to and as a result from this reform, different types of forest regimes coexist in
Cameroon: permanent forests, including among other types of forests, protected areas
and natural reserves, and non-permanent forests, including communal forests, private
forests, and community forests, the latter being the innovation from the 1994 Forestry
Law. Such a law is aimed at encouraging communities to create community forests in
order to manage themselves forest resources and derive benefits from it (Global Forest
Watch, 2005, MINFOF, 2009).
There exist moreover several previous conservation programmes, yet none of them taking
the form of PES schemes for which the situation in Cameroon appears to be appropriate,
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the country presenting the criteria and except one case, results from these programmes
are overall negative. Learning from this successful programme and failures from others,
I present how a payment scheme could potentially be implemented in Cameroon so as to
target poor forest households or communities.
3.4.1 Cameroonian forest estates: community forests and their limits to
achieve conservation
By law 30% of the national forest are permanent forests comprising State forests includ-
ing national and protected areas, production forest reserves to enable timber logging and
council forests, these latter being either “artificial” or natural forests managed by munici-
palities (figure 3.1). The 70% of remaining forest is non-permanent encompassing private
forests, owned by private agents, communal forests that are neither the property of the
State nor of individuals, and community forests that are a subcomponent of communal
forests upon which communities since the 1994 Forestry Law can manage, when obtaining
enhanced user-rights (Egbe, 2001, Mandondo, 2003, Minang et al., 2007). Overall, while 2
million hectares of forest are protected areas (Mbilea et al., 2005), 621,245 hectares have
received the legal status of community forests (MINFOF (2008) in Alemagni (2010)).
From the 1994 Forestry Law, a community forest is defined as “a forest of the non-
Figure 3.1: Forest estates in Cameroon
Source: Global Forest Watch (2005)
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permanent state forest, object of a management agreement between a village community
and the service in charge of Forestry. The management of such a forest shall be the re-
sponsibility of the village community concerned, with the technical assistance of the service
in charge of Forestry”(MINFOF, 2009). With this Law, the Ministry of Forestry seeks
to “enhance the participation of the populations in the conservation and management of
forest resources, in order to contribute in improving their living standards”. In order to
apply for this status, communities must delimit a forest area not exceeding 5,000 hectares
and draw up a management plan describing uses of the forest area and its resources.
However after 15 years, the existence of community forests in Cameroon has not taken
off, neither in terms of agreed status nor in terms of forest conservation. A large majority
of the 135 community forests that have received their titles is engaged in timber logging,
selling extraction permits directly to external companies and there exist no community
forest engaged in conservation activities (Minang et al., 2007, Alemagni, 2010). Several
factors explain the absence of conservation management plans in community forests in
Cameroon.
Firstly, the Law even if promoting conservation does allow communities to contract with
loggers, leading to an absence of interest in developing conservation plan. Secondly, since
the costs of drawing up a management plan or traveling to Yaounde´ in order to submit
the application, can be extremely expensive for small communities, these latter often bor-
row money from logging companies to face such costs, in the end repaying their debt
by granting rights to logging companies to extract timber resources from their forests
(Global Forest Watch, 2000). Thirdly, uncleared on the exact status of a community, the
Law grants the decision in defining such a community forest to local elites and leaders,
likely to have close relationships with and/or interests in logging companies. Under such
circumstances of corruption, management plans are more unlikely to withhold concession
rights (Djeumo, 2001).
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In the end it seems that as applied, community forests are not fulfilling their objectives of
safeguarding and conserving forest heritage, and strengthening the participation of local
populations in forest management. Timber logging remains the main form of manage-
ment implemented within community forests, such an activity clearly decreasing forest
resources.
In addition, participation in community forests and related decisions seem to be restricted
to a political upper-class, local populations rarely being consulted which diminishes their
incentives to adopt sustainable forest practices. Both timber logging and villagers’ unsus-
tainable uses of forest lands increase pressures on forests in Cameroon.
3.4.2 Recent conservation programmes in protected areas or community
forests
Besides community forests, Cameroon has created protected areas (figure 3.1 and figure
3.2) ranging from wildlife and forest reserves, protected for scientific purposes, to national
parks, managed for ecosystem protection and recreational services (EarthTrends, 2003).
While protected areas cover a fair scale of the Cameroonian forest estates, they are often
reported as being weakly monitored, boundaries and regulations being rarely respected.
In large, this is due to the fact that local populations, having been rarely consulted prior
to the implementation of national parks, have been excluded either from using forest re-
sources within the park while these resources contribute to their livelihoods, or from the
management of the parks which could constitute an alternative source of revenue (Mbilea
et al., 2005, Mayaka, 2002). As a consequence, poor households keep using and degrading
forest resources in protected areas, the latter suffering inadequate protection.
As a response, recent efforts have been made to promote forest and biodiversity conser-
vation by households living within or around these areas. For instance, the World Wildlife
Fund (WWF) has become more and more involved in Cameroon, implementing projects
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Figure 3.2: Biodiversity conservation and wildlife management
Source: Global Forest Watch (2005)
to regulate protected areas and to involve communities in the management of these areas
and in the protection of biodiversity (Gardner et al., 2001, Mayaka, 2002, Mbilea et al.,
2005, WWF, 2010). However, WWF programmes are too recent to judge their potential
effects on forest households, while there exist other case studies that show that when lo-
cal populations are involved, better results in terms of protection and respect of national
parks boundaries could be expected.
For instance, in the Northern Province, a wildlife reserve has been created without any
prior consultation of the local populations and as a result this reserve had ambiguous
effects on wildlife conservation and negative effects on the inhabitants of poor villages
surrounding the reserve (Mayaka, 2002). Indeed, villagers have lost large shares of their
agricultural production due to damages caused by animals since there were no fences im-
peding the animals from the wildlife reserve from their plots. Presumably, even if not
legally allowed to, villagers may have caught animals in the traps that often surround
their plots. As a result, conservation impacts are undermined since villagers illegally kill
the animals. However, such project could have offered economic measures to farmers so as
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to better achieve better conservation. Villagers could have been compensated for the loss
of their crops and of livestock due to wildlife, and they could have been allowed to hunt
game for commercial purposes. In addition, subsidies for the production of cotton near
the reserve should have been cut such that farmers would have relocated their production
away from the reserve, therefore diminishing their losses due to wildlife (Mayaka, 2002).
Another example deals with the Korup National Park in the Southwest Province. At-
tempts to extend its boundaries as to include a great number of villages within the park
are in conflict with a lack of recognition that villagers use resources from the park to
generate their livelihoods. Villagers are excluded from using such resources upon and not
permitted to participate in the management of the park. As a consequence, villagers are
pushed to use illegally forest resources, undermining the efficiency of the park in its mis-
sion of forest conservation. In order to be sure of decreasing pressures on park resources,
local populations must be recognised as legal residents of the park and be able to partici-
pate in its management such that villagers keep their user-rights on forest resources and
encouraged to adopt more sustainable practices (Mbilea et al., 2005).
While these two first cases show that villages are not often neglected when deciding the
management of their surrounding forests, the Kilum-Ijim forest project is an example
showing how communities participate in forest conservation Gardner et al. (2001). The
Kilum-Ijim project was first developed to protect the forest area applying for a natural
reserve status. However, the presence of 44 communities near the forest has led the conser-
vation organisation in charge of forest conservation, to assist local communities to apply
for a status of community forest with a management plan dedicated to forest conservation.
This conservation organisation has helped the communities to include in their manage-
ment plan a number of measures to ensure long-term biodiversity protection in the forest.
In addition, this organisation has offered villages training in agriculture, livestock raising
and other forest and non-forest related activities which should improve villagers’ welfare
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while reducing pressures on the Kilum-Ijim forest.
However even if this last programme has made such efforts towards including local popula-
tions in the management of forests, doubts arise concerning the existence and persistence
of net positive effects on both forest resources and forest households’ welfare once the
organisation has finished its training and support to the communities. In the Kilum-Ijim
forests, households participate in the conservation programme because the organisation
strengthens all the benefits they can derive from secured and healthy forest resources. It
is true that forest households benefit greatly from forest conservation through enhanced
agricultural productivity and improved availability of forest resources, but presumably
villagers were aware of the existence of such benefits prior to the intervention of the or-
ganisation and this has not reduced their incentives to degrade forest areas. Within this
project the communities are responsible for providing biodiversity protection through an
adaptation of their forest uses without being compensated for changing their agricultural
production process that was, even if more degrading, presumably giving them greater re-
turns.
Consequently, once the organisation has gone, one can wonder what would impede vil-
lagers to use their old practices since they can feel that no one in the end is interested in
the conservation of their surrounding forests. Giving payments is then expected to provide
signal and incentive to encourage villagers to conserve forests. Payments show that an
organisation derives its utility from the preservation and conservation of forest resources
and that the actions of the villagers are meaningful and valuable. Through payments,
forest households are entitled to be legitimately included in the management of the re-
sources upon which they generate their livelihoods and to be financially compensated from
providing forest conservation that increases the utility of another entity.
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3.4.3 Elements of an hypothetical forest conservation payment
Following the Kilum-Ijim example, it is true that local populations in Cameroon under-
stand the importance of conservation measures within forest areas, but it seems more
reasonable to say that compensating villagers would be a more efficient way of ensuring
that conservation is achieved. Looking at two provinces in Cameroon, South and East,
I can define what are the threats to forests in these areas, what should be the aim of a
forest conservation and who should be in charge of conserving forests against payments.
Forest covers in the South are greatly fragmented, resulting from an unsustainable expan-
sion of subsistence agriculture which impedes forest resources to regenerate from damage
caused by timber logging over the last 20 years. In the East Province, forests are less frag-
mented but highly-threatened by the presence of timber logging companies that harvest,
either legally or illegally, valuable species of timber without caring about the regeneration
process of such timber (Mongabay, 2010b).
The problem is then to conciliate forest conservation practices with households’ needs
of using subsistence agriculture and forest resources to generate their livelihoods. From
my own research in the South Province, households living in forest areas depend upon
both agriculture and forest resource extraction to meet their basic needs and generate
their livelihoods. Households dedicate a non-negligible part of their labour time in forest-
related activities and if anything households can improve their welfare when participating
in such activities. However, the expansion of agriculture in the forest has decreased the
availability of forest resources and increased the likelihood that small game destroy agri-
cultural plots in search of food. As common, households protect their plots from such
invasion with traps all around their plots, and consequently, agriculture, besides increas-
ing degradations and impeding forest regeneration, becomes responsible for the loss of
small game.
Threats to forest and biodiversity are a concrete reality and from my interviews, house-
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holds acknowledge that forest conservation is possible but they also reckon that they have
no incentives to do so. At the time of my research, one village in the South had obtained
the status of a community forest but obtaining such status with a management plan con-
sisting in selling concession rights to logging companies. The other villages surveyed were
trying to apply for a community forest but none of them mentioned that their management
plan would be directed towards forest conservation.
Incentives inducing forest conservation should be given such that payments become an
alternative to timber logging payments and to revenues from agriculture for the suppli-
ers of forest conservation. According to the Law, any association, cooperative, common
initiative group or economic interest groups can apply for the status of community forest
(Minang et al., 2007, MINFOF, 2009). Using this unclear definition, I assume that in
this hypothetical forest conservation, women’s associations should organise themselves to
provide forest conservation and apply to obtain enhanced user-rights on forests. Women
in Cameroon are both in charge of production of food crops and extraction of NTFPs
essentially used for home-consumption but also in charge with trade of crops and NTFPs
(Ruiz Perez et al., 2002, Kumase et al., 2010). As a result women have greater benefits
from sustainably-managed forests with less game destroying their plots, better NTFPs
and alternative sources of earnings from agriculture and NTFP extractions.
In addition, empowering women and paying them to conserve forest resources are assumed
to have additional positive externalities such as children’s education, such decisions being
usually left to the women, and a better management of financial resources in the household
to access credit and improve agricultural production or other activities. Paying women
groups to ensure forest conservation could have greater impact on poverty and improve
households’ welfare.
In this hypothetical forest conservation payment, assuming that there exists an interna-
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tional NGO or any other entity, interested in conserving their forests, these groups of
women, from now on referred as forest groups, need to agree with the NGO about a man-
agement plan in which payments and levels of forest conservation must be defined. With
such a management plan, forest groups can apply for the status of community forest and
after receiving it they can start supplying forest conservation.
However because corruption is widely spread in Cameroon, I assume that forest groups
can default and after receiving their enhanced-user rights, they can still decide to sell
concession rights to logging companies or use community forests for agriculture. As a
consequence, the payments upon which the NGO and forest groups have agreed must take
into account such alternatives. The following game examines how these payments are
defined such as ensuring that a forest group participates in forest conservation, and plants
and conserves high levels of trees.
3.5 Developing a forest conservation scheme using a principal-
agent game
In the following payment for conservation scheme, I consider an ES buyer as being an
international non-governmental organisation (NGO) interested in forest conservation and
an ES supplier as being a forest group in Cameroon composed of women of a village. Both
the NGO and the forest group have agreed upon a management plan consisting in planting
and conserving trees within the 5,000 hectares of forest for which the group has received
from the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife enhanced-user rights.
By implementing such a forest conservation scheme, the NGO wants to curb the loss and
depletion of forest resources, leading to decrease in the diversity of trees, plants and ani-
mals. Such loss and depletion are assumed to be mainly due to unsustainable agriculture
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and over-exploitation of forest resources through timber logging and extractions.
The forest group decides to participate in this scheme in which it supplies an environmen-
tal service, e.g. tree conservation, to an NGO paying for the supply of this service. The
effort made by the forest group to provide the ES is in terms of time spent finding seeds,
making cuttings, replanting small trees, pruning and caring for the trees once planted.
However, the forest group could have chosen another management plan for the forest area
such as contracting with a logging company or using the forest cover for unsustainable
agricultural purposes. Payments to conserve forest should compensate the community
forest to forgo these options. However, I assume that within the conserved area, the forest
group is allowed to develop agro-forestry practices and extract NTFPs. However, NTFP
extractions are limited in terms of quantities extracted such that the forest group can
ensure the sustainability of extracting these resources.
In the forest conservation scheme the two stakeholders have opposite objective functions.
The NGO paying for forest conservation wants the group to spend as much time as pos-
sible finding the seeds, making cuttings or taking care of the trees at a least cost while
the forest group wants to spend as little time as possible doing such tasks while receiving
high payments.
Such an opposition in their objective functions sheds light on the fact that a forest conser-
vation scheme presents the characteristics of a principal-agent game in which the principal
is the ES buyer, and she delegates the provision of the ES to an agent being the ES sup-
plier.1 I assume that the international NGO has her offices away from the forest area and
cannot observe the time the ES supplier spends providing the ES. It is too costly for her
to monitor how much time the forest group spends planting and taking care of the trees.
Delegation becomes problematic and a moral hazard situation arises.
1As in Maskin and Tirole (1990), I will refer to the principal with a female pronoun and to the agent
with a male one.
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However, using satellite images, the ES buyer can observe the outcome, i.e. the size of
forest planted with new trees, and she remunerates the agent with payments correspond-
ing to the observed outcome. I assume in this game, that she cannot observe the diversity
of trees planted only the scale. The NGO defines transfers corresponding to the different
levels of outcome so as to incentivise the ES supplier to allocate his time to planting and
taking care of the trees.
When defining such transfers, the ES buyer must take into account the loss of reservation
utility the ES supplier bears when he decides to participate in the provision of the ES
which instead of doing something else with forest resources.
The following analysis of a forest conservation scheme using a principal-agent game ap-
plies Laffont and Martimort’s models of incentives and contracts when there is a moral
hazard (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). I first apply their basic model with moral hazard
and a risk-neutral agent. I extend this model to relax the assumption of risk-neutrality of
the agent. Since the forest group receives enhanced-user rights for a period of 10 years, I
define repeated payments.
In the section 3.6, I attempt to deal with specificities linked to payments for forest conser-
vation such as resolving the problems of contracting with several forest groups whose types
in terms of alternative uses of forest areas or alternative uses of time differ. I investigate
how leakage arises from such a conservation programme and I look at what are the effects
of a forest conservation programme on non-members of the forest groups.
3.5.1 Basic principal-agent game for a forest conservation scheme
In this game with moral hazard, the ES buyer cannot observe the time the ES supplier
spends planting and taking care of the trees but the ES buyer can observe the outcome,
i.e. the size of forest planted with new trees that grow to maturity, and she pays the ES
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supplier according to this outcome.
When participating in the game, the ES supplier can choose whether to spend a lot of
time planting and caring for newly-planted trees or not. I assume that a weather shock,
either positive or negative, or tree diseases can occur making the outcome from forest
conservation known only when payments are received.
Formally, the game happens in four periods (figure 3.3). At time 0, the ES buyer offers
a contract with transfers corresponding to different outcomes. At time 1, the ES supplier
accepts or refuses the contract; if he refuses the contract, the game stops but if he accepts
it, he chooses his effort in time 2. In time 3, the stochastic event occurs and the outcome
is realised. In time 4, after observing the outcome, the ES buyer pays the agent with
a transfer corresponding to the observed outcome (Innes, 1990, Laffont and Martimort,
2002).
In this game, the ES supplier has to make two different choices. Firstly, he chooses whether
to participate in the game and lose his reservation utility or not to participate in the game
and sells concession rights to logging companies or use forest for agricultural purposes.
Secondly, the ES supplier chooses whether to exert a high effort and to incur a disutility
associated with the time spent working in forest conservation or to exert a low effort and
not to incur any disutility.
However, I realistically assume that the forest conservation agreement is poorly enforced;
a lack of control in determining whether or not the terms of the contract are respected,
encourages the forest group to sign the contract with the idea of exerting a low effort
and selling illegally concession rights to a logging company. As a result, the ES supplier’s
second choice becomes whether to exert a high effort and to have losses due to greater
disutility and forgoing his reservation utility from selling concession rights to logging com-
panies or to exert a low effort plus selling illegally concession rights to a logging company.
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When designing the incentives, the principal has all the bargaining power and offers a
“take-it-or-leave-it” contract to the agent who decides to participate according to his self-
interest (Sappington, 1991). The ES supplier chooses whether or not to participate in
the game comparing his expected utility from the payments to the utility he could have
obtained by contracting with a logging company or using the forest area for agricultural
purposes. In what follows, this utility is referred as a reservation utility, UR, and is as-
sumed to be strictly positive.
In the forest conservation scheme, the high effort, e = 1, consists of spending more time
planting new trees and taking care of these trees, while a low effort, e = 0, consists of
spending less time planting new trees and taking care of these trees.
However there exist negative events, e.g. weather risks (flooding or drought), tree diseases
or pests, that can prevent planted trees from showing signs of growing mature, or on the
contrary, positive events facilitating tree growth and regeneration. As a consequence even
when exerting a high effort, there exist a probability pi31 that the outcome is high, q3, with
a large number of new young trees, a probability pi21 that the outcome is intermediate,
q2, with a smaller number of such young planted trees, and a probability, pi11, that there
are no new trees q1. I assume that when exerting the high effort, the agent increases all
chances to obtain the high outcome, negative weather can occur but it less likely to obtain
the intermediate outcome and even less the low one such that pi31 > pi21 > pi11 with the
latter probability tending towards 0, pi11 → 0.
If the agent is not taking much care and exerts a low effort, there exist probabilities pi30 to
have the high outcome, pi20 to have the intermediate one and pi10 to have the low outcome.
However, it is quite unlikely that positive weather events favouring tree growth would be
sufficient enough that the high outcome occurs and pi30 = 0. On the other hand, positive
weather conditions can make the ES supplier lucky and get the intermediate outcome.
Overall, the probability to have a low outcome is higher than any other probabilities and
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pi30 < pi20 < pi10.
In addition, I assume that for both efforts the sum of probabilities is equal to 1,
∑3
i=1 piik =
1 with the effort k = 0, 1 and I denote the difference between probabilities as ∆pii =
pii1 − pii0.
Figure 3.3: Sequence of game and tree of probability
The ES supplier’s utility increases with the payments received through the PES but de-
creases with the time spent in the PES while he could have done something else; he has
a separable utility function U = u(t) − ψ(e), a function of the payment t received from
the ES buyer and of the cost ψ of exerting one unit of effort. In this model, the unit of
disutility of a low effort is null ψ(0) = 0 and the one of a high effort is such that ψ(e) = ψ.
The agent’s utility function u(.) is increasing and concave (u′ > 0, u′′ < 0) and the inverse
function of u is h = u−1, being increasing and convex (h′ > 0, h′′ > 0).
The ES buyer has a utility function v(.) which increases with the level of new trees planted
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but decreases with transfers made to the ES supplier. However, the ES buyer prefers the
stochastic production distribution associated with a high effort e = 1 than with a low
effort e = 0 and pi31v(q3) + pi21v(q2) + pi11v(q1) > pi30v(q3) + pi20v(q2) + pi10v(q1).
The ES buyer needs to offer a contract with payments that encourage the agent to exert
the high effort e. She offers a payment t3 if she observes a high level of outcome q3, t2 if
she observes an intermediate outcome q2 and t1 if the outcome is low q1.
3.5.2 Incentives and transfers with moral hazard and a risk-neutral
agent
In the basic model, both the buyer and supplier are risk-neutral meaning that both are
indifferent to the risk linked to planting and conserving trees. To define a contract, the
ES buyer offers payments to incentivise the ES supplier to participate in the game and to
exert the high effort. I also assume that the ES buyer is able not to pay the agent but it
may not be practical for her to tax him since the ES supplier does not have many assets
and can pretend not to have cash to pay the ES supplier.
The ES buyer’s maximisation programme can be written as follows
max
(t1,t2,t3)
3∑
i=1
pii1(Si − ti) (3.1)
subject to
3∑
i=1
pii1u(ti)− ψ ≥ UR (3.2)
3∑
i=1
(pii1u(ti)− pii0u(ti)) ≥ ψ + UR (3.3)
and
ti ≥ 0 (3.4)
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The first equation (3.1) refers to the ES buyer’s expected utility when inducing a high
effort in which Si are the ES buyer’s benefits in each state of nature and ti are the trans-
fers when she observes the different outcomes. The ES buyer has higher utility when she
observes the high effort and consequently when maximising her utility with a high effort,
she maximises her utility with a low effort.
The equation (3.2) is a participation constraint that ensures that the agent, when exerting
a high effort, will receive at least his reservation utility UR that he can obtain from selling
permits to logging companies or using forest areas for unsustainable agriculture. In this
forest conservation game, I assume that the utility of reservation is different from zero and
positive.
The equation (3.3) is the agent incentive constraint in which the ES supplier prefers exert-
ing a high effort rather than a low one. When making a high effort, the ES buyer promises
the ES supplier transfers such that his expected utility with a high effort compensates him
from his disutility of making the high effort and his reservation utility of not working with
a logging company. Such a constraint stipulates that the ES buyer has to offer transfers
such that the ES supplier exerts a high effort instead of exerting a low effort and selling
concession rights to a logging company.2
The last constraint, called a limited-liability constraint, stipulates that all transfers must
be nonnegative but they can be equal to 0 in some cases.
Analysing the different constraints, the participation constraint (3.2) is implied by the
incentive constraint (3.3) and if the incentive constraint binds so does the participation
constraint. The participation constraint is dominated and the resolution of the principal’s
2If I do not consider the case that the ES buyer compensates the ES supplier from making an effort
and from not defaulting, the two constraints are not binding at the same time. The ES buyer offers
contract making assumption on the value of the disutility compared to the value of the reservation utility.
According to these different cases, the ES buyer offers payments considering that the ES supplier has
greater reservation utility than disutility or the reverse.
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problem can be resolved using only the incentive (equation (3.3)) and limited liability
constraints (equation (3.4)). The principal’s problem can be optimised with respect to the
transfers, using the multipliers λ and µi for respectively (3.3) and (3.4) which gives the
following first-order conditions
− pii1 + λ∆pii + µi = 0 (3.5)
for any i = 1, 2, 3 and with the slackness conditions that µiti = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
When the second-best transfers tSBi are positive, the slackness conditions imply that
µi = 0, and this leads to λ = pii1pii1−pii0 . Laffont and Martimort (2002) explain that if
the ratio 1λ =
pii1−pii0
pii1
is different for each outcome i, there exists a situation j such that
this ratio is higher. In such a situation j the agent receives a positive payment tSBj such
that the incentive constraint (3.3) is binding. In the other situations i 6= j, the agent
receives a transfer equal to 0. Such a contract rewards the agent only in the situation the
principal has the best information so as to whether the agent has exerted a high effort.
If the ratio is nondecreasing in i, the probabilities for the different outcomes satisfy the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), implying that information about the effort
exerted by the agent increases with the outcome (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Under
the MLRP a higher effort leads to a greater probability of having the high outcome and
the transfers must increase with the outcome produced qi (Innes, 1990, Laffont and Mar-
timort, 2002).
Returning to the forest conservation scheme, I assume that the most informative situation
that the agent has exerted a high effort is when the principal observes q3. The highest
outcome can only be obtained through a high effort since I assume pi30 = 0. In addi-
tion, when observing the low outcome q1, the principal knows that there exists a greater
probability that the agent has exerted a low effort since I assume that weather conditions
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cannot be as bad as destroying all new trees when an agent has exerted a high effort. The
probability to observe the lowest outcome with a high effort tends towards 0, pi11 → 0.
Considering the intermediate outcome q2, several situations may be described. There
could be the case that it is more likely that negative weather conditions such as droughts
or floods destroy part of the newly planted and conserved trees than that positive weather
conditions favour the natural growth of trees. In such a case, the probability of observing
the intermediate outcome with a high effort is higher than the probability of observing the
intermediate outcome with a low effort pi21 > pi20. On the contrary, weather conditions
can be such that there is more chance to observe the intermediate outcome when exerting
a low effort than with a high effort and pi21 < pi20.
Using these different probabilities, the MLRP does hold and the ratio increases with the
level of outcome
pi11−pi10
pi11
→ −∞ if pi11 → 0.
On the other hand, with pi21 > pi20, 0 < pi21−pi20pi21 < 1 and with pi21 < pi20,
pi21−pi20
pi21
< 0 but
the latter ratio is greater than pi11−pi10pi11 since I assume that pi21 > pi11.
With respect to the high outcome, pi31−pi30pi31 = 1.
The MLRP implies then that the ES supplier receives a non-zero transfer when the ES
buyer has the greater certainty that the high effort has been exerted. The agent is rewarded
with transfers such that
tSB3 =
ψ + UR
pi31
(3.6)
and
tSB1 = t
SB
2 = 0 (3.7)
The principal does not reward the agent when she observes the intermediate outcome since
there exists a probability that the agent has made no effort in forest conservation. This
“bang-bang” contract is supposed to reduce the agent’s incentives to exert a low effort
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and to reduce the likelihood of having an intermediate outcome that does not provide any
information about the level of effort exerted by the agent.
The limited-liability constraint is binding. The principal is limited in her punishments
since tSB1 = t
SB
2 = 0. Since she cannot effectively punish the agent when he has made a
low effort, the ES buyer induces the high effort by rewarding the ES supplier when the
ES buyer can observe the highest outcome. The ES supplier receives an ex-ante limited-
liability rent (equation (3.8))
EUSB = pi31tSB3 − ψ = UR (3.8)
The ES buyer is willing to give the ES supplier a rent equal to his reservation utility
because in such a case she is sure the agent has exerted the high effort.
Inducing the high effort is optimal for the ES buyer since her expected utility with the
high effort is greater than her expected utility with the low effort.
V1 = pi31(S3 − tSB3 ) + pi21S2 + pi11S1 ≥ V0 = pi30(S3 − tSB3 ) + pi20S2 + pi10S1.
This equation can be formulated such that
V1 − V0 = (pi31 − pi30)(S3 − ψ + UR
pi31 − pi30 ) + (pi21 − pi20)(S2 − 0) + (pi11 − pi01)(S1 − 0)
= ∆pi3S3 + ∆pi2S2 + ∆pi1S1 − (ψ + UR) ≥ 0
(3.9)
This equation can be rewritten such that
3∑
i=1
∆piiSi ≥ ψ + UR (3.10)
The expected payment of the principal through this contract, meaning the cost of
inducing a high effort, is
CSBn = pi31t
SB
3 = ψ + UR (3.11)
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The strategy to induce the agent a high effort is optimal for the principal if her gain is
greater than or equal to the cost
3∑
i=1
∆piiSi ≥ ψ + UR (3.12)
With such a contract, the ES buyer has her cost greater than, or equal to, her gain.
Such a cost with moral hazard and limited liability is greater than the cost when the ES
buyer can fully observe the effort (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). If there is no moral
hazard, the principal pays the agent with a payment equal to his disutility of exerting
the high effort and his reservation utility. Such a payment would not be a function of
the probability of observing a high outcome or not. In addition, not imposing a limited
liability constraint implies that the agent can be punished with negative transfers when
he exerts a low effort and sells illegally concession rights to logging companies.
The ES supplier switches from a low effort to a high one as soon as his expected gain
fully covers the cost of exerting a high effort and using equation (3.3), his gain is equal to
∆pi3tSB3 + ∆pi2t
SB
2 + ∆pi1t
SB
1 = UR + ψ.
A risk-neutral ES supplier will be induced to spend a lot of time planting or taking care
of new trees when his cost of doing so is less than the cost the ES buyer to induce a high
effort.
But risk-neutrality is a strong hypothesis and does not seem a reasonable reflection of
reality in a forest conservation scheme; the ES supplier does not want to be the only one
to bear the risk.
3.5.3 Risk-averse agent and risk sharing transfer
Introducing risk aversion in the game, the ES supplier becomes risk-averse and prefers
a certain payment with a logging company rather than uncertain payments. When he
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contracts with the ES buyer to work in forest conservation, the agent decides his effort
before weather conditions happen; even if he exerts a high effort, there is a chance that
the resulting and observed outcome is intermediate. As a result, payments offered by the
ES buyer should cover some of the risk otherwise the ES supplier will not participate in
the game if there is no element of risk-sharing.
However, the ES buyer can choose to bear part of the risk instead of giving him full
insurance. With an additional payment, the agent is not the only one to bear the risk,
but he shares it with the principal (Sappington, 1991, Laffont and Martimort, 2002). As
before I ensure that the ES buyer receives nonnegative payments by introducing a limited-
liability constraint.
To ensure concavity of the principal’s programme, the following changes of variable u1 =
u(t1), u2 = u(t2) and u3 = u(t3) and t1 = h(u1),t2 = h(u2) and t3 = h(u3) with h(.)
strictly convex, are performed.
The ES buyer’s programme can be rewritten as follows and is strictly concave in ui since
h(.) is strictly convex.
max
(u1,u2,u3)
∑
pii1(Si − h(ui)) (3.13)
subject to
3∑
i=1
pii1ui − ψ ≥ UR (3.14)
3∑
i=1
(pii1ui − pii0ui) ≥ ψ + UR (3.15)
and
h(ui) ≥ 0 (3.16)
for any i = 1, 2, 3
As before, using µ and λ as nonnegative multipliers associated with respectively (3.15)
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and (3.16), a Lagrangian function can be written as follows
L =
3∑
i=1
pii1(Si − h(ui)) + λ
[ 3∑
i=1
(pii1ui − pii0ui)− ψ − UR
]
+
3∑
i=1
µih(ui) (3.17)
Resolving for ui, the first-order conditions are
− pii1h′(ui) + λ(pii1 − pii0) + µih′(ui) = 0 (3.18)
and this equation (3.18) can be rearranged such as
λ =
1
u′(tSBi )
pii1 − µi
pii1 − pi10 (3.19)
Again I assume that there is slackness in the game with µih(ui) = 0. If there exists a
non-zero transfer in a situation j, the slackness conditions imply that µj = 0; as a result
λ takes the following form
λ =
pii1
pii1 − pii0
1
u′(tSBi )
(3.20)
Since 1
u′(tSBi )
and pii1pii1−pii0 increase with i, λ are different for any i and there exists a situation
j such that λ is higher and positive. In such a situation j, (3.15) is binding. In the other
situations, µi 6= 0, the two constraints are not binding and the agent receives a transfer
equal to 0.
As in the case of risk neutrality, the MLRP holds and information about the effort increases
with the outcome. The ES buyer knows for sure that the ES supplier has exerted the high
effort when she observes the high outcome. The ES buyer has once again no information
about the effort exerted when she observes the intermediate outcome q2.
Resolving the principal’s problem with (3.15), the ES supplier is rewarded when the ES
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buyer can observe the high outcome and he receives
tSB3 = h(u
SB
3 ) = h
(
ψ + UR
pi31
)
(3.21)
and in the case, the ES buyer observes an intermediate or low outcome she offers
tSB2 = h(u
SB
2 ) = h(0) = 0 (3.22)
and
tSB1 = h(u
SB
1 ) = h(0) = 0 (3.23)
The transfer received by a risk-averse agent in the case of a high-outcome is greater than
the one received by a risk-neutral agent since the function h(.) is convex, positive and
increasing.
The cost of inducing a high effort when ES supplier is risk averse CSBa
CSBa = pi31t
SB
3 + pi21t
SB
2 + pi11t
SB
11 = pi31h
(
ψ + UR
pi31
)
(3.24)
is higher than when the ES supplier is risk-neutral CSBn (equation (3.11)). The ES buyer
has the same probability to pay a greater transfer since h(UR+ψpi31 ) >
UR+ψ
pi31
. Through this
greater cost, she is bearing part of the risk borne by the ES supplier, and both ES buyer
and supplier are sharing this risk. The ES buyer needs to compensate for the fact that
the ES supplier prefers having a secure payment from a logging company UR rather than
participating in a forest conservation scheme in which payments are uncertain.
Paying more is rational for the ES buyer when her benefit from inducing a high effort is
greater than her cost
3∑
i=1
∆piiSi ≥ pi31h
(
ψ + UR
pi31
)
(3.25)
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The expected benefit of the ES supplier is equal to his cost, and both the expected benefit
and the cost are greater when the agent is risk-averse than when the agent is risk-neutral.
Both when the ES supplier is risk neutral or risk averse, the contract offered by the ES
buyer is “bang-bang” and the ES supplier receives greater payments when he has planted,
conserved and taken care of the greatest level of trees. On the other cases, the agent
receives null payments.
Through such a contract, the ES buyer induces the agent to exert the high effort, increasing
the probability of having a greater level of forest conservation.
3.5.4 Repeated payments in a principal-agent game
The status of a forest group is often granted for several years implying that the forest
group will receive repeated payments over time. Such repeated payments can be modeled
as a two-period contract offered by the ES buyer at the beginning of the first period. Pay-
ments are made at the end of each period after observing whether the outcome is high,
intermediate or low. In this two-period game, I assume that transfers are defined such
that in the first period, the ES supplier is paid according to the first-period outcome while
in the second period the agent is paid according to first- and second-period outcomes.
Using the same model, the risk-averse agent can exert in both periods the same high
em = 1 or a low effort em = 0, with m being the period in which the agent exerts effort
and m = 1, 2. His disutility of making an effort is the same in both periods and normalised
as previously with ψ(1) = ψ and ψ(0) = 0.
With the same notations as in the static game, the agent’s effort brings a stochastic output
independently distributed over time. In each period m = 1, 2, when exerting a high effort
k = 1 or a low effort k = 0, there is a probability pi3k that the ES buyer observes the high
output qm3 , a probability pi2k that she observes the intermediate output q
m
2 and a same
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probability pi1k to observe the low output qm1 and ∆pii = pii1 − pii0 with i = 1, 2, 3, each
probability of observing one outcome being identical in each period.
In a two-period environment, the principal offers a long-term contract which involves
transfers at each date; she offers contract with payments t1(q1i ) at the first period and
payments t2(q1i , q
2
i ) at the second period, payments in the second period being contingent
on the observed first-period outcome.
In the first period, transfers can be rewritten as t1(q3) = t13, t
1(q2) = t12 and t
1(q1) = t11.
With the same modifications, second-period transfers are t23(q
1), when she observes the
high outcome in the second period after any outcome in a first period, t22(q
1) when she
observes the intermediate outcome in the second period after any outcome in a first period,
and t21(q
1) when she observes the low outcome in the second period after any outcome in
a first period, with q1{q13, q12, q11}.
As a result, the utility gains associated with each transfer are such that the agent’s utility
in the first period are only function of the transfers in this period, u13 = u(t
1
3)), u
1
2 = u(t
1
2)
and u11 = u(t
1
1). The second-period utilities are functions of the transfers in the second-
period contingent on the outcomes in the first-period. The utility associated with the high
transfer in the second period after any outcome in the first period is u23(q
1) = u(t23(q
1)), the
one when observing the intermediate outcome in the second period after any first-period
outcome is u22(q
1) = u(t22(q
1)) and the one when observing the low second-period outcome
after any first-period outcome is u21(q
1) = u(t21(q
1)) with q1[q13, q
1
2, q
1
1].
The ES buyer wants to induce the high effort in the two periods; before accepting the
contract, the ES supplier considers his expected second-period utilities whatever the out-
comes the ES buyer has observed in the first period. The ES buyer should offer a contract
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Figure 3.4: Expected payments in a repeated game
such that the ES supplier has his intertemporal incentive constraint written as follows
(pi11 − pi10)
[
u11 + δ
3∑
i=1
pii1u
2
i (q
1
1)
]
+ (pi21 − pi20)
[
u12 + δ
3∑
i=1
pii1u
2
i (q
1
2)
]
+
(pi31 − pi30)
[
u13 + δ
3∑
i=1
pii1u
2
i (q
1
3)
]
≥ (1 + δ)(ψ + UR)
(3.26)
with u1, u2 and u3 being the current utility gains from each first-period transfer and
δ
∑3
i=1 pii1u
2
i (q
1) being the discounted expected utilities from the second-period transfers
after any possible outcome in the first period.
The ES buyer also considers the agent’s intertemporal participation constraint (equation
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(3.27)) since the agent contracts before the outcomes q1 and q2 are observable
pi11
[
u11 + δ
3∑
i=1
pii1u
2
i (q
1
1)
]
+ pi21
[
u12 + δ
3∑
i=1
pii1u
2
i (q
1
2)
]
+
pi31
[
u13 + δ
3∑
i=1
pii1u
2
i (q
1
3)
]
≥ (1 + δ)(ψ + UR)
(3.27)
Subject to these two constraints, the ES buyer’s problem is
maxpi11
[
S1 − h(u11) + δ
3∑
i=1
pii1(Si − h(u2i (q11)))
]
+ pi21
[
S2 − h(u12)+
δ
3∑
i=1
pii1(Si − h(u2i (q12)))
]
+ pi31
[
S3 − h(u13) + δ
3∑
i=1
pii1(Si − h(u2i (q13)))
] (3.28)
However when the ES buyer resolves such a problem, she needs to take into account that at
the end of the first period the reservation utility of the ES supplier has changed. According
to the outcome observed at the end of the first period, the ES supplier knows that his
reservation utility has changed and that he can expect different payments for the second
period. Such a change makes the intertemporal game differ from a static problem.
Writing a continuation payoff for the second period as pi11u21(q
1)+pi21u22(q
1)+pi31u23(q
1)−ψ,
this is a function of the outcome at the end of the first period q1 that the ES buyer has to
consider when defining the second-period transfers. I assume that at the end of the first
period, the agent can renegotiate his contract since either he has improved the quality of
forest resources and knows that he can sell concession rights to logging companies for more,
or he has experienced a loss at the end of the first period and prefers leaving the game and
sells concession rights to logging company, even if at a lower price. As a consequence the
ES buyer when defining the second-period transfers must take into account that the agent
reservation utility has changed according to the outcome observed at the end of the first
period. The continuation payoff must take into account this change in reservation utility.
In the game such an increase in the agent’s reservation utility leads to include in the
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participation and incentive constraint a function g(q1) which represents the change in the
reservation utility the agent knows he can add to his reservation utility after the realisation
of the first-period outcome.
After a high outcome, the ES supplier can sell concession rights at a higher price since
he has improved the quality of forest resources and g(q13) is strictly positive. After an
intermediate outcome, the agent may or may not have improved the quality of forest
resources and his reservation utility may increase by g(q12) which could be positive or
null. In the case of a low first-period outcome, the agent has not improved the value of
forest resources and the ES buyer knows that the reservation utility has changed by g(q11)
which is negative since the ES supplier has degraded forest resources in the first period
for instance through the sales of concession rights.
The continuation contract for the second-period is such that
max
3∑
i=1
(
Si − h(u2i (q1))
)
(3.29)
subject to a second-period participation constraint
3∑
i=1
pii1u
2
i (q
1) ≥ ψ + UR + g(q1) (3.30)
a second-period incentive constraint
3∑
i=1
(pii1 − pii0)u2i (q1) ≥ ψ + UR + g(q1) (3.31)
and a limited-liability constraint
h(u2i ) ≥ 0 (3.32)
The second-period participation constraint (equation (3.30)) stipulates that considering
the first-period outcome q1 the ES supplier knows that his second-period transfer is going
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to be a function of the change g(q1) which conditions his sales of concession rights to the
logging companies.
The second-period incentive constraint (equation (3.31)) stipulates that the ES buyer
must define payments such that she compensates the ES supplier to make a high effort
instead of a low effort and also to compensate him not to sell illegally logging concession
rights which are revalued with the change in their reservation utility. The second-period
limited liability constraint (equation (3.32)) implies that the ES supplier will not receive
any negative payments at the end of the second period.
The second-period principal’s problem is quite similar to the static problem presented in
the previous subsection. The second-period participation constraint (equation (3.30)) is
dominated by the second-period incentive constraint (equation (3.31)). Using the following
Lagrangian multipliers λ and µ for respectively the incentive constraint (equation (3.31))
and the second-period limited liability constraint (equation (3.32)), as in the static game
there exists a situation j in the second-period in which the agent receives a non-zero
transfer. In this situation j, the incentive constraint is binding since λ is positive
λ =
pii1
pii1 − pii0 (3.33)
if i = 3.
The MLRP holds; the agent receives a reward when the ES buyer observes the high
outcome. The second-period utilities for each outcome are such that
u23(q
1) =
ψ + uR + g(q1)
pi31
(3.34)
and
u22(q
1) = u21(q
1) = 0 (3.35)
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The second-period cost function takes the following form
C2(u2(q1)) = pi31h
(
ψ + UR + g(q1)
pi31
)
(3.36)
Knowing this cost function, the continuation value payoff can be expressed as
V 2(u2(q1)) =
3∑
i=1
pii1Si − CSB(u2(q1)) (3.37)
for any q1{q11, q12, q13}. The derivative of a continuation payoff function is equal to
V
′2(u2(q1)) = −C ′SB(u2(q1)) (3.38)
To offer a contract encompassing payments for the two periods that would keep the agent
in the game after any outcome in the first period, the principal faces the following problem
max
3∑
i=1
pii1(Si − h(u1i )) + δ[pi11V 2(u2(q11)) + pi21V 2(u2(q12)) + pi31V 2(u2(q13)) (3.39)
subject to the following constraints
3∑
i=1
(pii1 − pii0)(u1i + δu2(q1i )) ≥ ψ + UR (3.40)
3∑
i=1
pii1(u1i + δu
2(q1i ))− ψ ≥ UR (3.41)
with u2(q1i ) = pi31u
2
3(q
1
i ) + pi21u
2
2(q
1
i ) + pi11u
2
1(q
1
i ). The limited liability constraint is
h(umi ) ≥ 0 (3.42)
with m = 1, 2.
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The first constraint (equation (3.40)) represents the incentive constraint through which
the ES buyer offers payments such that the ES supplier is compensated from exerting
the high effort in both periods and not to sell illegally permits to logging companies. The
second constraint (equation (3.41)) implies that the expected utility of the agent over time
when making a high effort and receiving a promised expected utility in period 2 equal to
u2(q1i ) is greater than the reservation utility. The last constraint (equation (3.42)) is a
limited liability constraint for the first- and second-period transfers implying that the ES
supplier receives a nonnegative transfer in the two periods whatever the outcome.
Analysing the incentive and participation constraint, the latter is again implied by the
former; the ES buyer defines contract using only the incentive and limited-liability con-
straints. Using the multipliers λ and µ for each constraint, the problem can be optimised
with respect to u1i with i = 1, 2, 3.
The first-order conditions are
− pii1h′(u1i ) + λ(pii1 − pii0) + µi = 0 (3.43)
and optimising with respect to u2(q1i )
− pii1C ′SB(u2(q1i )) + λ(pii1 − pii0) + µi = 0 (3.44)
From these first-order conditions, there exists an equality between the marginal cost of
giving up some rewards in the first period following a first-period outcome q1 and the
marginal cost of giving up these rewards in the corresponding continuation of the contract
in the second period
h′(u1i ) = C
′2(u2(q1i )) (3.45)
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Using the cost function (3.36), the first-derivatives are such
h′(u1i ) = C
′2(u2(q1i )) = pi31h
′(u23(q
1
i )) + pi21h
′(u22(q
1
i )) + pi11h
′(u21(q
1
i )) (3.46)
Laffont and Martimort (2002) explain that these equations follow a martingale property
and at the optimum
u1i = u
2(q1i ) + ψ (3.47)
for any q1{q11, q12, q13} and with u2(q1i ) = pi31u23(q1i ) + pi21u22(q1i ) + pi11u21(q1i )− ψ.
Again there exists a situation j in which the agent receives non-zero transfers and µj = 0.
λ =
pii1
pii1 − pii0 [h
′(u1i )] (3.48)
λ is positive in j and the incentive constraint is binding.
The MLRP holds in this case, and the ES buyer offers a non-zero transfer in the first
period when she observes a high outcome which reveals that the ES supplier has exerted
a high effort. In the other two cases, the ES buyer offers a zero transfer.
Using the binding incentive constraint (equation (3.40)), the ES supplier is rewarded in
the first period when the ES buyer observes the high outcome. Resolving the problem,
using the equality u1i = u
2(q1i ) + ψ for i = 1, 2, 3
u13 =
ψ + UR
(1 + δ)pi31
(3.49)
Whether the ES buyer observes an intermediate or low outcome, the reward is zero in the
first-period
u12 = u
1
1 = 0 (3.50)
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Using the relationship between the first and second period utilities (equation (3.47))
u2(q13) = u
1
3 − ψ =
ψ + UR
(1 + δ)pi31
− ψ (3.51)
and
u2(q11) = u
1
1 − ψ = −ψ (3.52)
while after an intermediate outcome I assume that the ES buyer has to promise an expected
utility equal to the reservation utility in order to keep the agent in the game
u2(q12) = UR (3.53)
Determining the value of the change in the utility reservation after each outcome I have
u2(q13) = pi31u
2
3(q
1
3)− ψ = UR + g(q13) =
ψ + UR
(1 + δ)pi31
− ψ (3.54)
giving g(q13) =
ψ+UR
(1+δ)pi31
− (ψ + UR) > 0
u2(q12) = pi31u
2
3(q
1
2)− ψ = UR + g(q12) = UR (3.55)
giving g(q12) = 0 and
u2(q11) = pi31u
2
3(q
1
1)− ψ = UR + g(q11) = −ψ (3.56)
giving g(q11) = ψ−UR since u2(q1i ) = u1(q1i ) = 0 The utility associated with a high transfer
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in the second period after a high first-period outcome is
u23(q
1
3) =
ψ + uR + g2(q13)
pi31
=
UR + ψ
pi31
+
1
pi31
[
UR + ψ
(1 + δ)pi31
− (UR + ψ)
]
=
1
pi31
UR + ψ
pi31(1 + δ)
(3.57)
If she observes a high outcome in the second period, following an intermediate transfer in
the first period, the transfer brings a utility equal to
u23(q
1
2) =
ψ + UR + g2(q12)
pi31
=
ψ + UR
pi31
(3.58)
and after a low outcome in the first period, she offers for a high outcome in the second
period a transfer such that
u23(q
1
1) =
ψ + UR + g2(q11)
pi31
=
ψ
pi31
(3.59)
The second-period payments offered when the ES buyer observes the low or intermediate
outcomes are equal to zero after any outcomes in the first period and the utilities are
u2(q1i ) = u1(q
1
i ) = 0 (3.60)
The ES buyer offers a contract in which transfers are greater in the case that the ES buyer
has the greatest information that the ES supplier has exerted the high effort both periods.
The ES buyer smooths the reward over time and punishes the ES supplier for not having
exerted the high effort in the first period by offering a smaller transfer when observing an
intermediate or low outcome in the first period and a high outcome in the second period.
In this model, the contract presents some memory; if the ES supplier has in the first period
planted and conserved trees such as having a larger size of area planted with trees, he is
going to be compensated in the future by greater transfers. On the other hand, if the ES
222
supplier works such that only an intermediate level of trees is conserved in a first period,
the second-period transfers are smaller and he is punished for not having produced a high
level of forest conservation in the first period.
Overall, this repeated game with memory appears to be more costly for the ES buyer.
Payments to induce the agent to exert a high effort in both periods, are higher when she
observes the high outcome in each period. Offering static payments may be a cheaper
option for the ES buyer. But, with such static payments she would not take into account
the fact that the reservation utility of the forest group has changed. The ES buyer needs
to define incentives including the fact that over time forest resources changed and so does
the forest group’s reservation utility.
The ES buyer is willing to face such cost in order to have the agent to stay in the second
period and she is sure that she is paying the agent only when he exerts a high effort.
Moving forward, the next section looks at the practicalities when dealing with different
types of forest groups in terms of reservation utility and the disutility of making an effort.
I also determine how to deal with specificities associated with a forest conservation scheme,
including leakage and the effects of forest conservation payments on non-participants in a
forest group.
3.6 Dealing with some specificities and limits of a forest
conservation scheme
In this section, I look at some specificities and limits of a PES scheme. In order to conserve
large forest areas, the ES buyer contracts with different forest groups and when doing so
she must define contracts for different types of agents, i.e. agents with higher or lower
reservation utility or agents with higher or lower disutility. Here I assume that the ES
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buyer does not know the type of the agents and that defining differentiated contracts is
too costly. As a result, she needs to define an incentive contract so as to have all forest
groups or to select specific forest groups.
In addition, the ES buyer does not want that the forest conservation programme increases
pressures on nearby forests not included in the programme, and she must find incentives
to encourage forest groups not to create leakage.
Finally I assume that there exists a selection-bias in the constitution of the forest groups
since women participating in these groups may be from wealthier and more educated
households while women from poorer households may be excluded from participating in
the forest conservation programme. The last point of the following section presents how
to increase the benefits of forest conservation for these non-participants.
3.6.1 Differentiating forest groups’ reservation utilities
When contracting with several agents, the ES buyer needs to find how to conciliate the fact
that all these forest groups may not have the same reservation utilities, with her objective
of offering a single contract. In this case, a forest group with a high reservation utility (UhR)
is assumed to have better forest areas than a forest group with a lower reservation utility
(U lR). Since the transfers received by the ES suppliers are a function of their reservation
utility, the transfers for the agents should differ depending on whether they have a high
or low reservation utility.
Although, the ES buyer knows that there exist ES suppliers with different reservation util-
ities, she cannot differentiate each ES supplier according to his type. As a consequence,
she decides to offer a single contract to all ES suppliers. To define such contract several
options present themselves.
I consider then that when contracting with agents with a high reservation utility, the ES
buyer attempts to avoid future degradations in these forest areas while when she contracts
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with agents with a low reservation utility, reforestation and restoration of forest cover are
the expected outcomes.
If the offered contract depends upon the low reservation utility, when observing a high
effort she offers
tSB3 = h(u
SB
3 ) = h
(
ψ + U lR
pi31
)
(3.61)
and when observing an intermediate or low outcome she offers
tSB2 = t
SB
1 = h(0) = 0 (3.62)
With such a reservation utility, the transfers defined above are not high enough for the ES
suppliers with a high reservation utility to participate in the scheme since their reservation
utilities are higher than the expected utility from such a contract
pi31u
3
SB − ψ = pi31
ψ + U lR
pi31
< UhR (3.63)
These latter earn more if they sell concession rights to logging companies or use forests
for agriculture and decide not to participate. If the ES buyer is not particularly keen
on paying for avoided deforestation but is more interested in reforesting and replanting in
highly degraded areas, such a contract would be strategic. On the contrary, if she wants to
preserve and avoid deforestation or degradations in well-preserved areas, such a contract
will not be efficient.
However, if the ES buyer wants to avoid deforestation in preserved forest areas, she can
225
offer a contract in which transfers are a function of the high reservation utility.
tSB3 = h(u
SB
3 ) = h
(
ψ + UhR
pi31
)
(3.64)
Doing so she is certain that the ES suppliers with a high reservation utility participate in
the game and so do ES suppliers with a low reservation utility.
pi31u
3
SB − ψ = pi31
ψ + UhR
pi31
= UhR (3.65)
However, such a contract is costly; her costs are higher than the expected costs she would
have to face whether she could have differentiated between high and low reservation utility
ES suppliers.
CSBa = pi31h
(
ψ + UhR
pi31
)
≥ vpi31h
(
ψ + UhR
pi31
)
+ (1− v)pi31h
(
ψ + U lR
pi31
)
(3.66)
with v being the probability that the agent has a high reservation and (1 − v) that the
agent has low reservation utility. She ends up paying more the ES supplier with a low
reservation utility.
The ES buyer may attempt to locate those forest groups with greater reservation utility.
With respect to Cameroon, forests are highly degraded in the Province South of the coun-
try where logging has been intensive throughout the late 1990s. Logging companies are
now more attracted to exploit forest areas in the East of the country where forests are
well-preserved. Whether the ES buyer wants to preserve the Eastern forests or to reforest
the Southern ones, she can offer differentiated contracts and locate the forest conservation
scheme in one specific area.
If the ES buyer offer transfers with the lowest reservation utility to both forest groups in
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both Provinces, the forest groups in the East would not participate. On the other hand,
if she offers transfers with the low reservation utility of the Eastern groups, forest groups
with a low reservation utility in both Provinces participate. In addition, if Southern forest
groups with a high reservation have a high reservation utility inferior to the low reservation
utility of the Eastern forest groups, all forest groups in the Province South participate in
forest conservation. However, forest groups in the East with a high reservation utility do
not participate.
Defining transfers using an average reservation utility of all reservation utilities, the ES
buyer can expect that all forest groups in the South participate in forest conservation
while she is able to contract only with forest groups that have a low reservation utility in
the East.
In the end, if the ES buyer aims at restoring forests such that carbon offsets can be
traded within the Kyoto Protocol, she can offer payments with the high reservation utility
of Southern forest groups to all groups and she selects only forest groups with highly-
degraded areas. On the other hand, she offers greater payments such as encouraging
Eastern forest groups not to increase pressures on forest areas. With such a payment she
contracts with forest groups in the South and the East and even if she does not contract
with forest groups with the highest reservation utility, she defines payments such that her
utility is greater than it would be if contracting only with highly-degraded forest groups.
3.6.2 Forest conservation within high-return or low-return strategies
Whether the agents have diversified livelihood strategies including high-return or low-
return activities their disutility to provide the ES varies. I assume that a forest group
whose members are mainly involved in high-return activities, for instance cocoa produc-
tion and trade, have a higher disutility (ψh) of providing the effort than a forest group
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whose members are mainly involved in low-return activities, e.g. subsistence agriculture
(ψl). This assumption is drawn from the fact that the former households have livelihood
strategies with greater returns than other agents. Supposedly, the ES supplier with a
greater disutility is wealthier than the one with a lower disutility.
The problem again is that the ES buyer does not know who she is dealing with. Similarly
as the case in which she does not know their reservation utility, the ES supply has different
options.
She may want to have every forest groups participating in the forest conservation scheme
and she has to compensate all agents with the high disutility. Doing so she is sure that
the agents with more diversified livelihoods participate in the scheme.
The cost of such a contract for the ES buyer is greater than when she knows the agent’s
disutility. However, she is willing to pay more in order to have all agents to exert a high
effort so as to have more probability to have the high outcome.
By giving higher payments for all types of agents, the ES buyer is actually rewarding more
the ES suppliers with a lower disutility; this can be seen as a pro-poor mechanisms since
these ES suppliers are poorer.
On the other hand, if the ES buyer is particularly keen in improving the welfare of poorer
forest groups and does not mind not to have all agents to participate in the forest con-
servation scheme, she can define transfers employing the low disutility. The agents with
a high disutility are neither willing to participate nor to exert the high effort but the ES
buyer is sure that poorer forest groups participates; she is improving poorer forest groups
welfare at a lower cost.
In Cameroon, my previous research reports that households living in the South Province
have highly diversified livelihoods and overall, the South Province is wealthier than the
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East one. As a consequence, if the ES buyer is particularly keen in implementing a pro-
poor forest conservation project, she should offer contracts with transfers including the
low disutility. She selects poorer forest groups in the East offering them a new strategy to
generate their livelihoods. To conclude, implementing pro-poor forest conservation such as
selecting forest groups with lower disutility is feasible with offering lower transfers. Such
transfers are cheaper than offering greater transfers that incentivise both wealthier and
poorer to participate.
3.6.3 Reducing leakage
In the previous model, the outcome is expressed only in terms of trees planted; the ES
buyer is better off when more trees are planted. However, leakage may occur when the
ES supplier increases forest pressures outside the forest area dedicated to a forest conser-
vation scheme. In this case, I assume that leakage may consist in burning and clearing
great size of nearby forests, and it is presumably created by the ES supplier and not by
non-participants to the game. I assume that the ES buyer can perfectly observe leakage
using satellite images.
In the game, leakage occurs after the ES supplier has decided to participate in the game
and to exert a high effort. However, before starting the game the ES buyer can define
incentives since she knows that there exists a probability β that the ES supplier does not
increase pressures on a nearby forests and a probability (1 − β) that on the contrary he
does so and creates leakage. The ES supplier creates leakage so as to obtain a benefit L
out of it.
I assume that leakage can result from the fact that either transfers offered in the contract
are not high enough so that the ES supplier must clear nearby forest in order to increase
its revenue, or on the contrary, the transfers are high such as increasing the ES suppliers’
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demand of agricultural goods and encouraging them to adopt more degrading techniques.
Then, the ES buyer needs to redefine incentives such that the expected utility of the agent
is greater when he is not creating leakage than when he is doing so.
The principal’s problem is
max
3∑
i=1
(Si − h(ui)) (3.67)
subject to a participation constraint
3∑
i=1
pii1ui − ψ ≥ UR + (1− β)L (3.68)
to an incentive constraint
3∑
i=1
(pii1 − pii0)ui ≥ UR + ψ + (1− β)L (3.69)
and a limited liability constraint implying that the ES supplier does not receive negative
payments
h(ui) ≥ 0 (3.70)
Resolving this problem as previously, the utility linked to the transfer when the ES buyer
observes the high outcome is a function of the probability that the agent exerts leakage.
u3 =
UR + ψ + (1− β)L
pi31
(3.71)
The ES buyer offers a contract in which the transfer is greater and increases if the ES
supplier is more likely to create leakage. With such a contract the ES buyer has defined
appropriate incentives to be sure that the ES supplier would not exert leakage since his
expected utility when not doing leakage is greater than his expected utility if he does so.
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Besides the promise of greater payments, the ES buyer stipulates in the contract that if she
observes leakage, she would fine the ES supplier since the above transfers are such that
leakage resulting from low transfers are prevented, only leakage from greater payments
remains. The ES buyer knows that leakage results from the fact that the ES supplier has
been able to afford more degrading tools so as to degrade greater levels of forests.
The ES buyer can then create a fine f such that after having remunerated the ES supplier
for providing a high level of forest conservation, she would punish him from creating
leakage.
f =
L
1− β (3.72)
The principal defines a fine such that the ES supplier loses more after paying a fine than
he has benefited from creating leakage.
With this contract including greater payments and a fine, the ES buyer is designing incen-
tives such that the ES suppliers who could not fulfill their basic needs with the payments
as defined in the previous section would not create leakage, while the ES suppliers that
create leakage because payments allow them to adopt more degrading techniques, would
pay a fine.
After paying their fine, the latter agents have a lower utility and knowing this result, they
are incentivised not to create leakage.
3.6.4 Increasing benefits from forest conservation for poorer non-participants
As mentioned above, the constitution of a forest group may create a self-selection bias
in favour of women from wealthier and more educated households. As a result, wealthier
women benefit from an additional source of income while non-participants who are from
poorer households do not receive such extra-income.
However it is interesting to acknowledge that there exist different channels through which
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a forest conservation scheme can create positive effects on non-participants. These lat-
ter benefit from better forest resources and better agricultural resources if they can still
access some of them. Conserving forest decreases the likelihood that small game enters
agricultural plots and destroy cultivations, it increases the availability of forest prod-
ucts in both protected and neighbouring forests through natural regeneration of forests.
Non-participants can have more productive agricultural production resulting from better-
quality soil and a decrease in the occurrence of floods and erosion. In addition, the forest
conservation scheme can develop projects such as the construction of a school, training the
community to prune trees or to treat trees against diseases, to develop trade of NTFPs...
In addition to these indirect effects, non-members of the forest group can benefit di-
rectly from the forest conservation payment if the forest group has decided to hire non-
participants to provide the ES. These employees are in charge of planting and taking care
of the trees while the forest group is in charge of monitoring that the employees are ex-
erting the high effort.
Such a programme has been implemented in South Africa where the programme Working
for Water consists in employing poorer households to control and clear mountain catch-
ments of invasive alien plants so as to ensure biodiversity conservation and the protection
of hydrological functions of watersheds (Turpie et al., 2008).
In the forest conservation scheme developed above, by hiring the poorest of the village to
provide the ES, the forest group delegates the provision and becomes a manager for the
ES buyer. Both manager and employees can exert high or low effort but while the ES
buyer cannot observe the effort of the manager, the manager perfectly observes the effort
of the employees if he exerts a high effort in monitoring.
When observing that employees are exerting a high effort, the manager offers a wage p1
while if he observes the exertion of a low effort, the wage is p0 that I assume equal to
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0. Knowing that payments are strictly greater than 0 when exerting the high effort, but
equal to 0 when making the low one, the employees have no incentives to exert a low effort
when the manager perfectly observes their effort. On the other hand, when the manager
exerts a low effort in monitoring, the employees have diminished incentives to exert the
high effort since the manager does not know what effort they are making and may not
compensate them accordingly if the observed outcome is intermediate or low.
I assume in this model of delegation that the employees are remunerated according to their
effort while the manager is remunerated according to the outcome the ES buyer observes.
Since the employees exert a high or low effort according to the effort exerted by the man-
ager, the ES buyer needs to induce the manager to exert a high effort in monitoring.
The principal’s problem can be rewritten as follows:
max
(u3,u2,u1)
3∑
i=1
pii1(Si − h(ui)) (3.73)
subject to
3∑
i=1
(pii1 − pii0)ui − (p1 − p0) ≥ UR + ψ (3.74)
3∑
i=1
pii1ui − p1 ≥ UR + ψ (3.75)
with
h(ui) ≥ 0 (3.76)
Resolving this game as previously with the MLRP holding, the transfer is non-zero when
the ES buyer is sure that the manager has done the high effort in monitoring the agents.
The manager is paid only when the ES buyer observes this outcome and constraint (3.74)
233
is binding. The utility from a high transfer when the outcome is high is
u3 =
UR + ψ + p1
pi31
(3.77)
and in the other cases, the utilities and transfers are zero u2 = u1 = 0.
Transfer when the ES buyer observes the high outcome is higher than previously; the ES
buyer compensates the forest group for hiring out and exerting a high effort in monitoring
the employees. The forest group has great incentives to exert a high effort in monitoring
the employees since he knows that the latter would exert a high effort too which does
increase the probability to obtain a high outcome.
With respect to the ES buyer, delegation increases costs and she is the one paying both
manager and employees. Considering that the ES buyer wants to improve the welfare of
the poorest, she needs to weight whether it is better for her to contract with a forest group
that would hire out the poorest in order to plant and conserve trees or whether she is not
better off when creating new infrastructure, training or markets besides paying the forest
group to conserve forest.
3.7 Implications of this scheme in the light of existing PES
and conclusion
Through logging and subsistence agriculture, households and companies heavily degrade
forests in Cameroon and impede the provision of environmental services. To reduce the
loss of such services and secure their provision, Cameroonian forest conservation efforts
have been mainly directed towards the creation of protected areas which unfortunately
appear to be inefficient in conserving forest resources, generally not taking into account
that people living within or near protected areas use such resources to generate their liveli-
hoods.
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As a consequence to smooth these tensions, a 1994 Law has been promulgated in which a
community can receive enhanced-user rights for managing nearby forest areas. At first the
Law was unclear about the objectives of community forests but a 1995 Decree emphasises
the importance of forest conservation for local communities and attempts to encourage
communities to develop a management plan focusing on conservation.
However, when deciding upon their management plan, communities have greater incentives
to sell concession rights to logging companies than to conserve forests. As a consequence, I
consider that besides underlining the direct benefits derived from conservation, additional
incentives must be defined to pay local populations for conserving forests whenever an
external group consumes environmental services supplied by such an activity, e.g. biodi-
versity conservation, carbon sequestration, watershed protection or landscape beauty.
Since forest groups have different alternatives for their time use and their use of forest,
they must be compensated such as covering their whole opportunity cost and such that
the risk is shared between consumers of forest services and forest groups. Forest groups re-
ceive a non-zero payments when forest service consumers observe that high levels of forest
conservation have been achieved and they receive zero-payments for all other outcomes.
Over time, payments should increase if the forest groups have improved the quality of
forest resources since these groups can have better alternatives than conserving forests.
Although these payments seem unfair, what matters for forest-service consumers is the
level of forest conservation achieved and they pay only when observing the greatest result
they have agreed to pay for.
Such findings are derived from a principal-agent game in which an NGO, consuming forest
services, offers an incentive contract such that she pays a forest group only when observing
a high level of planted and conserved trees. In all other cases, she offers zero payments.
After accepting such a contract the forest group rationally makes the high effort in con-
serving forests and is compensated with a payment greater than his disutility for not using
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his time in another activity augmented by the reservation utility he could have received if
implementing another management of forests. If the forest group is risk-averse, the NGO
needs to pay him more than when he is risk-neutral, this additional payment constituting
a risk-sharing mechanism ensuring the risk-averse agent’s conservation effort.
Over two periods, payments should differ from static payments given the fact that from
forest group’s past actions, forest resources have changed. If at the end of a first period
high levels of forest conservation are observed, the forest group has improved the qual-
ity of forest resources and can expect greater alternative payments than if lower levels
of forest conservation have resulted from his action. As a consequence, the NGO must
define incentives such that the forest group is rewarded for conserving high levels of trees
in each period. The incentives are such that payments increase over time when the forest
group improves the quality of forest resources. The forest group is encouraged to create a
virtuous circle in forest conservation.
Overall, these payments differ from the ones offered in the PES schemes in Costa Rica
and Nicaragua. In Costa Rica and Nicaragua, ES suppliers are paid even if they have not
effectively improved levels of forest conservation and payments received do not cover the
whole opportunity of supplying the ES, respectively. In addition, payments either do not
change over time or they decrease. This latter case is explained by the fact that payments,
being only a function of increments in the supply of the ES, decrease following a great
level of conservation in a first period since improvements in a second period may be harder
to achieve and incremental points are smaller. In both cases, ES may stop participating if
they realise that they could earn more from alternative options than from providing the
ES.
With respect to pro-poor schemes, I find that the NGO can offer low payments such that
only poorer and forest groups living in highly-degraded areas participate and provide high
levels of forest conservation. Interestingly in Cameroon, poor forest groups are more likely
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to be in the East of the country while highly-degraded forests are in the South. As a
result when offering low payments, the NGO may be able to select forest groups in both
Provinces. Besides being effectively pro-poor, this scheme presents characteristics of an
avoiding deforestation programme in the East and of a reforestation one in the South.
Pro-poorness can also be achieved if the NGO develops a scheme including in-kind pay-
ments or encourages forest groups to hire presumably poorer non-participants to conserve
forests. In the latter case, she defines greater payments so as to incentivise both the forest
groups and the non-participants to exert a high effort in their respective task.
To stop leakage, the NGO defines greater payments and a fine. Consequently, forest groups
creating leakage because payments were initially too low stop creating leakage while the
ones still creating leakage have to pay a fine since the NGO knows that such leakage is
created from the fact that forest groups could afford more expensive and more degrading
techniques.
Further research should deal with analysing how to define the elements included in these
payments, i.e. disutility and reservation utility, so as to value for these payments. This
could be achieved with household and community surveys focusing on the activities house-
holds or forest groups are engaged in, and with environmental and satellite data to assess
what are forest covers and the value of forest groups’ reservation utility.
Moreover, it would be interesting to determine how indirect and direct effects from forest
conservation and related payments affect participants and non-participants in the forest
groups, and to understand the linkages between different environmental conservation prac-
tices within forest, e.g. effects and consequence of conserving in-land fisheries or developing
biodiversity corridors.
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Conclusion
Answering to my main research question, forest conservation policies can improve forest
households’ welfare through different channels.
In my research I demonstrate that forest households are poor and more likely to be poor
over their lifetime even if there is no evidence for the existence of a poverty trap. Empirical
evidence show that they accumulate assets over time but low initial levels of asset holdings
associated with a slow accumulation process highlight the fact that forest households are
more likely to remain in persistent poverty than to escape it. In addition, more frequent
covariant and idiosyncratic shocks have adverse effects on asset accumulation, such shocks
destroying households’ asset holdings and degrading their living conditions. In addition,
so as to cope with unexpected events, households can either sell undestroyed assets or get
engaged in wage activities.
However such wage activities are often inefficient in helping households to become better
off. Forest households are more likely to be wealthier when engaged in diverse activities
including forest-related activities than when not engaged in such activities. Although
agriculture remains their main source of production, the extraction of non-timber forest
products (NTFPs) and hunting contribute to large shares of production, and households
not extracting such products are overall worse off than households who do. Overall, even
if a diversification into NTFP extraction pushes forest households to work more than oth-
ers, they are also able to consume more. Furthermore, increasing the price of NTFPs is
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expected to have positive effects on households’ welfare. Consequently, households are
able to consume more so as to cancel out any potential negative effects of an increase in
prices on their leisure. Contrary to what is stated in the literature, forest-related activities
appear to allow households to improve their welfare. It appears that developing forest-
related activities instead of unskilled or poorly-paid wage activities is a plausible solution
to alleviate forest households’ poverty.
Given these welfare results, forest conservation improving the quality of forest resources
appears to be an adequate tool to improve households’ welfare and protect forest resources.
Furthermore, paying households to be in charge of forest conservation can decrease ten-
sions between households’ needs of using forest resources for their livelihood and forest
conservation that if undertaken within protected areas impedes such uses. Thus, forest
households benefit from forest conservation directly and indirectly. Direct benefits are
derived from the payments that compensate households for forest conservation, such pay-
ments being made such that households are paid only if they are efficient in their levels
of forest conservation. Households are only compensated for effective increments in the
size of forest planted with trees. Such a contract gives households incentives to plant and
conserve more trees. Households are insured against the risk of losing conserved trees with
greater payments and over time, households are compensated for always improving forest
conditions and for remaining in the forest conservation scheme while alternative revenues
increase. A pro-poor forest conservation scheme can be implemented at a least cost when
offering low payments such that wealthier agents are not willing to participate in forest
conservation. Forest conservation is then used as a pro-poor mechanism.
Besides these direct effects from payments, forest conservation has indirect effects on forest
households since it improves the quality of forest resources as well as the quality of other
environmental services provided by forests and agricultural production. Indeed, when
conserving trees within forests, water quality is improved and water flows are controlled.
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This allows households to consume better quality of and greater quantities of fish, but
also to have better agricultural production since small animals, able to feed themselves
in forest areas, are less likely to destroy agricultural plots. Households’ likelihood of sell-
ing their assets or of participating in wage activities decreases since floods are less likely
to occur. As a consequence, forest conservation appears to allow households to smooth
poverty pressures and to accumulate assets since households do not sell them as often as
they used to. Such an asset accumulation linked to less risks and negative shocks on their
consumption should enable them to escape poverty in the long run. Besides permitting
households to accumulate assets, forest conservation increases prices of forest resources and
if scheme allows households to extract a limited amount of better-quality forest products
quantities, households can improve their welfare through the extraction of these resources
and through increments in their agricultural and hunting productions caused by reduced
shocks. As a result, households may have even more incentives to conserve forests and to
develop forest-friendly or agro-forestry practices.
Knowing that forest conservation can improve forest households’ welfare, more work can
be done about forest households’ livelihoods such as detailed assessment of households’
participation in fisheries and hunting, the effects forest degradations have on these ac-
tivities and how households can use links between forest and these sub-ecosystems so as
to develop practices that can conserve both types of ecosystems. Further research could
deal with how forest conservation can help households to develop new types of insurance
and risk-coping mechanisms, encouraging forest groups to create microcredit organisations
or to process forest or agricultural products which would allow them to store such pro-
cessed products and smooth consumption. Furthermore, work still need to be done about
the techniques households can use to secure their assets and develop higher-return forest-
friendly activities. It would be interesting to understand what forces forest households to
migrate and what are the consequences for households remaining within forests.
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Defining the forest groups’ reservation utility required to implement a forest conserva-
tion scheme could encourage further work on how to define forest values acknowledging
whether all uses and non-uses values matter for forest conservation or only revenues offered
by alternative activities matter. Finding forest values can be done using forestry data but
also using experiments so as to have households revealing their preferences in terms of
selling concession rights or conserving forests. Encouraging research on forest households’
livelihood could help to precisely define what is forest households’ disutility of conserv-
ing forests. This can be estimated using household and community surveys, focusing on
households’ time uses and different opportunities available at the community level, so as
to find in which communities households have high or low disutility of participating in
forest conservation and how differences between households or communities can affect the
implementation of such a programme.
As a result of forest conservation practices, assessing whether direct or indirects benefits
from forest conservation for households dominate would help to understand what kind of
forest conservation practices are more likely to efficiently improve their welfare.
In the end, the assessment of the effects from forest conservation could be done such as
understanding from which type of programmes, either reforestation or avoided deforesta-
tion, benefits for poor forest households are greater. Knowing what is best for the poor
could help to settle the debate on whether or not to include avoided deforestation within
Kyoto.
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Appendix A
Appendix Chapter One
A.1 Construction of the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
To construct a Consumer Price Index (CPI) within the research area, I start first calcu-
lating the total amount spent in each food commodity during the last 7 days by all the
Tsimane’ households and I calculate the total amount spent in all food commodities.
For the most important food commodities consumed by the Tsimane’ households in 2006
such as bread, flour, lard, noodle, rice, cassava, maize, plantain, oil and sugar, I extract
weights that I use afterwards to estimate a weighted sum of prices for each village using
village level prices and overall weights. According to their availability I use village selling
or village buying prices; agricultural commodities are reported using village selling prices
while market food commodities are reported with village buying prices.
Over time prices of these commodities have mainly increased in all communities but the
rate of change is slower between 2005 and 2006 than it is between 2002 and 2006.
Finally, I use the weighted sum of prices for these 10 commodities in each year and divide
it by the weighted sum of village prices in 2006 in order to determine the price index
used to deflate the values to 2006 prices. I apply the price index to prices in every years
between 2002 and 2005 that are reported in nominal values.
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Table A.1: Weights of different food commodities used in CPI and average weighted village
prices in each commodity (standard deviation)
Food commodities Weight in 2006 Average weighted prices (std dev.)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Bread 0.07 0.20 (0.04) 0.19 (0.08) 0.19 (0.07) 0.19 (0.07) 0.20 (0.10)
Flour 0.01 0.05 (0.008) 0.07 (0.03) 0.05 (0) 0.07 (0.04) 0.06 (0.02)
Lard 0.01 0.15 (0.13) 0.10 (0.02) 0.16 (0.04) 0.19 (0.09) 0.17 (0.04)
Maize 0.007 0.07 (0.01) 0.08 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02) 0.10 (0.01) 0.12 (0.03)
Cassava 0.03 0.16 (0.006) 0.16 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) 0.18 (0.03) 0.21 (0.05)
Noodles 0.02 0.12 (0.03) 0.13 (0.02) 0.16 (0.04) 0.16 (0.08) 0.14 (0.05)
Oil 0.03 0.29 (0.16) 0.25 (0.03) 0.34 (0.06) 0.38 (0.16) 0.41 (0.17)
Plantains 0.07 0.47 (0.07) 0.47 (0.07) 0.40 (0.04) 0.49 (0.10) 0.53 (0.12)
Rice 0.05 0.54 (0.07) 0.53 (0.07) 0.58 (0.12) 0.73 (0.13) 0.69 (0.12)
Sugar 0.04 0.18 (0.06) 0.21 (0.18) 0.20 (0.06) 0.22 (0.09) 0.28 (0.11)
Table A.2: Average of sum of weighted village prices and average price index in each
village (standard deviation)
Variables 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Sum of weighted village prices 2.25 (0.41) 2.22 (0.30) 2.37 (0.21) 2.74 (0.44) 2.84 (0.38)
Village price index 80.31 (13.68763) 80.01 (16.96) 84.94 (12.64) 97.13 (14.11) 100 (0)
Overall inflation rate is similar in 2002 and 2003, and quite small in 2005.
A.2 Households strategies according to their wealth and
earnings
I assume that a household is in a high-return strategy when it has its wealth and earnings
in the two upper quintiles at least three years out of five which means that they are in a
high-return strategy, or whether they are not in these two upper quintiles meanings that
they are in a low-return strategy.
28 households have their earnings and assets at least three years in the two upper quintiles
and are engaged in a high-return strategy, and 148 households are in a low-return one.1
1I am using the 176 households for which I have deflated values of consumption and assets, and I use
this same deflator to deflate earnings.
259
Table A.3: High and Low-return strategy according to earnings and assets
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Variables High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
Sale 216.6 85.0 164.3 114.5 403.6 51.1 590.9 125.2 354.3 99.46
Wage 250.2 93.0 261.6 109.4 247.7 152.8 294.4 111.0 311.6 146.6
Total earningsa 490.7 201.8 473.0 246.2 692.7 225.7 954.0 300.4 718.6 285.8
Animal wealth 1746.5 467.8 1227.8 400.7 2141.4 558.8 2201.8 455.8 1527.7 377.1
Traditional wealth 1196.0 855.9 1179.7 797.2 1126.2 741.6 1281.6 832.9 1027.1 776.7
Modern wealth 4050.7 1687.9 4262.6 1824.2 4107.7 2103.5 4316.8 2331.1 3468.8 2062.4
Total wealth 6993.3 3011.8 6670.1 3022.3 7375.5 3404.0 7800.3 3619.9 6023.6 3216.2
Beef 1.3 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.1 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.8 2.3
Chicken 1.7 0.9 1.1 1.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.6
Plantains 2.1 3.4 1.9 2.8 2.1 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.7
Manioc 0.9 1.6 0.5 1.3 0.5 0.9 0.9 1.5 0.8 1.1
Noodle 1.9 1.1 1.7 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 0.6 1.0
Game 12.2 13.0 9.4 16.0 18.9 18.7 9.4 13.9 5.7 5.0
Fish 10.6 11.6 9.3 10.9 13.5 14.9 9.2 13.2 8.6 8.3
Total Consumption 41.7 41.4 36.6 46.7 52.3 49.2 38.6 49.1 35.7 34.5
Household characteristics
Household size 8.8 6.2 8.8 6.2 7.8 6.3 8.8 6.5 8.1 6.5
Household age 22.4 21.6 20.1 22.2 22.5 21.7 19.5 20.9 20.4 21.8
Head Age 49.7 42.2 50.2 43.4 54.3 42.8 47.7 42.9 51.5 42.2
Household education 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.5 2.7 1.8 2.7 1.8
Agricultural production
Rice productionb n/a n/a n/a n/a 93.2 57.7 148.2 73.7 128.9 65.6
Rice sales 44.9 23.3 n/a n/a 57.2 30.9 83 39 61.8 26.7
Corn productionc n/a n/a n/a n/a 129.2 61.3 104.9 72.3 47.9 37.2
Corn sales 24.0 8.8 n/a n/a 90.7 39.1 37.1 20.4 16.8 7.1
Plot sized 12.3 8.8 15.2 9.2 13.1 8.4 16.6 9.4 16.4 10.1
aValues deflated to 2006 prices
bin arrobas
cin mancornas
dsum of old-growth and fallow-forest; tareas
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A.3 Factor analysis and asset index
Table A.4: Factor analysis/correlation
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs. = 870
Method: principal factors Retained factors = 1
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 17
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 3.71410 2.70345 0.7959 0.7959
Factor2 1.01066 0.47873 0.2166 1.0125
Factor3 0.53193 0.22753 0.1140 1.1265
Factor4 0.30440 0.06685 0.0652 1.1917
Factor5 0.23755 0.11913 0.0509 1.2426
Factor6 0.11842 0.07890 0.0254 1.2680
Factor7 0.03952 0.03596 0.0085 1.2765
Factor8 0.00357 0.02701 0.0008 1.2772
Factor9 -0.02344 0.02751 -0.0050 1.2722
Factor10 -0.05095 0.02502 -0.0109 1.2613
Factor11 -0.07597 0.02074 -0.0163 1.2450
Factor12 -0.09671 0.04845 -0.0207 1.2243
Factor13 -0.14516 0.05694 -0.0311 1.1932
Factor14 -0.20210 0.00992 -0.0433 1.1499
Factor15 -0.21201 0.02055 -0.0454 1.1044
Factor16 -0.23256 0.02228 -0.0498 1.0546
Factor17 -0.25484 . -0.0546 1.0000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(136) = 3246.72 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.5: Factor loadings
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
axe 0.5847 0.6581
bike 0.3118 0.9028
bow 0.5488 0.6988
canoe 0.3286 0.8920
cow 0.2032 0.9587
hook 0.6264 0.6076
knife 0.6825 0.5342
machete 0.7359 0.4584
mosquito net 0.7432 0.4477
net 0.4197 0.8238
radio 0.4404 0.8061
rifle 0.2467 0.9392
shot gun 0.3764 0.8583
size plot 0.4562 0.7919
gift 0.1662 0.9724
nb speak Spanish 0.2399 0.9424
dummy math 0.0810 0.9934
Table A.6: Factor scores
Variable Factor1
axe 0.14333
bike 0.05572
bow 0.12669
canoe 0.05943
cow 0.03420
hook 0.16634
knife 0.20611
machete 0.25900
mosquito net 0.26783
net 0.08220
radio 0.08814
rifle 0.04237
shot gun 0.07076
size plot 0.09294
gift 0.02758
nb speak Spanish 0.04107
dummy math 0.01315
Table A.7: Summary statistics of variables used in parametric regressions
Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
Change asset index Change in asset index between two years 0.12 0.84
Lagged asset index Lagged value of the lagged asset index -0.06 1.11
Squared lagged asset index Squared value of the lagged asset index 1.23 2.60
Cubed lagged asset index Cubed value of the lagged asset index 1.59 11.52
Fourth degree lagged asset index Value of the lagged asset index at the fourth-degree
power
8.29 55.35
Age household head Age of household head over all years 43.94 16.95
Squared age household head Squared age of household head over all years 2218.30 1689.99
Education household head Average grade of household head over all years 2.51 2.74
Household size Average size of household over all years 6.70 2.85
Children Number of children in the households over all years 2.95 2.34
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Appendix B
Appendix Chapter Two
B.1 Household questionnaire, code-book and village ques-
tionnaire
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B.2 Summary descriptive, first-stage, OLS, reduced-forms
and labour shares regressions
Table B.1: Summary statistics of variables used in section2.5
Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
Dependent variables
Log Agric. prod Log of total household agricultural output value per
week in CFA Francs
9.78 1.12
Log NTFP prod Log of total household NTFP output value per week
in CFA Francs
7.62 1.38
Log of hunting production Log of total household hunting output per week in
CFA Francs
7.6 1.3
Log total time Log of weekly total time spent working in agriculture,
NTFP, off-farm and hunting
4.15 0.62
Explanatory variables in production functions
Log hours agriculture Log of total hours devoted to agriculture by house-
holds in a week
3.75 0.61
Log hours NTFPs Log of total hours devoted to NTFP by households in
a week
2.18 1.21
Log of hours hunting Log of total hours devoted to hunting by households
in a week
0.62 1.36
Log input expenditures Log of total input expenditures used in agricultural
production in CFA Francs
1.80 2.77
Log seed expenditures Log of expenditures in seeds in CFA Francs 5.84 4.14
Log land area Total area in hectares used for agricultural production 0.45 1.35
Ekouk Dummy if household collects ekouk 0.61 0.48
Ndo’o Dummy if household collects ndo’o 0.30 0.46
Distance to ndo’o Interaction term ndo’o and distance to ndo’o site; 1 if
far and 0 otherwise
.26 0.44
Palm Dummy if household extracts palm nuts 0.73 0.44
Distance to palm Interaction term palm and distance to palm site; 1 if
far and 0 otherwise
0.32 0.46
Equipment index Index of dummy variables for whether household has
a large equipment (chainsaw, motorbike, spray ...)
0.0075 0.66
Hunt with rifle Dummy if household hunts with a rifle 0.11 0.31
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Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
Interaction terms for translog
Log squared hours Log of squared hours in agriculture 14.43 4.64
Log squared input expenditures Log of total input expenditures used in agriculture 10.88 18.15
Log squared land size Log of squared of land agricultural area 2.04 6.01
Log square seed expenditures Log of squared value of seed expenditures 51.26 38.88
Log hours*expenditures Log of interaction terms between hours and input ex-
penditures
7.00 11.13
Log seed*land Log of interaction terms between seed and land area 2.96 9.22
Shadow wages and income
Log shadow wage (1) Log of predicted shadow wage in agriculture using re-
gression (3)
5.04 0.64
Log shadow wage (2) Log of predicted shadow wage in agriculture using re-
gression (4)
5.07 0.64
Log shadow income (1) Log of shadow income using regression (3) 9.73 0.72
Log shadow income (2) Log of shadow income using regression (4) 9.70 0.76
Household characteristics
Household size Number of household members 5.02 2.81
Wives Number of wives in household 0.83 0.55
Child Number of household members less than 15 years old 2.05 2.09
Ill adults Number of adult members ill during the last week 0.85 0.83
Age head Age of household head 50.30 15.33
Squared age head Squared age of household head 2765.10 1592.93
Bulu Dummy if household is Bulu 0.45 0.49
Ngoumba Dummy if household is Ngoumba 0.20 0.40
Average grade Average grade attained by all household members aged
15 or above
3.81 1.19
Maximum grade Maximum grade attained by all household members
aged 15 or above
4.69 1.89
Primary education Dummy if household average grade is primary school 0.30 0.46
Higher education Dummy if household average grade is higher education 0.18 0.39
Education head Average education of household head 3.87 1.91
Secondary education head Dummy if household head has secondary education 0.50 0.50
Distance field Distance between house and plot (minutes) 32.44 25.13
Non-labour income Dummy if household receives non-labour income 0.39 0.49
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Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
Total expenditures Household average expenditures in durable goods 40355.99 59911.64
Number sheep Number of sheep owned by households 0.12 1.13
Village control variables
Price cocoa District price of a bag of cocoa 44204.24 7111.70
Village input Village average value of input expenditures 10708.59 7245.87
Wage clearing Village average wage for clearing plot 1899.17 1857.88
Village ethnicity Dummy if village has more than 2 ethnicities 0.70 0.45
Village distance market Distance between village and market (km) 14.26 17.88
Village palm Dummy if village has more than 70% households ex-
tracting palm
0.59 0.49
More rain Dummy if village has more rain the last year 0.64 0.48
Mbango Dummy if household lives in Mbango-Bitouer 0.06 0.24
Ebom Dummy if household lives in Ebom 0.07 0.26
Mekalat Dummy if household lives in Mekalat 0.04 0.20
Bipindi Dummy if household lives in the village of Bipindi 0.17 0.38
Bidjouka Dummy if household lives in Bidjouka 0.09 0.29
Lambi Dummy if household lives in Lambi 0.05 0.22
Ebimimbang Dummy if household lives in Ebimimbang 0.10 0.30
Bongwana Dummy if household lives in Bongwana 0.04 0.19
Akom Dummy if household lives in the village of Akom II 0.11 0.31
Nkomakak Dummy if household lives in Nkomakak 0.04 0.20
Abiete Dummy if household lives in Abiete 0.05 0.22
Mvie Dummy if household lives in Mvie 0.04 0.20
Nyangong Dummy if household lives in Nyangong 0.11 0.32
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Table B.2: First-stage estimates of agricultural production function
Variables log hours agriculture log input expenditures log hours agriculture log input expenditures
(1) (1) (2) (2)
Household size 0.0682*** (0.0109) 0.0164 (0.0462) 0.0653*** (0.0110) 0.0216 (0.0466)
Equipment index 0.0173 (0.0501) 1.144*** (0.212) 0.0110 (0.0501) 1.154*** (0.213)
Log seed expenditures 0.00152 (0.00742) 0.127*** (0.0314) 0.00327 (0.00745) 0.122*** (0.0317)
Log land area 0.0668*** (0.0233) 0.277*** (0.0985) 0.0663*** (0.0232) 0.276*** (0.0985)
Age household head 0.00445** (0.00211) -0.0107 (0.00895)
Secondary education head 0.0327 (0.0642) 0.103 (0.273)
Mbango -0.102 (0.153) -0.000826 (0.650) -0.146 (0.154) 0.116 (0.656)
Ebom 0.00614 (0.142) 1.096* (0.602) -0.0143 (0.142) 1.152* (0.603)
Mekalat 0.00833 (0.171) 1.312* (0.724) -0.00173 (0.171) 1.373* (0.726)
Bipindi -0.0742 (0.118) 0.452 (0.498) -0.0908 (0.118) 0.462 (0.501)
Bidjouka -0.0801 (0.133) -0.187 (0.565) -0.0965 (0.133) -0.156 (0.566)
Lambi -0.279* (0.157) -0.771 (0.667) -0.303* (0.158) -0.737 (0.669)
Ebimimbang -0.0330 (0.130) -0.345 (0.550) -0.0456 (0.130) -0.300 (0.551)
Bongwana -0.0715 (0.176) -0.876 (0.744) -0.0698 (0.175) -0.873 (0.744)
Akom 0.0467 (0.128) -0.304 (0.541) 0.0225 (0.129) -0.288 (0.546)
Nkomakak -0.0835 (0.169) -1.255* (0.718) -0.163 (0.174) -1.123 (0.741)
Abiete -0.102 (0.161) -1.027 (0.682) -0.115 (0.161) -0.995 (0.683)
Mvie 0.224 (0.166) -1.292* (0.704) 0.173 (0.167) -1.175* (0.712)
Constant 3.409*** (0.106) 0.954** (0.450) 3.194*** (0.149) 1.405** (0.634)
Observations 384 384 384 384
R-squared 0.144 0.243 0.154 0.247
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.3: First-stage estimates of NTFP production function
Household time in NTFP extraction
Household size 0.0880*** (0.0190) 0.0864*** (0.0192)
Ill adults 0.182*** (0.0643) 0.189*** (0.0649)
Ekouk 0.274** (0.118) 0.291** (0.119)
Ndo’o 0.911*** (0.244) 0.915*** (0.244)
Age household head -0.000137 (0.00379)
Secondary education head 0.105 (0.115)
Distance ndo’o 0.560** (0.242) 0.550** (0.243)
Mbango -0.938*** (0.282) -0.916*** (0.287)
Ebom 0.760*** (0.258) 0.772*** (0.259)
Mekalat -0.137 (0.365) -0.137 (0.367)
Bipindi 0.313 (0.206) 0.296 (0.207)
Bidjouka 0.298 (0.231) 0.300 (0.232)
Lambi -0.298 (0.269) -0.296 (0.270)
Ebimimbang 0.253 (0.215) 0.265 (0.216)
Bongwana 0.0602 (0.291) 0.0662 (0.292)
Akom 0.0919 (0.209) 0.0622 (0.213)
Nkomakak -0.109 (0.298) -0.135 (0.310)
Abiete -0.249 (0.277) -0.235 (0.278)
Mvie 0.439 (0.271) 0.434 (0.275)
Constant 0.807*** (0.197) 0.755*** (0.275)
Observations 304 304
R-squared 0.478 0.480
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.4: Hunting production function OLS
Log of hunting production
Hours hunting 0.600*** 0.0721)
Rifle hunt 0.685*** (0.215)
Palm 0.542* (0.286)
Distance to palm 0.361* (0.192)
Ebom 0.826 (0.540)
Mekalat 0.412 (0.565)
Bipindi 0.565 (0.553)
Bidjouka 0.490 (0.542)
Ebimimbang 1.078** (0.523)
Bongwana 0.735 (0.614)
Akom 0.723 (0.544)
Nkomakak 1.629* (0.897)
Abiete 0.0732 (0.571)
Mvie 0.962 (0.586)
Nyangong 0.121 (0.519)
Constant 5.859*** (0.514)
Observations 150
R-squared 0.484
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure B.1: Total time and time spent in different activities (hours per adult)
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Table B.6: Reduced form for total labour supply estimations
Variables Log total time Log total time
Child 0.0480** (0.0235) 0.0148 (0.0285)
Wives 0.225*** (0.0578) 0.211*** (0.0576)
Ill adults 0.0838** (0.0380)
Dependency ratio -0.186 (0.176) -0.0665 (0.201)
Average age -0.000921 (0.0152)
Squared age -6.13e-05 (0.000165)
Age head 0.0345*** (0.0109) 0.0345*** (0.0123)
Squared age head -0.000329*** (0.000107) -0.000304*** (0.000113)
Maximum grade 0.115*** (0.0430) 0.105** (0.0437)
Primary education 0.0835 (0.120) 0.107 (0.121)
High education -0.0967 (0.158) -0.0888 (0.158)
Education head -0.0779** (0.0337) -0.0686** (0.0340)
Secondary education head 0.0659 (0.117) 0.0903 (0.117)
Ngoumba -0.0166 (0.120) -0.0243 (0.119)
Bulu 0.277** (0.129) 0.272** (0.129)
Distance field -0.00237* (0.00124) -0.00230* (0.00124)
Village ethnicity -0.0385 (0.218) 0.00703 (0.219)
Village distance market -0.00224 (0.00360) -0.00204 (0.00360)
Village palm 0.0402 (0.168) 0.0925 (0.169)
Village road -0.378** (0.168) -0.398** (0.169)
District price manioc 8.32e-05 (0.000192) 8.19e-05 (0.000193)
Ebom 0.203 (0.265) 0.176 (0.265)
Bipindi 0.124 (0.188) 0.123 (0.188)
Bidjouka 0.250 (0.211) 0.262 (0.211)
Ebimimbang 0.0224 (0.175) -0.0256 (0.175)
Nkomakak -0.198 (0.222) -0.171 (0.221)
Akom 0.205 (0.221) 0.186 (0.220)
Abiete -0.235 (0.179) -0.211 (0.180)
Constant 2.706*** (0.806) 2.647*** (0.839)
Observations 374 374
R-squared 0.233 0.251
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.7: Summary statistics of variables used in section 2.6
Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
Dependent variables
Agri - Log (earnings/hours) Quotient of agricultural production over hours worked 6.03 1.15
NTFP - Log (earnings/hours) Quotient of NTFP production over hours worked 5.44 1.47
Off-farm - Log (earnings/hours) Quotient of off-farm earnings over hours worked 6.60 1.39
Hunting - Log (earnings/hours) Quotient of hunting earnings over hours worked 6.98 1.31
NTFP - Participation Participation to NTFP extraction 0.79 0.40
Off-farm -Participation Participation to off-farm activities 0.48 0.50
Hunting -Participation Participation to hunting activities 0.42 0.49
Hours agriculture Total of household weekly hours spent in agriculture 51.26 33.67
Hours NTFP Total of household weekly hours spent in NTFPs ac-
tivities
14.43 25.61
Hours Off-farm Total of household weekly hours spent in off-farm off-
forest activities
9.37 16.2
Hours hunting Total of household weekly hours spent in hunting ac-
tivities
1.78 5.29
Agriculture share (w1) Share of time spent in agriculture over total time spent
working in a week
0.71 0.21
NTFP share (w2) Share of time spent in NTFPs activities over total time
spent working in a week
0.15 0.16
Off-farm share (w3) Share of time spent in off-farm off-forest activities over
total time spent working in a week
0.11 0.17
Hunting share (w4) Share of time spent in hunting over total time spent
working in a week
0.02 0.05
Shadow wages
Agricultural shadow wage (2) Predicted shadow wage in agriculture using regression
(4)
482.09 326.47
NTFP shadow wage (1) Predicted shadow wage in NTFP using Heckman
model (1)
510.00 544.61
NTFP shadow wage (2) Predicted shadow wage in NTFP using Heckman
model (3)
475.15 482.80
Shadow wage off-farm (1) Predicted shadow wage in off-farm off-forest activities
using Heckman model (2)
1381.96 966.73
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Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
Shadow wage off-farm (2) Predicted shadow wage in off-farm off-forest activities
using Heckman model (4)
1807.15 1139.45
Log of agriculture shadow wage Log of shadow wage in agriculture using regression (4) 6.02 0.50
Log of NTFP shadow wage Log of shadow wage in NTFP using Heckman model
(1)
5.95 0.67
Log of off-farm shadow wage Log of shadow wage in off-farm off-forest using Heck-
man model (2)
7.01 0.67
Log of hunting shadow wage Log of shadow wage in hunting using Heckman model
(5)
7.78 0.66
Explanatory factors
Children at school Number of children still at school 1.49 1.74
Wives Number of wives in household 0.83 0.55
Child Number of household members less than 15 years old 2.05 2.09
Dependency ratio Ratio of children and elder on household size 0.38 0.27
Ill adults Number of adult members ill during the last week 0.85 0.83
Age head Age of household head 50.30 15.33
Squared age head Squared age of household head 2765.10 1592.93
Head aged less than 30 Dummy if household head is less than 30 years old 0.09 0.29
Head aged [31;55] Dummy if household head is between 31 and 55 years
old
0.53 0.50
Household age less than 20 Dummy if household average age is less than 20 years
old
0.28 0.45
Household age [21;40] Dummy if household average age is between 21 and 40
years old
0.48 0.50
Education head Average education of household head 3.87 1.91
Secondary education head Dummy if household head has secondary education 0.50 0.50
Literacy head Dummy if household head can read and write 0.90 0.29
Average grade Average grade attained by all household members aged
15 or above
3.81 1.19
Primary education Dummy if household average grade is primary school 0.30 0.46
Secondary education Dummy if household average grade is secondary school 0.51 0.50
Higher education Dummy if household average grade is higher education 0.18 0.39
Bulu Dummy if household is Bulu 0.45 0.49
Ngoumba Dummy if household is Ngoumba 0.20 0.40
Area Size of agricultural land 2.50 2.19
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Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
Livestock dummy Dummy if household has dummy from animal raising 0.69 0.46
Non-labour income Ratio of non-labour income over total production 0.02 0.09
Tontine Dummy if household participates to a tontine 0.55 0.49
Palm Dummy if household extracts palm nuts 0.73 0.44
Self employment Dummy if household is self-employed 0.33 0.47
Wage skilled Interaction term between participating in a wage ac-
tivity and activity is skilled activity
0.04 0.19
Distance field Distance between house and plot (minutes) 32.44 25.13
Household asset Value of household assets and expenditures in durable
goods
113063.3 390474.8
Village variables
District price cocoa District price of a bag of cocoa 44204.24 7111.70
Village wage clearing Village average wage for clearing plot 1899.17 1857.88
District price manioc District price of a filet of manioc 3628.12 403.37
District price cucumber District price of a bag of cucumber 17340.28 6303.96
Village electricity Dummy if village has more than 5 households with
electricity
0.56 0.49
Village ethnicity Dummy if village has more than 2 ethnicities 0.70 0.45
Village distance market Distance between village and market (km) 14.26 17.88
Village palm Dummy if village has more than 70% households ex-
tracting palm
0.59 0.49
More rain Dummy if village has more rain the last year 0.64 0.48
Mbango Dummy if household lives in Mbango-Bitouer 0.06 0.24
Ebom Dummy if household lives in Ebom 0.07 0.26
Mekalat Dummy if household lives in Mekalat 0.04 0.20
Bipindi Dummy if household lives in the village of Bipindi 0.17 0.38
Bidjouka Dummy if household lives in Bidjouka 0.09 0.29
Lambi Dummy if household lives in Lambi 0.05 0.22
Ebimimbang Dummy if household lives in Ebimimbang 0.10 0.30
Bongwana Dummy if household lives in Bongwana 0.04 0.19
Akom Dummy if household lives in the village of Akom II 0.11 0.31
Nkomakak Dummy if household lives in Nkomakak 0.04 0.20
Abiete Dummy if household lives in Abiete 0.05 0.22
Mvie Dummy if household lives in Mvie 0.04 0.20
Nyangong Dummy if household lives in Nyangong 0.11 0.32
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Table B.9: NTFP, off-farm and hunting shadow wages by quintiles of total time
Quintiles NTFP Off-farm off-forest Hunting
shadow wage (3) shadow wage (4) shadow wage (5)
Lowest 692.1 1780.8 12153.3
2nd 493.7 1730.3 8456.9
3rd 463.8 1909.6 8851.7
4th 408.5 1751.3 8929.9
Highest 312.7 1852.2 7230.8
Total 475.1 1807.1 9137.2
Table B.10: OLS and Tobit regressions for labour allocations
Variables Hours Agriculture Hours NTFP Hours off-farm
Shadow wage agriculture 0.00489 (0.0220) -0.0152 (0.0262) 0.0306 (0.0353)
Shadow wage NTFP -0.00512 (0.00556) -0.00406 (0.00671) -0.00682 (0.0126)
Shadow wage off-farm -0.001000 (0.00275) -0.000553 (0.00222) 0.00318 (0.00275)
Children 2.349** (0.976) 0.889 (1.005) -0.897 (0.746)
Wives 13.05*** (3.810) 7.953** (3.156) 2.488 (2.355)
Age head 2.190*** (0.494) 0.760 (0.646) 0.469 (0.547)
Squared age head -0.0183*** (0.00465) -0.00807 (0.00570) -0.00903 (0.00572)
Average grade 3.782(2.633) -0.0345 (2.387) 2.734 (1.998)
Primary education 0.542 (6.442) -3.012 (5.451) 1.927 (4.815)
Higher education 4.615 (8.314) 12.92 (10.97) 11.16* (5.944)
Education head -4.103* (2.232) -2.520 (2.849) -3.169** (1.425)
Secondary educ head 1.104 (6.961) 1.590 (7.332) 1.851 (5.099)
Ngoumba -7.935 (5.165) 6.448 (5.048) 3.440 (5.783)
Bulu 11.82 (8.798) 11.01** (5.453) 1.657 (5.205)
Distance field -0.151** (0.0662) 0.0146 (0.0758) -0.0571 (0.0588)
Village ethnicity 17.82 (16.99) 0.493 (12.43) 1.164 (14.68)
Village distance market 0.239 (0.310) -0.111 (0.269) 0.115 (0.255)
More rain 2.906 (14.86) 17.10 (12.17) -0.282 (11.68)
Mbango -4.408 (35.07) 4.702 (33.55) -72.46 (45.58)
Ebom -19.65** (9.748) -2.118 (11.97) -15.24 (10.26)
Mekalat 9.279 (20.57) -24.59 (17.29) -17.54 (18.32)
Bipindi 2.870 (9.353) 8.355 (8.489) -20.09* (11.57)
Bidjouka 3.238 (12.59) 8.981 (8.903) -5.875 (10.57)
Ebimimbang -4.387 (8.962) 3.426 (7.790) -5.175 (7.690)
Bongwana 1.131 (12.04) 1.373 (8.911) -13.29* (7.598)
Mvie 8.415 (15.87) 6.298 (13.29) -4.274 (14.73)
Abiete -6.984 (12.75) -21.88** (11.09) 22.79* (12.03)
Constant -37.73 (24.66) -13.52 (24.77) -10.12 (22.75)
Observations 375 375 374
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.11: First-stage results for labour allocations
Variables Shadow wage Agriculture Shadow wage NTFP Shadow wage off-farm
Shadow wage agriculture 0.200 (0.702) -5.508*** (0.958)
Shadow wage NTFP 0.0150 (0.0543) 0.491 (0.396)
Shadow wage off-farm -0.0531*** (0.00509) 0.0678** (0.0320)
Livestock dummy -10.67* (6.202)
Village price of cucumber 0.0969*** (0.00401)
Village wage clearing -0.0664 (0.0467)
Price of cocoa -0.0265*** (0.00883)
Child -5.365*** (1.413) -19.98*** (7.693) -13.70 (12.74)
Wives 1.700 (3.779) 23.61 (16.40) -20.22 (50.62)
Age head 0.536 (0.960) 1.820 (3.098) 16.51** (7.365)
Squared age head -0.0170* (0.00986) -0.0578* (0.0317) -0.111 (0.0788)
Average grade -1.872 (5.296) -18.17 (13.58) 25.86 (58.23)
Primary education -6.599 (17.79) 219.5*** (35.29) -301.0** (132.4)
Higher education -65.87*** (13.33) -42.44 (43.78) -686.1*** (130.2)
Education head 4.933 (3.128) -6.468 (9.078) -52.89 (33.14)
Secondary education head -4.293 (12.78) -16.83 (34.36) -70.84 (97.87)
Ngoumba 34.99** (16.19) -82.49 (67.80) 91.75 (130.7)
Bulu -14.91 (10.11) 108.9 (97.32)
Distance field 0.173 (0.144) -0.102 (0.405) 0.232 (1.151)
Village ethnicity -511.4*** (20.77) 195.3 (295.3) 2743*** (343.6)
Village distance market -35.33*** (1.486) 3.549 (4.039) 47.98*** (7.100)
More rain 454.1*** (26.75) -517.0* (264.2) -1645*** (324.4)
Mbango -401.5** (162.4) 1886* (1013) 4993*** (1137)
Ebom -269.5*** (34.43) 160.3 (175.4) 1072*** (270.2)
Mekalat -907.8*** (70.25) 782.6** (361.3) 2857*** (412.1)
Bipindi 415.9*** (15.20) -166.9 (242.5) 1282*** (301.6)
Lambi 351.6*** (22.90)
Bidjouka 404.0*** (26.05) -1237*** (312.5)
Ebimimbang 235.5*** (13.20) 62.90 (79.30) -287.3** (122.2)
Mvie 116.6 (274.3) 289*** (324.2)
Abiete 235.2** (114.5) 739.9*** (207.1)
Bongwana -21.66* (12.50) 23.48 (52.52)
Constant -592.4*** (67.38) 535.7* (313.3) 2529*** (549.5)
Observations 375 375 374
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.12: Reduced form for labour allocation estimations
Variables Hours Agriculture Hours NTFP Hours off-farm Hours hunting
Child 2.612* (1.493) 1.501 (1.353) -0.202 (1.084) 0.442 (0.498)
Wives 12.56*** (3.736) 7.937** (3.173) 1.702 (2.360) 4.148*** (1.199)
Dependency ratio -4.127 (9.165) -6.239 (7.315) -7.543 (8.508) -7.509** (3.610)
Age head 1.950*** (0.493) 0.565 (0.722) 0.126 (0.555) -0.444 (0.296)
Squared age head -0.0164*** (0.00481) -0.00589 (0.00641) -0.00575 (0.00581) 0.00256 (0.00272)
Maximum grade 6.358*** (2.420) 4.385* (2.304) 0.906 (1.976) 0.499 (0.803)
Primary education 7.244 (6.756) 3.903 (6.242) -0.335 (5.191) 3.781* (2.060)
Higher education -6.781 (9.030) 3.093 (10.34) 7.813 (7.117) -1.695 (3.191)
Education head -4.803** (2.363) -3.703 (2.877) -2.450* (1.459) -0.557 (0.695)
Secondary education head 3.793 (7.091) 3.774 (7.613) 1.231 (4.980) 2.368 (1.973)
Ngoumba -6.992 (5.178) 6.071 (4.821) 3.508 (5.419) 1.878 (1.932)
Bulu 12.76 (8.436) 13.05** (5.895) 0.433 (5.063) -1.333 (3.695)
Distance field -0.159** (0.0654) 0.000260 (0.0741) -0.0625 (0.0575) 0.0537** (0.0226)
Wage skilled -14.68* (7.979) -14.72**(6.100) -0.140 (2.324)
Tontine 4.968 (3.562) 3.779 (2.547) 5.703* (3.116) 2.962** (1.310)
Village ethnicity 3.381 (13.07) 7.864 (9.342) -19.78* (11.58) 1.202 (2.043)
Village distance market 0.0173 (0.166) -0.256* (0.147) 0.164 (0.164) 0.0103 (0.0549)
Village palm -4.389 (9.502) 6.846 (6.790) 7.410 (7.479) -1.977 (2.096)
Village road -4.625 (9.954) -31.30*** (7.282) 11.40 (7.633) -8.897** (3.701)
District price manioc 0.00353 (0.00999) -0.00674 (0.00811) 0.0337*** (0.0125) -0.0117** (0.00583)
Mbango 0 (0) -60.95 (0)
Ebom -6.746 (13.48) 9.581 (12.78) 23.94 (14.70)
Bipindi 1.818 (11.46) 13.85* (7.364) -4.295 (8.755) 1.387 (4.282)
Lambi 0 (0) 4.166 (5.129)
Bidjouka 2.243 (12.11) 22.03** (9.137) -3.391 (9.046) 4.610 (4.849)
Ebimimbang 2.542 (9.549) -4.387 (6.372) 1.909 (8.525) -0.111 (2.782)
Nkomakak -9.508 (12.23) 8.434 (11.01) -11.85 (10.63)
Akom 4.801 (12.39) 15.31 (9.713) 12.08 (10.33) 8.040** (3.669)
Abiete -15.66** (6.746) -24.22*** (6.398) 17.22* (9.394) -3.695 (2.507)
Constant -40.36 (43.12) 5.623 (40.94) -114.6** (47.70) 52.20** (25.57)
Observations 375 375 374 375
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.13: Estimation results for labour allocations in a 3sls
Variables Hours agriculture Hours NTFP Hours Off-farm Hours hunting
Shadow wage agriculture 0.356 (0.418) -0.322 (0.333) 0.423 (0.315) 0.0145 (0.0571)
Shadow wage NTFP -0.00958 (0.0109) 0.00388 (0.00866) -0.00789 (0.00819) 0.000540 (0.00148)
Shadow wage off-farm 0.0173 (0.0222) -0.0175 (0.0177) 0.0223 (0.0168) 0.000531 (0.00304)
Children 4.293* (2.487) -0.653 (1.980) 1.788 (1.874) 0.133 (0.339)
Wives 12.48*** (3.731) 6.979** (2.972) 0.633 (2.812) 1.303** (0.509)
Age head 1.948*** (0.697) 0.613 (0.555) -0.0832 (0.525) -0.251*** (0.0951)
Squared age head -0.0115 (0.00975) -0.0104 (0.00776) 0.00377 (0.00735) 0.00203 (0.00133)
Average grade 4.699 (3.171) -1.477 (2.525) 2.376 (2.390) 0.364 (0.433)
Primary education 2.274 (7.396) -6.665 (5.890) 4.587 (5.574) 0.603 (1.009)
Higher education 27.58 (28.80) -8.017 (22.94) 31.90 (21.71) 0.674 (3.931)
Education head -5.908** (3.008) -0.793 (2.395) -4.015* (2.267) -0.381 (0.410)
Secondary educ head 2.223 (7.514) -0.210 (5.984) 4.193 (5.663) 0.872 (1.025)
Ngoumba -20.22 (16.39) 15.53 (13.05) -14.65 (12.35) -0.0644 (2.237)
Bulu 17.03 (10.36) 5.956 (8.252) 7.098 (7.809) -1.203 (1.414)
Distance field -0.216** (0.109) 0.110 (0.0868) -0.111 (0.0821) 0.0343** (0.0149)
Village ethnicity -282.4 (318.6) 114.4 (114.0) -221.8 (178.9) -5.990 (43.48)
Village distance market -4.716 (5.251) 1.730 (1.853) -3.559 (2.938) -0.0936 (0.717)
More rain 128.3 (153.6) 23.06 (20.53) 66.90 (55.10) 10.12 (20.96)
Mbango -381.2 (453.8) 352.7 (380.1) -474.1 (350.1) -23.50 (61.93)
Ebom -26.59 (24.30) 56.80 (64.54) -55.47 (37.72) -5.125 (3.316)
Mekalat -252.9 (286.6) 114.0 (135.0) -229.4 (175.2) -8.958 (39.11)
Bipindi 0 (0) 132.0 (140.5) -89.56 (62.08) 0 (0)
Lambi 70.33 (86.50) 62.64 (79.60) 0 (0) 2.068 (11.80)
Bidjouka 178.3 (205.8) 0 (0) 101.0 (83.69) 6.775 (28.09)
Ebimimbang 31.24 (35.35) 7.243 (13.61) 9.291 (13.57) -4.518 (4.824)
Bongwana 40.06 (42.38) -7.748 (14.03) 18.14 (22.52) -2.086 (5.784)
Nkomakak -143.7 (131.4) 102.0 (111.6) -122.2 (102.1) 1.509 (17.94)
Mvie -262.6 (291.6) 122.7 (120.4) -215.2 (170.8) -8.352 (39.79)
Abiete -174.2 (172.1) 21.69 (40.41) -89.00 (87.11) -5.295 (23.49)
Observations 374 374 374 374
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.14: Reduced forms for labour allocations in a 3sls
Variables Hours agriculture Hours NTFP Hours Off-farm Hours hunting
Child 2.641** (1.266) 1.814* (0.946) -0.517 (0.625) 0.360* (0.199)
Wives 12.55*** (3.121) 6.649*** (2.331) 1.132 (1.538) 1.165** (0.491)
Dependency ratio -4.263 (9.534) -8.396 (7.121) 0.123 (4.702) -3.330** (1.501)
Age head 1.908*** (0.596) 0.247 (0.445) 0.0775 (0.294) -0.348*** (0.0938)
Squared age head -0.0159*** (0.00585) -0.00305 (0.00437) -0.00295 (0.00289) 0.00276*** (0.000921)
Maximum grade 6.376*** (2.329) 3.038* (1.739) 0.866 (1.147) 0.292 (0.367)
Primary education 7.002 (6.469) 1.873 (4.832) 1.765 (3.192) 1.100 (1.018)
Higher education -7.121 (8.539) 5.331 (6.378) 2.741 (4.207) -1.073 (1.344)
Education head -4.767*** (1.835) -3.355** (1.370) -1.641* (0.904) -0.211 (0.289)
Secondary education head 3.497 (6.333) 3.111 (4.730) 2.401 (3.125) 0.856 (0.997)
Ngoumba -7.105 (6.493) 4.292 (4.850) -0.112 (3.204) 0.343 (1.022)
Bulu 12.69* (7.021) 12.52** (5.244) -0.0585 (3.457) -1.349 (1.105)
Distance field -0.160** (0.0674) 0.0421 (0.0504) -0.0365 (0.0331) 0.0358*** (0.0106)
Wage skilled -13.73 (8.465) -14.15** (6.314) -0.593 (1.333)
Tontine 4.864 (3.448) 3.184 (2.576) 2.929* (1.699) 1.179** (0.543)
Village ethnicity 7.384 (7.552) 13.27** (5.641) 0.812 (3.728) -1.333 (1.189)
Village distance market 0.218 (0.246) -0.0310 (0.184) 0.106 (0.122) 0.0226 (0.0388)
Village palm -15.26** (7.410) 3.398 (5.534) 6.711* (3.657) 1.127 (1.166)
Village road -11.60 (8.868) -12.94* (6.624) 1.394 (4.376) 0.771 (1.396)
District price manioc -0.00552 (0.00485) -0.00133 (0.00362) 0.00166 (0.00239) 0.00199*** (0.000764)
More rain -9.282 (8.311) -7.121 (6.208) -1.663 (4.081) 2.544* (1.308)
Mbango -3.926 (10.55) -4.074 (7.879) 0.917 (5.207) -1.021 (1.660)
Bipindi 1.842 (7.007) -4.683 (5.234) 2.042 (3.448) -0.331 (1.103)
Lambi 10.05 (11.17) -17.97** (8.342) 1.829 (5.494) -1.907 (1.758)
Ebimimbang 12.36 (11.01) -4.057 (8.224) -0.0764 (5.430) -2.937* (1.733)
Akom 20.39** (9.463) 5.109 (7.068) -0.543 (4.671) 1.485 (1.489)
Mvie 10.20 (13.47) 9.165 (10.06) 1.042 (6.643) -1.235 (2.120)
Abiete -6.699 (12.07) -13.25 (9.012) 14.70** (5.951) -2.313 (1.899)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.15: Estimations of labour shares in all four activities using template by Urzu´a
(2010)
Agriculture (w1) NTFPs (w2) Off-forest (w3) Hunting (w4)
Log shadow
wage agricul-
ture
0.0154 (0.0281) -0.0017 (0.00131) -0.0111 (0.0373) -0.0025 (0.0233)
Log shadow
wage NTFP
0.0229 (0.0215) 0.0040*** (0.0007) -0.0305 (0.0226) 0.00350 (0.0076)
Log shadow
wage off-farm
-0.0002 (0.0069) -0.0001 (0.0006) 0.00066 (0.007) -0.00028 (0.0004)
Log shadow
wage huntinga
-0.0381* (0.02272) -0.0021 (0.0014) -0.0385 (0.0240) -0.0006 (0.0246)
Children -0.0609*** (0.0183) 0.0526 (0.0411) 0.0078 (0.0486) 0.0004*** (0.0001)
Age head 0.0001 (0.0059) -0.0026 (0.0314) 0.0047 (0.0319) -0.0021*** (0.0006)
Primary educa-
tion
-0.0104 (0.0138) 0.0077 (0.0102) 0.0014 (0.0173) 0.0012** (0.0005)
Secondary edu-
cation
0.0040 (0.0105) 0.0371 (0.0301) -0.0416 (0.0332) 0.0004*** (0.0001)
Secondary
educ head
0.0040 (0.0034) 0.0004 (0.0230) -0.00442 (0.0232)
Distance field 0.0043 (0.0052) 0.0053 (0.007) -0.0097 (0.0091)
Village dis-
tance market
0.0005 (0.004) 0.0244 (0.0305) -0.025 (0.0309)
Constant 0.5835*** (0.0655) 0.0611 (0.0500) 0.3070*** (0.0529) 0.0482***(0.0162)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
aShadow wage for hunting has been calculated following the same Heckman model as used to estimate
the shadow wage in NTFPs and off-farm off-forest activities.
